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Abstract
China is widely recognised as the world’s factory. Besides providing low-cost production,
firms are highly flexible and find various ways to react to changing markets, thereby
serving them quickly. The research objectives of this work were firstly to understand
how informal modes of interactions in customer and producer relations contribute to
greater flexibility of firms in China, and secondly to find out whether this is a transitional
phenomenon. The Greater Pearl River Delta (GPRD), consisting of Hong Kong (HK)
and the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone (PRD), a part of the Guangdong province,
were chosen as the research region due to the two distinct institutional environments
there.
The issues of why changing value chain patterns increase the need for firm flexibility
and how firms can cope with it by applying informal modes of governance were addressed
in a conceptual discussion. It was questioned whether informality serves as a substitute
for missing formal rules in transitional economies or as a complement to smooth business
operations. Two standardised surveys of electronic firms in HK and the PRD were
conducted in order to study informal interactions with customers and producers.
The surveys revealed that both HK and PRD electronics firms are integrated into
modular value chains and are subject to the global pressure for flexibility. HK firms are
directly connected to leading global firms via market relationships, whereas firms in the
PRD serve as producers for HK firms in hierarchical relationships. Governance modes
were determined by the distinct institutional setting. Going beyond the governance
modes, HK firms combine formal and informal modes in recruiting, contracting and
enforcing processes with customers and producers. This enhances their pool of coping
strategies when market changes occur and flexibility is needed. Additionally, the more
informal contracts are, the less time is needed before the production process can start,
which again increases the speed to market of HK firms.
This work showed that informal interactions enhance the flexibility of firms in an
incomplete institutional setting, and, to a lesser extent, also in a complete institutional
setting. In order to understand the complex Asian business model, this research topic
requires further attention.
Key Words: Regional Economic Development (R11), Institutional Economics (B52),
China (O53)
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Kurzzusammenfassung
China ist bekannt als Fabrik der Welt. Neben Kostenersparnissen in der Produktion
sind Firmen in China hochflexibel und ko¨nnen auf verschiedensten Wegen schnell auf
Marktvera¨nderungen reagieren. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit war erstens zu verstehen wie
informelle Interaktionen in Kunden- und Produzentenbeziehungen zu einer ho¨heren Fle-
xibilita¨t der Firmen beitragen und zweitens zu analysieren ob dieses ein voru¨bergehendes
Pha¨nomen der Transformation ist. Das Große Perlflussdelta (GPRD), bestehend aus
Hongkong (HK) und dem Perlflussdelta (PRD) in der Provinz Guangdong, diente als
Untersuchungsregion aufgrund der zwei unterschiedlichen institutionellen Umfelder.
In einem konzeptionellen Rahmen wurde diskutiert, warum eine Vera¨nderung der
Wertscho¨pfungsketten die Nachfrage nach Flexibilita¨t der Firmen erho¨ht und wie in-
formelle Handlungen zur Flexibilita¨t beitragen. Es wurde hinterfragt, ob Informalita¨t
eher als Substitut fu¨r fehlende Formalita¨t in der Gesetzgebung steht oder als Komple-
ment zum reibungslosen Ablauf von Gescha¨ftsaktivita¨ten. Zur empirischen U¨berpru¨fung
wurden zwei standardisierte Unternehmensbefragungen in der Elektronikindustrie in HK
und im PRD durchgefu¨hrt.
Die Befragungen zeigten, dass sowohl Elektronikunternehmen in HK als auch im PRD
in modulare Wertscho¨pfungsketten integriert sind und damit dem globalen Druck nach
Flexibilita¨t unterliegen. HK Unternehmen sind durch Marktbeziehungen direkt mit glob-
alen Playern vernetzt. Firmen im PRD sind durch hierarchisch organisierte Produzen-
tenbeziehungen an HK Unternehmen gebunden. Der unterschiedliche Entwicklungsstand
der Institutionen in Regionen der Kunden und Produzenten bestimmt maßgeblich die
Organisationsform. Eine detaillierte Analyse zeigte, dass HK Unternehmen formelle
und informelle Handlungen kombinieren, wenn sie Kunden und Produzenten rekrutieren,
Vertra¨ge abschließen und durchsetzen. Diese Vielfalt an Optionen erho¨ht ihre Flexibilita¨t
auf Marktvera¨nderungen zu reagieren. Außerdem konnte empirisch gezeigt werden, dass
informelle Vertra¨ge den Zeitverlust bis Produktionsbeginn verringern, was eine schnelle
Markteinfu¨hrung von Produkten beschleunigt. Um das komplexe Unternehmensmodell
in Asien zu verstehen, verdient dieses Forschungsfeld jedoch weitere Aufmerksamkeit.
Schlagwo¨rter: Regionalwirtschaftliche Entwicklung (R11), Institutioneno¨konomik (B52),
China (O53)
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background Information and Necessity of Research
The global impact of China as one of the world’s leading production engines is growing.
An increasing number of goods on the world market are produced in China. The Greater
Pearl River Delta (GPRD), consisting of Hong Kong (HK) and the Pearl River Delta
Economic Zone (PRD), part of the southern Chinese province of Guangdong, is to a large
extent responsible for the economic growth and increasing prosperity of China. Since the
implementation of the Chinese opening policy in 1979, the country has attracted foreign
investments from HK and, more recently, from Taiwanese and Western firms. Due to its
proximity to HK, the PRD served as an experimental zone for Chinese policy makers to
coordinate foreign interests. Low production costs were the initial motivation for foreign
firms to invest in or source from the GPRD. Today, the PRD is one of China’s most
important economic centres. The economic power of the GPRD results from the intensive
interaction between HK and the PRD. Meanwhile, the GPRD is exposed to intense
competition from other countries and regions which also offer attractive production
conditions for global firms. Moreover, production costs in the GPRD are rising due
to higher wages, higher land prices, higher electricity costs, etc. Although some firms
have relocated operations to other countries, the majority of firms continue to source
or set up production facilities in the GPRD. The trend has decelerated as a result of
the economic crisis in 2008, but is still obvious. Firms in the GPRD seem to be able
to maintain their competitiveness on the world market despite severe competition and
higher production costs (Federation of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI) 2007;
Federation of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI) 2003; Enright et al. 2005).
The new challenge of serving leading global firms provides explanations. In times of
made-to-order production, shorter product life cycles, smaller batch sizes, high market
volatility and especially mass production, a flexible firm and network organisation is
required in order to provide speed in the production process and the necessary ability
to rearrange the production process (Volberda 1996). Besides cost cutting and up-
grading pressure, the flexibility of firms is crucial for their integration into global value
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chains. The model of flexible specialisation and the just-in-time concept addressed this
new global challenge for the first time. Although some research exists about the means
of achieving flexibility (for example small-batch production, economies of scope, flexible
machines, specialisation), the contribution of informal modes in interactions with busi-
ness partners to smooth relations is still underrepresented in the economic geography
literature. This work aims to explain how firms in the GPRD have adapted their busi-
ness organisation, especially their customer and producer relations, in order to build a
flexible production network which is capable of ensuring their competitive advantage.
The concept of this work acknowledges the call of Yeung (2007) and Yeung and
Lin (2003) for a research agenda on Asian business that integrates micro-level analysis
of intra-firm governance and macro-level influences of institutional settings as well as
global production networks. Existing literature studies the growth and success of firms
in China and especially of the firms in the PRD (Enright et al. 2005; Berger and
Lester 1997). Moreover, Asia-specific literature provides insights into the peculiarities
of Asian businesses, such as informal institutions in guanxi networks (Gipouloux 2000;
Xin and Pearce 1996; Zhang and Zhang 2006).
The informal ties which ease and smooth relations between business partners seem
to play a significant role in firm organisation. The concept of informalisation does
not refer to illegality or the informal sector. It goes beyond that and touches on the
personal elements of interactions which allow the avoidance of time-consuming official
business procedures. This shortens firms’ time to market and provides an additional
opportunity for quick response which increases firms’ flexibility. Until now there has
been no comprehensive study of the informal way Asian firms do business and the effects
of these methods on the flexibility of firms and their success. The aim of this work is to
shed light on that issue, thereby filling an important gap in research.
Informal modes of interactions seem to characterise both the external and the internal
organisation of firms. The competitive advantage of the GPRD is expected to result
not only from a single firm’s capability to organise and react flexibly to the needs of
global customers, but also from the way a flexible network of firms is built. This work
concentrates, therefore, on the organisation of customer producer relations along the
value chain in the GPRD. Emphasis is put on the unique institutional setting in the
GPRD. HK provides a legal system adapted to fit international standards, whereas
firms in the PRD operate in a transitional setting.
This work could potentially be developed further within the Priority Programme 1233
“Megacity—Megachallenge: Informal Dynamics of Global Change”, funded by the Ger-
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man Research Foundation (DFG). This would provide an opportunity to study the
relevance and significance of informal modes in customer and producer relations of firms
in the GPRD in order to enhance the flexibility of firms. Informal modes of governance
in customer and producer relations cannot be seen as the only factor influencing flexible
firm organisation, but rather as one of several possibilities. The GPRD was selected
as a research region because its economic structure requires continuous adaptation to
changes in global markets and to the institutional setting.
A sectoral study of the electronics industry was conducted. The novelty of the research
topic suggested a concentration on a specific sector in order to exclude the influences
of industry specifications. The electronics industry is the most relevant and dynamic
in the GPRD. It serves as a good example of the interplay between informality and
flexibility. Two company surveys were conducted in HK and the PRD, complemented
by qualitative interviews with regional stakeholders.
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions
The research objectives of this work are to discover:
1. how electronics firms in the GPRD are spatially organised and integrated into
global value chains and what pressures for flexibility driven by global markets and
institutional changes they have to respond to
2. which governance modes HK and PRD firms apply in customer and producer
relations along the value chain and how they can be explained
3. how relevant informal modes of interactions between customers and producers are
in achieving a high level of flexibility under special consideration of:
• contact and selection processes for customers and producers
• contractual arrangements
• enforcement mechanisms of contracts
The main research questions addressed in this work are:
Theory-guided
A Which critical factors pushed the global spread of production locations, especially
in the electronics industry? How does this affect the organisation of value chains?
Which new challenges and risks do electronics firms in emerging economies face if
they want to enter the global production network?
3
B How does the institutional environment in a region determine the behaviour of
firms under special consideration of institutional change in transitional economies?
C How does the institutional environment and the transactional specificity affect the
choice of governance modes? What governance modes can be expected in HK and
the PRD?
D Under what circumstances do firms prefer informal practices over formal ones to
organise their customer producer relations? How do informal interactions enhance
the flexibility of firms? In answering these questions, the focus will be on:
• contact and selection procedures for customer and producers
• contractual arrangements
• enforcement mechanisms
Methods
E How can informality and flexibility be operationalised in customer and producer
relations?
F Which methods are suitable for measuring informality and flexibility in customer
producer relations?
Empirically-guided
G How are electronics firms in HK and the PRD integrated into global value chains?
How is the division of work spatially organised between HK and the PRD?
H How well is the formal institutional environment in HK and the PRD developed?
What informal institutions guide the way of doing business in HK and the PRD?
I Do HK firms organise their business relations to customers and producers in the
PRD differently from their relations to customers and producers abroad? Is this a
consequence of the different development stages of the institutional environment?
Is there a trend toward hybrid forms of governance in China resulting from the
transitional change?
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J How high is the degree of informality in customer producer relations of HK-based
and Chinese-based firms? Are there any differences in the behaviour of firms
between the two locations? Does informal behaviour result in greater flexibility?
In answering these questions, the focus will be on:
• contact and selection procedures for customer and producers
• contractual arrangements
• enforcement mechanisms
Policy-guided
K What implications do the research results have for policy makers and firm managers
in the GPRD and what further research is needed in order to consolidate the new
business concept?
1.3 Structure
The main body of this work has been divided into four parts. The first part deals with
the conceptual framework (Chapter 2), the second part with operationalisation, methods
and data (Chapter 3), the third part (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) addresses the empirical findings
of the work, and finally, a conclusion is drawn which includes policy recommendations
and further research implications (Chapter 7).
The conceptual Chapter 2 discusses how firms in emerging markets can successfully
integrate themselves into global value chains under special consideration of leading West-
ern firms’ requirements for flexibility. In doing so, the focus is placed on how firms
organise their customer producer relations in order to build a flexibly organised network
of firms along the value chain. To answer the theoretically guided questions A—D, an
eclectic concept is applied. The behaviour of firms is discussed against the background
and interplay of the industrial dynamics and market conditions, the location of specific
formal and informal institutions and firms’ capabilities to deal with them. Firstly, the
industrial and market dynamics implying the need for firms’ flexibility are analysed us-
ing the global value chain concept of Gereffi et al. Secondly, a discussion about the
changing institutional environment in transitional economies and the interplay of formal
and informal institutions guiding firms’ behaviour is outlined. Thirdly, the consequences
for the selection of governance modes to organise customer and producer relations will
be examined. Finally, the discussion goes beyond governance modes and deals with the
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expected informal modes of behaviour applied in contacting and selecting customers and
producers as well as in concluding and enforcing contracts. All four conceptual discus-
sions are based on literature reviews and conclude by producing hypotheses which will
be proven in the empirical part of this work.
Before analysing the empirical data, Chapter 3 describes how informal modes of in-
teraction between customers and producers and increasing firm flexibility can be oper-
ationalised and measured using primary and secondary data and literature in order to
answer research questions E—F. Because of the novelty of the topic (informality achiev-
ing flexibility), emphasis is placed on the collection of primary data. A standardised
survey of electronics firms was conducted in HK and another in the PRD. Additionally,
interviews with major players in the electronics industry in HK were organised. The
collection of empirical data was supplemented by expert interviews in order to gain a
deeper understanding of the processes in the research region. This chapter also covers
the assessment of research methods and a discussion about data quality and validity.
The first empirical Chapter 4 analyses the framework conditions influencing the be-
haviour of electronics firms in the GPRD. Firstly, the industrial dynamics of the electron-
ics value chain are analysed through the use of primary and secondary data. Secondly,
the changes to the formal and informal institutional environments in China are studied.
The second empirical Chapter 5 investigates the applied governance modes of HK and
PRD firms for their customers and producers as a consequence of the industrial dy-
namics of the electronics industry and the institutional environment in HK and China.
Some governance modes are assumed to be more informal and flexible than others. Two
logit models are built to identify the determinants of governance modes in order to
prove or disprove respectively what has been discussed in the conceptual part of the
work. The third empirical Chapter 6 goes beyond the governance modes and addresses
in more detail how relevant informal modes of interactions with customers and produc-
ers are in terms of contacting and selecting, contractual arrangement and enforcement
of contracts. Attention will be paid to differences in the organisation of firms in HK
and the PRD in consideration of the distinct institutional environments in which they
operate. After every empirical chapter, a summary and discussion section is included to
refer to the theoretically guided hypotheses which provide the background for answering
research questions G—J. Mirroring the empirical data with the conceptual discussion
seems to be valuable in terms of providing new inputs for the refinement of theoretical
concepts. Those concepts are mainly derived from experience with Western firms and
tend to underemphasise the specific way in which Asian firms organise their business.
6
Finally, in Chapter 7 a conclusion is drawn for policy implications (research question
K). As this work is based on fundamental research of an explorative nature, further
research topics are recommended in order to improve the academic understanding of the
interplay between informality and flexibility.
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2 Developing a Conceptual Framework:
Organisation of Customer and Producer
Relations in Emerging Markets
This chapter aims to give a theoretically supported background to how firms are expected
to organise their customer producer relations. In the Section 2.1, a model developed by
Lewin et al. (1999) will provide a framework illustrating that external determinants
such as institutional and industrial dynamics coevolve with a firm’s organisation of its
customer producer relations. The structure of this chapter is developed according to
this model. The use of informal interactions as a contribution towards enhancing the
flexibility and success of firms is critically assessed. Herrigel (2007:2) summarised as
follows:
“It was clear that in order to understand the success of the alternative more
flexible forms of organization [. . . ], one had to look past the boundaries of the
firm and see how producers were embedded in regionally specific institutions and
networks.”
2.1 Coevolution of Firms’ Behaviour, Industrial
Dynamics and Institutions
In this section, emphasis is placed on how the behaviour of firms can be analysed ac-
cording to recent management literature. A coevolutionary perspective suggests concen-
trating not only on how firms organise their business activities, especially their customer
and producer relations, but also on environmental factors influencing the organisational
form. The theoretical model of organisational adaptation by Lewin et al. (1999) consid-
ers the interaction of the firm, its industrial dynamics and its institutional environment.
The basic thesis of this model is that a firm’s adaptation processes and its organisa-
tional form coevolve with changes in the institutional environment and the industry.
Industrial changes caused by the introduction of new technology, for example, require
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greater institutional protection, which leads to new organisational forms of firms and
the weakening of existing ones. If the formal institutional environment is incomplete,
firms attempt to adjust by expanding the firm’s network, intensifying relationships to
customers and producers or diversifying their range of partners to maintain their com-
petitiveness. The model of Lewin et al. (1999:235) attempts to integrate the interplay
between “adaptation of individual firms, their competitive dynamics and the dynamics
of the institutional systems within which firms and industries are embedded”. Pajunen
and Maunula (2008) extended the model by emphasising its importance for interna-
tionalisation processes. They strengthened the influence of firms’ own organisational
resources and capabilities and their ability to analyse the existing and emerging in-
dustry constraints, especially in an international environment. Moreover, Krug and
Hendrischke (2008) proposed a new institutional perspective to explain the local dif-
ferences in business systems in China. They suggested studying institutions on a regional
rather than a national level, as done by Lewin et al. (1999). With respect to the three
papers, this work focuses on the coevolution of the global industrial dynamics, the re-
gional institutional environment and the firms’ adaptation processes to successfully deal
with them.
Figure 2.1 provides a framework for this study to analyse how firms organise their
business activities and why they do it in a particular way. The increasing turbulence of
firms’ environments usually results from dynamics of industries. Firms have to adapt
and develop their skills to encounter industrial changes. Especially in a globalised world,
firms in developing countries and emerging markets are greatly affected by global changes
in their industry. The industrial dynamics can be observed on the macro level, e. g. the
global level. The institutional environment influencing the behaviour of firms can be
divided into formal and informal institutions on the regional level (meso level). Formal
institutions are developed on a regional level, such as the rules of law, capital markets,
the rule-making system, the education system etc. Informal institutions exist in a re-
gion’s society, for example culture, norms, conventions and values rooted in its history.
Institutions are created to buffer economic entities, groups and individuals from the ef-
fects of environmental uncertainty (Lewin et al. 1999:541). An institutional system can
increase or decrease the attractiveness of regions for business, because it is an essential
factor for the decision-making process and behaviour of firms. The specific institutional
system enables and restricts the adaptation and development of the governance modes
of firms. Institutions and industrial dynamics influence the organisation of firms on the
micro level. Managerial and strategic actions, financial sources, production and innova-
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tion organisation and customer and producer relations are determined by the industrial
dynamics and the institutional environment. But it is not a one-way determination.
The organisation of firms also influences the institutional environment and the indus-
trial dynamics. It is a mutual interaction. Moreover, industrial dynamics coevolve with
the regional institutional environment.
Research into a firm’s organisational pattern for customer and producer relations
should not be limited to a firm’s level analysis, but should be extended to the study
of the interrelation of industrial dynamics and the institutional environment, as recom-
mended by Lewin et al. (1999). Therefore, Section 2.2 focuses on the development of
industries at a global level. Emphasis is placed on the challenges firms in emerging
economies encounter while attempting to integrate themselves into global value chains.
It will become clear that achieving flexibility is the major challenge for firms involved in
the manufacturing process. In Section 2.3, the formal and informal institutions deter-
mining a firm’s decision-making on customer and producer relations will be analysed.
Additionally, the subject of institutional transformation will be outlined in the context
of China’s transformation from a planned to a market economy. In HK, however, a
market-institutional environment exists. The influence of industrial dynamics and the
institutional environment on firms’ governance mode of customer producer relations will
be studied in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 will investigate under which conditions informal or
formal aspects of behaviour contribute to the financial success of firms. Here, emphasis is
placed on recruitment methods, contractual arrangements and enforcement mechanisms
of contracts. The need for informality in business relationships is discussed against the
background of the existing industrial and institutional environment.
2.2 The Need for Flexibility in Emerging Economies: A
Global Value Chain Perspective
This sections aim to explain how the electronics industry develops globally and how this
influences the behaviour and adaptation processes of firms in emerging economies (see
model Lewin et al. (1999)). Focussing on the global development of industries, the
empirically-based concept of modular value chains provides a framework to analyse the
competitive dynamics of the electronics industry. The approach sheds light on new chal-
lenges encountered by firms at the upper end of the value chain. It will become obvious
that the cost-effectiveness of firms in emerging economies is not the only competitive
advantage, but also the flexibility to adapt to changing customer requirements, which
has increased in importance recently (see Section 2.2.1). The many facets of flexibility
will be discussed in Section 2.2.2.
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2.2.1 Global Production in Modular Value Chains
The globalisation of production and markets has led to the integration of firms in de-
veloping countries and newly industrialising countries into the global economy (Ernst
2004). The electronics industry is characterised by a rapid fragmentation (Lall et al.
2004; Jones et al. 2005) and an increasing trade in components across the globe (Whit-
ford and Potter 2007). However, for the analysis of the shape and trajectory of global
economic integration, a tool is needed which not only focuses on the macro-level statis-
tics, such as trade and investment, but also identifies the players, links and locations
in order to make detailed contours of the world economy visible (Sturgeon 2000:1–6).
Sturgeon (2002, 2003a, 2006) and Gereffi (2005) developed the concept of mod-
ularity in value chains to conceptually describe the empirically observed restructuring
of production organisation in the electronics industry. The concept stresses the spatial
scale and the productive players. Gereffi et al. (2005:97) states that “the modular
form [of the value chain] appears to be playing an increasingly central role in the global
economy”, as standards, information technology and the competencies of producers im-
prove. The modular value chain concept provides a suitable framework to answer the
first theoretical question. It explains:
• which critical factors pushed the global spread of production locations, especially
in the electronics industry
• how this affects the organisation of value chains
• which new challenges and risks firms of emerging economies face if they want to
integrate themselves into the global production network.
Concept of Modularity in Value Chains
In a modular chain, transnational corporations (leading firms) outsource production ac-
tivities to large suppliers (contract manufacturers). Gereffi et al. (2005) characterise
leading firms (LFs) as those that usually initiate the flow of new products through the
value chain and help to drive the organisation and geography of their production net-
works by demanding their producers engage in new activities and invest in new places. In
the electronics industry, LFs include firms such as Dell or IBM. Contract manufacturers
(CMs) provide a full range of services without a great deal of input from LFs. LFs pro-
vide only instructions as to what to make, but it is almost entirely up to the suppliers
how and sometimes where this is done. CMs take over complex production processes
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from LFs and have their own research and development facilities. CMs usually serve
more than one LF to economise on scale production (see Figure 2.2). Therefore, they use
generic machinery that limits transaction-specific investments, but supports spreading
investments across a wide customer base. Suppliers provide “modular” production for
their customers. In China, CMs in the electronics industry are also known as Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) or Electronic Manufacturing Services (EMS). Origi-
nally, the term OEM was used for LFs which manufactured a significant proportion of
their products, but later, with the shift of production to CMs, the term OEM shifted
as well. In contrast, the automobile industry still reserves the term OEM for the large
brands such as Ford or Toyota, because they still provide parts and subassembly lines.
The terminology of suppliers in the automobile industry is well known—there are first
(also system suppliers), second or lower tier suppliers. In the electronics industry, CMs
correspond to the first tier suppliers and component suppliers (CSs) to the second or
lower tier suppliers. CSs provide CMs with components and services for simple goods,
because of their limited capabilities (Sturgeon 2000:8–11). The industry-specific terms
are different, but they roughly denote the same scope of activities. As this work will
investigate the electronics industry, it will refer to the terminology of this industry: lead-
ing firms, contract manufacturers and component suppliers. The main drivers for a shift
in the electronics industry from a completely in-house, hierarchical value chain to one
which is modular-based are multifarious:
1. With the economic boom in industrialised countries in the 1970s, international
competition intensified.
2. Market volatility in the electronics industry has made the scheduling of produc-
tion extremely difficult. CMs have provided the opportunity to increase or reduce
the volume of production at short notice.
3. The shortened lifecycles of electronics products have placed pressure on the ca-
pacity of firms to face regular changes in all units (R&D, manufacturing, marketing,
sales). The division of work has made the shorter product life cycles manageable
for every unit.
4. The complexity of products has increased, which has led to more steps in the
production process and has resulted in the potential for fragmentation of produc-
tion.
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5. The competence of suppliers has improved in emerging economies. Firms from
industrialised countries are now more willing to divest their manufacturing divi-
sions.
6. The rapid advance in organisation and information technology has re-
duced the difficulties of coordinating production at a distance. The development
of computer-controlled production equipment on the factory floor has led to the
codifyability of data and its exchange. Manufacturing activities and enterprise
resource planning systems have been introduced and have tracked the inventory.
More recently, supply management systems have been developed which calculate
the demand forecast for component purchasing, inventory management and capac-
ity planning.
7. Expansive automation in the manufacturing process requires high volume pro-
duction. As markets are volatile, LFs face the risk of low plant utilisation. It has
been more efficient to pool capacity in shared external suppliers.
8. The ascendancy of liberalisation policies around the world has made the trade
between nations possible or easier to manage.
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9. Standards have been established (for example the International Organisation of
Standardisation (ISO), International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)), which
have made the understanding of product specification easier by reducing the amount
of information which needs to be exchanged.
10. In the beginning, CMs sourced components from their customers. After CMs were
successfully established in the mid-1980s, they began to purchase components
from third-party component suppliers, which made it beneficial for CMs to
have locations closer to the CSs mainly located in emerging economies.
11. CMs have added a variety of front- and back-end services (design, test-
ing, packaging, after-sales service), which has made them more attractive to LFs
(Sturgeon 2002:462; Whitford and Potter 2007:12; Volberda 1996:359;
Ernst 2004:90; Sturgeon 2007).
The interplay between the different development processes resulted in the establish-
ment of CMs which serve a broad customer base. CMs thus had the opportunity of
simply applying more of the production capacity to customers who had gained market
shares, while reducing the production for firms that had lost market shares. Resource
pooling has led to a better plant utilisation and scale economies in equipment and com-
ponent purchasing. Economies of scope have also been realised through a better asset
utilisation, as human effort and fixed capital can be pooled, conserved and deployed
across a broad customer base. A specialised firm producing a particular component for
several LFs has longer production runs than any LF. Shared producers reduce produc-
tion costs (McMillan 1995:206). Dynamic advantages refer to the upside and downside
flexibility of CMs. They provide LFs with the opportunity to increase or decrease pro-
duction volume without installing in-house capacity.
The first CMs were established in North America (for example Solectron), but with the
increasing intensity of competition and competencies of component suppliers in emerg-
ing economies, CMs have shifted their manufacturing activities to low-cost production
countries in proximity to their new CSs (Ernst 2004:93). Because of the professional
cooperation between LFs and CMs, spatial proximity is no longer necessary, with the
exception of some CMs which resist codification. Even though ties are thin, LFs and
CMs depend greatly on each other (Whitford and Potter 2007:16). In contrast,
the propinquity to Asian CSs is even more important, as the relationships are built less
on professional codified contracts and more on relational aspects. Moreover, proximity
between plants of the CMs and CSs brings the advantage of component delivery on
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short notice. Besides geographical proximity, cultural and social proximity have a pos-
itive effect on efficient customer producer relations (Goffin et al. 2006:193). Besides
the shift from Western CMs to Asia, Asian-based CMs (for example Hon Hai Preci-
sion (Taiwan), Wong’s Electronics (HK)) emerged in first generation countries (Japan,
Taiwan, South Korea, HK, Singapore) and later in second generation countries such as
China, Vietnam or Thailand. They had a better connection to local CSs (Sturgeon
2007; Sturgeon 2002; Ernst 2004; Sturgeon 2006a). Although Asian-based CMs
have fewer globally-spread networks than CMs from developed countries, their global
share is growing (Ernst 2004:99; Reed Business Information n. d.). Component
sourcing and actual production activities shifted quickly from emerging countries of the
first generation to countries of the second generation.
The spatial proximity of CMs and their CSs results in huge firm agglomerations
(Sturgeon 2003:216). One should be aware that new industrial agglomerations in
emerging markets do not occur because of the spatial dispersion of production, but
because of the spatial fragmentation of production. A glance at Asia shows that the
trade pattern is predominantly inter-firm, rather than intra-firm. Studies focussing on
China have empirically confirmed the emergence of industrial agglomerations, particu-
larly in the Pearl and Yangtze Delta region (Fan and Scott 2003; Christerson and
Lever-Tracy 1997). This clustering of firms is associated with higher productivity.
Face-to-face contacts, reciprocity and mutual understanding are crucial for business suc-
cess in Asia (Whitford and Potter 2007:14). Even if a codification of information is
possible, the institutional environment does not sufficiently protect and support codified
communication. Therefore, ties between these firms are expected to be not thin and
codified, but rather thick (Whitford and Potter 2007:16). Sturgeon (2002:488)
summerised the performance advantages of modular value chains as follows:
“First, geographic flexibility creates greater access to a variety of place-specific
factors and markets. An important result of geographic flexibility is the system’s
easy reach into areas with lower factor costs. Second, shared suppliers can bet-
ter match and adjust capacity to demand, resulting in more intensive capacity
utilization. The overall result is lower costs and less risk [. . . ].”
Breaks in the chain tend to emerge where information regarding product and process
specifications can be highly formalised (see Figure 2.3). Within individual firms, infor-
mation creation and exchange is based on tacit links, but between firms, information is
codified in the form of protocols and standards (Sturgeon 2003:221). Codified links
allow the transfer of detailed product and production specifications to occur more easily
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at great distance. The LF continues to carry out such firm activities as development of
production strategy, R&D, design for manufacturing, core design, prototype fabrication,
administration and later marketing, sales and distribution. CMs are responsible for pro-
cess R&D, purchasing components, manufacturing, testing and packaging. CSs provide
manufacturing capacity for CMs. The modular concept of value chains expects links
to be highly formalised. This implies little time to establish and re-establish inter-firm
links. But although this formalisation is assumed, Howard and Squire (2007) pro-
vide empirical evidence showing that the modularisation of production leads to greater
collaboration between customers and producers and reduces the probability of working
in ”arm’s length” market relationships.
This work mainly concentrates on the upper end of the value chain—the link between
CMs and CSs in the GPRD. The aim is to make a comparison to ties between LFs
and CMs. Empirical evidence for the formalisation of ties between LFs and CMs exists,
but the characteristics of ties between CM and CSs have received less attention in the
past. Even though industrial dynamics are pushing the codification of information, the
institutional environment, for example in China, acts restrictively on this issue. When
the transfer of data or information is not protected, firms still have to rely on links based
on proximity and informal ties. It takes some time to make the links work efficiently.
It can be expected that links between CMs and CSs in emerging economies with an
incomplete formal environment rely heavily on proximity and less codified cooperation.
As the concept of modular value chains lacks an institutional perspective, it did not
consider this aspect. This work will fill the gap by comparatively studying the locational
and organisational pattern of LFs and CMs, as well as that of CMs and CSs. Differences
between the behaviour of firms in transitional countries such as China and in market-led
economies such as HK should become visible.
Challenges and Risks of Firms while Acting on the Global Platform
The intensive outsourcing of production activities from LFs to globally acting and
spreading CMs has raised challenges as well as risks for the LFs. They have been
able to overcome the risk of high market volatility by outsourcing production activities.
LFs thus had the opportunity to alter the volume of production upwards and downwards
at very short notice without installing any of their own plants and equipment, which
saved them costs. The LFs concentrate on the strategic and organisational leadership
beyond the resources. They retain in-house activities in which they have a particular
strategic advantage, while outsourcing those in which they are not competitive. LFs offer
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technological and quality-control advice to suppliers and give extra design responsibility
to them. Suppliers are monitored and are requested to deliver inventory just-in-time
(Sturgeon 2002:455; Henderson et al. 2002:443; McMillan 1995). But the LFs
have to endure the risk of losing their ability to innovate and design successive product
generations, which comes with the loss of manufacturing knowledge. Intellectual prop-
erty and other sensitive information about product design, product features, pricing,
production forecasts and customer information can find their way from the shared sup-
pliers to their competitors. CMs gain a strategic insight into their LFs’ business, which
could be quite damaging if leaked to other LFs. Moreover, LFs face the risk that a
competitor could easily purchase the common supply firm. Additionally, they fear that
CMs may develop their own products and compete directly with the LFs. A further
risk is that an outsourcing strategy goes along with commodification of individual firm
functions. As the rate of outsourcing increased in the 1990s, firms found themselves
managing an increasing number of relationships. Because of that, firms started to con-
centrate on fewer suppliers with a higher volume (McMillan 1995:203). If the volume
is higher, LFs can insist on customised treatment of CMs. When such specific assets are
in place, it becomes more difficult for either party to switch. Long-term relationships de-
veloped and competitive bidding to select suppliers became less important (Sturgeon
2006a:26–42; McMillan 1995).
But nevertheless, LFs are still in the position to select suppliers. Only suppliers which
fulfil the LFs’ requirements can be integrated into the global production network. Once
a supplier is selected, the process of integration advances and the interdependence grows.
Sturgeon (2002) and Ernst (2004) identified challenges and risks for CMs and CSs
in emerging economies involved with being selected as a supplier for LFs.
Challenges
• Reduction of production costs: The reduction of costs in their own production
processes is one of the main reasons why firms from industrialised countries look to
Asia. Cost reduction results from decreased location-specific land and labour costs,
and decreased expenditure for machinery and components. As the competition
between producers in emerging economies grows and LFs look for the best deal,
producers continually have to cut costs.
• Mass Customisation: Asian producers have to adapt their production processes
to a broad base of customers who continually change their requirements. They
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therefore have to specialise in cross-cutting base processes (processes which support
the production of products for a wide range of end-markets), base components
(products which can be used in a wide variety of end-products) and base services
(services which are needed by a wide variety of end-users). To do so, they have to
work with generic manufacturing machines. This allows large product variations as
long as the specifications fall within the parameters of the base process and at the
same time realise economies of scale. But CMs and CSs fear the risk of focussing
too much on standard components, which leads to a loss of distinctiveness in their
products. To summerise, their products have to be as standardised as is necessary,
and as customised as possible to ensure an adaptable production mode.
• Speed of reaction: When Asian producers (CMs and CSs) want to integrate
themselves into global production networks, they have to prove their ability to:
– respond at short notice to unexpectedly high demand or a sudden reduction
of product volume
– shorten production lead time (quick delivery)
– change product lines and find new CSs quickly, due to the demand for small
batch runs
The former weaknesses of LFs are the strengths of Asian suppliers. The dimension
of time is one of the most competitive challenges today (Reichhart and Holweg
2007:1144–1145).
• Variety of options: Asian producers are being pushed hard by LFs to take on
additional functions, especially made-to-order final assembly and design services
for low-end products. The increased scope of activities and business solutions
provides LFs with more options to act and producers with more options to react.
Having a variety of options with which to react to changing demand enables CMs
and CSs to manage the continual organisational adaptation.
• Innovation activities and technological capabilities: The challenge is to keep
track of new developments on the one hand while trying to standardise as much
as possible on the other hand. For the time being, firms are strongly pressured to
build up technological capabilities in order to assimilate new knowledge in design
and development. New machinery, R&D labs and qualified workers are essential.
Even though not all firms are forced to become highly innovative, the existence of
innovation activities will be crucial for survival in the future (Sturgeon 2002:455;
Sturgeon 2007:63).
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Risks
• Reversibility: CMs and CSs fear the risk that LFs may indeed push for outsourc-
ing, but this process is not irreversible, especially in highly volatile industries.
• Greater competition: Another risk is the number of LFs, which declined during
the economic downturn in the 1990s. Additionally, the number of CMs and CSs is
increasing continually. The position of CMs is weakening and LFs are now much
more demanding (for example on price issues).
• Competing interests: There seems to be a conflict between the interests of LFs,
which are looking for flexibility to scale production up and down, and CMs and
CSs, which are looking for predictability and scale (Ernst 2004:104–106).
2.2.2 Flexibility of Firms as a Competitive Advantage in Emerging
Economies
The challenges encountered by manufacturing firms in emerging economies when entering
the global production network are identified in Section 2.2.1—reduction of production
costs, mass customisation, the necessity for speed and variety of options to react and
expansion of innovation activities. As this work examines the customer and producer
relations of firms, only two of the five identified challenges are related to this issue: the
variety of options for reacting to market changes and the speed with which they can be
implemented. The adjustment of individual firms to market changes (for example new
technology, high volume demand) is not sufficient; the entire value chain has to adapt.
If LFs require a certain shipment, CMs and CSs have to work cooperatively in response
to short-term dynamics (Krajewski et al. 2005:453). The successful implementation
of production cost reduction, mass customisation and expansion of innovation activi-
ties are mainly dominated by the in-house activities of firms. Cost reduction refers to
cost-cutting of labour, land, machinery and sourced components. Producers only come
into play concerning the price of sourced components. As this work concentrates on the
organisation of customer producer relations, prices of compontents are not of great rele-
vance. Mass customisation refers mainly to the assignment of personnel and machinery
to changing orders. As the in-house management is responsible for the organisation of
processes and services, customers and producers do not influence the plant adaptabil-
ity. Moreover, the establishment of innovation activities does not depend much on the
organisation of custome producer relations either.
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Volberda (1996:361–363) looked into the subject of firm flexibility in his highly
regarded article “Towards the Flexible Form” and identified speed and variety of man-
agerial capabilities of firms as main drivers for organisational flexibility. For Volberda
(1996:361)
“Flexibility is the degree to which an organization has a variety of managerial
capabilities and the speed at which they can be activated, to increase the control
capacity of management and improve the controllability of the organization.”
Volberda’s understanding of flexibility fits particularly well with what capabilities
firms in emerging markets require for integration into global value chains. He defines the
variety of managerial capabilities as a summary of the arsenal of capabilities currently
used plus the potential of flexibility-increasing capabilities. A firm must have a variety of
capabilities, which increases the variety of options for reacting to different disturbances
in the environment. Speed in reaction serves as the second essential factor of flexibility.
Therefore, supply flexibility can be recognised as a firm’s ability to respond in multifar-
ious and quick ways to changing demand, using its customer producer network. As the
variety of options has a qualitative component and the speed with which actions are car-
ried out has a quantitative component, the following work will use the terms qualitative
and quantitative flexibility (see Figure 2.4). Two points have to be made: firstly, supply
flexibility can be seen as a new challenge for firms in emerging markets integrating them-
selves into the global economy, and secondly, supply flexibility is highly influenced by
the form of collaboration with customers and producers (Krajewski et al. 2005:455).
Supply flexibility is not exclusively responsible for a firm’s manufacturing performance,
but it makes a contribution.
Depending on the organisation of customer producer relations, firms have more or
fewer options to adjust to the requirements of LFs. If firms have to increase their
production volume at short notice, for example, they can employ additional producers or
negotiate and squeeze their existing producers. Speed is necessary to activate and apply
a firm’s options in a certain time. Firms have to decide which options for responding
to higher volume demand take less time. Is the recruitment of a new producer more
beneficial than using experienced producers? A considerable number of options for
reacting to changing demand, as well as the speed of applying them, depend on the
organisation of customer producer relations. They are crucial for the success of the entire
manufacturing system (Reichhart and Holweg 2007:1148). Relations to customers
and producers organised in a way that contributes to speed and variety is assumed to
be optimal for a firm’s total performance.
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Variety 
(Qualitative 
Flexibility)
Speed 
(Quantitative 
Flexibility)
High
High
Low
Low
Structural Strategic
Steady-State Operational
Figure 2.4: Types of flexibility
Source: According to Volberda (1996:361)
Volberda (1996) distinguished four main types of flexible firm organisation—steady-
state (low variety, low speed), structural (high variety, low speed), operational (low va-
riety, high speed) and strategic (high variety, high speed). Each type represents a com-
bination of speed and variety. The three main research areas of this study—recruitment
of customers and producers, conclusion and enforcement of contracts—can be trans-
ferred to the four different types of flexibility. The number of reliable and successfully
functioning recruitment processes for customers and producers which firms can revert to
indicates the factor of variety. The time firms actually need to employ a new customer
or producer is related to the factor of speed. It is expected that firms which consider
more options for recruiting partners have a better chance of quickly finishing the pro-
cess. They would reach the maximum flexibility—strategic flexibility. But there might
be firms specialising on a small number of recruitment processes which are very effec-
tive. They would refer to operational flexibility. With regard to contract conclusion,
firms can have a standard procedure or they can have several contract models. Finally,
the time they need to conclude contracts is essential. When it comes to conflicts, firms
may take advantage of a large number of different enforcement mechanisms for con-
tracts involving a certain time. Assessing firms’ qualitative and quantitative flexibility
in the various research areas leads to a classification of firms using the four types of firm
flexibility (Volberda 1996:361–363; Avittathur and Swamidass 2007:720; Lummus
et al. 2003).
23
Lee (1997) attributed the major economic success of HK firms to their flexibility. He
argues that their flexibility arises from the ability of manufacturers to find new market
niches and to respond quickly to market changes. Furthermore, he argues that “the
flexibility of the Hong Kong economy stems from the interactions between the busi-
ness strategy of Hong Kong entrepreneurs and the small and medium-sized firm (SME)
subcontracting networks” (Lee 1997:189). But there is a distinction between the type
of flexibility expected from CMs and CSs in HK and the PRD. The main competitive
advantage of CSs is their function as price breakers and capacity buffers. CSs usually
lack proprietary assets and financial capital for investments in R&D. This makes them
highly vulnerable to changes in markets, technology or to a financial crisis. It can be
expected that operational flexibility is their main competitive advantage, while strategic
or structural flexibility is less important. CMs are expected to have either strategic flex-
ibility or, when upgrading and innovation activities are of greater importance, structural
flexibility (Ernst 2004:95–96). As the subcontracting network of firms seems to have a
great influence on the flexibility of firms in HK, the organisation of the network must be
studied. This depends strongly on the institutional environment, which will be covered
in the next Section 2.3.
2.2.3 Interim Conclusion and Hypotheses derived from Section 2.2
A Which critical factors pushed the global spread of production locations, especially
in the electronics industry? How does this affect the organisation of value chains?
Which new challenges and risks do electronics firms in emerging economies face if
they want to enter the global production network?
The economic boom in the 1970s was the main driver of the development of global
value chains. Increasing demand for electronics products, the advance in organisation
and information technology, and the automatisation of production pushed the growth
of the electronics industry. However, this development was accompanied by a high
market volatility and short product life cycles. Leading Western firms had difficulties
handling these factors. At the same time, the competence of suppliers in third-world
economies increased and international trade barriers were removed. Leading Western
firms started to outsource their production to large CMs which they shared with other
LFs. Modularisation of production took place at steps in the production process where
information could be easily codified. This production model of the electronics industry
is referred to as a modular value chain. Firms in emerging economies had to compensate
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for LFs’ weaknesses in dealing with demand changes, short production cycles and fast
delivery times. Only firms providing a high flexibility were selected to supply LFs.
Flexibility can be understood as the degree to which a firm has a variety of capabilities
for reacting to demand changes and the speed at which those capabilities can be activated
(Volberda 1996:361). Integrating themselves into global value chains is identified as
the main challenge for electronics firms in emerging economies. To prove propositions
derived from the conceptual discussion, the following empirical research questions and
hypotheses were formulated:
G How are electronics firms in HK and the PRD integrated into global value chains?
How is the division of work spatially organised between HK and the PRD?
Hypothesis A1 Electronics firms in the GPRD have increased their market share in a
growing industry sector due to the outsourcing tendencies of leading Western firms.
Hypothesis A2 For electronics firms in the GPRD, the intensity of competition is high
and increasing, markets are volatile and changes are virtually unpredictable.
Hypothesis A3 Large HK-based electronics firms are integrated into modular value
chains as CMs.
Hypothesis A4 Production activities of electronics firms in the GPRD take place in the
PRD. HK firms have kept their headquarters and higher-value activities in HK, but have
shifted production activities and simple services to the PRD.
Hypothesis A5 The distance to LFs as customers is great, whereas the production
networks between CMs and CSs work in spatial proximity.
Hypothesis A6 Electronics firms in the GPRD are characterised by quantitative and
qualitative flexibility in order to respond to LF requirements.
2.3 Institutions, Transition and Informality: A Regional
Perspective
This section focuses on institutions, institutional transition and informal behaviour de-
termined by the institutional environment. According to the model of Lewin et al.
(1999:537), this section deepens the discussion about the interplay of institutions on
the regional level and the behaviour of firms. Besides the industry and market develop-
ment, institutions also determine the behaviour of firms. In order to answer the research
question B outlined at the beginning of this work, this section will:
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• explain the interaction between the institutional environment and the informal
behaviour of firms under special consideration of an institutional change in tran-
sitional economies
• discuss the term ”informality” in the behaviour of firms and its effects on their
flexibility
Section 2.3.1 will examine the formal and informal institutional framework on a regional
level. Section 2.3.2 focuses on the transformation process in content and time in tran-
sitional economies. However, it will be argued that in transitional economies, informal
institutions often determine the rules of behaviour. As informal institutions evoke in-
formal practices in the behaviour of firms, Section 2.3.3 seeks to discuss ”informality”
and outlines how the term is interpreted in this work. Dimensions of informality which
facilitate its understanding and measurement will be identified. Section 2.3.4 gives a
brief overview of informal behaviour of firms in the applied research areas—recruitment,
contractual arrangements and their enforcement in customer producer relations—and
their expected effects on the flexibility of firms. The final Section 2.3.5 addresses the
unresolved question of whether informality in a firm’s interaction pattern can be taken
as a substitute for a lack formal rules, which would suggest that it is a transitional phe-
nomenon, or whether it is a complement to these rules and can be seen as a permanent
phenomenon.
2.3.1 Playing the Game: Institutions and Institutional Change
Neoclassical economic theory was dismissive of institutions. This was one of its major
weaknesses. It is now generally accepted that institutions are important for the economic
development of regions and firms. According to North (1990:3), “institutions are the
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly-devised constraints that
shape human interaction.” A method now prevalent is to study institutions using the
new institutional economics (NIE). The NIE basically arose from changing assumptions
about the neoclassical model. Proponents of the theory took a more realistic view of
human behaviour than the traditional neoclassical approach (Richter and Furubotn
1996:35–38).
1. The neoclassical theory assumes profit maximisation to be the first goal of business.
But the NIE identifies the importance of institutionally expected utility, which is
based on more realistic human behaviour that can be directed by ideology, al-
truism and self-determined behaviour. Institutions are the key to understanding
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the complex rules of behaviour, because they help to explain the choice of busi-
ness goals other than profit maximisation (for example gaining reputation, mar-
ket power, technological upgrading, internationalisation) (Williamson 1987:45;
North 1990:26–60; Richter and Furubotn 1996:3).
2. The second assumption shifted from complete rationality to bounded rationality.
This implies that players are not able to survey complete information and thereby
comprehensively predict their business future. The environment is too complex and
the cognitive competence to cope with all the information is limited (Richter
and Furubotn 1996:3–5; North 1990:17–26; Simon 1961:xxiv; Williamson
1987:45–46).
3. The third shifting assumption concerns the behaviour of human beings. In the
neoclassical model, human beings behave as “homo oeconomicus”, but the NIE
assumes that people do not automatically observe the given rules and try to act to
their individual advantage. They behave opportunistically. Opportunism is a trou-
blesome source of behavioural uncertainty in economic transactions (Williamson
1987:447–50; Richter and Furubotn 1996:4–5).
The core idea of the NIE is to emphasise the impact of institutions on the behaviour
and decision-making processes of firms. This is related to the success of firms and there-
fore to regional economic development. Experts have tried to endogenise the variable
institutions in economic models in order to measure its contribution (Coase 1992:714).
This leads to the central research targets of the NIE—the description of institutions, the
analysis of effectiveness of institutions and political recommendation for the establish-
ment of rules with respect to efficiency.
Williamson (2000) developed four levels of analysis to describe the economics of
institutions against a time-conscious background. He studied informal institutions at
the first level, because they are deeply embedded in society (see Figure 2.5). Informal
constraints are characterised by the customs, norms, traditions, culture and religion of a
region. They are based on implicit understanding and are socially derived, which makes
them inaccessible through written documents. However, it is widely recognised that it
is easier to describe and to be precise about the formal rules that societies devise than
about informal constraints. Informal institutions are path-dependent and have a long
pervasive influence on the character of economic development. Institutional change on
this level is gradual and happens over centuries or millennia. Many of them are linked
with complementary formal institutions. The solid arrows connecting higher with lower
27
Level Frequency (years) Purpose
100 to 1000
1 to 10 
continuous
10 to 100
L1
L4
L3
L2
Embeddedness:
informal institiotions, 
customs, traditions, norms, 
religion
Ressource allocation and 
employment (prices and 
quantities; incentive 
alignment)
Governance:
Play of the game – esp. 
contract (aligning 
governance, structures with 
transactions)
Institutional Environment:
Formal rules of the game –
esp. property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy)
Get the marginal 
conditions right.
3rd order economizing
Get the governance 
structures right.
2nd order economizing
Get the institutional 
environment right.
1st order economizing
Often noncalculative
L1: social theory
L2: economics of property rights / positive political theory
L3: transaction cost economics
L4: neoclassical economics / agency theory 
Figure 2.5: Institutions and decision making in a regional aspect
Source: According to Williamson (2000:597)
levels indicate that the higher level imposes constraints on the lower level. The reverse
arrows are dashed and signal feedback. The second level can be seen as the formal insti-
tutional environment. Formal rules involve laws and regulations, for example property
rights, constitutions (Furubotn and Richter 1991:3–6). Changes in formal institu-
tions occur either over decades or centuries (for example the development of the EU)
or when dramatic events result in sharp breaks with established procedures (civil war,
occupations, breakdowns, financial crises). While informal norms only change gradually,
formal rules can change overnight. According to North (1990:3–5), the institutional
environment is composed of formal rules, informal constraints and the enforcement char-
acteristics of both. The formal constraints set the rules and regulations and the informal
norms define the contour and the way in which the rules and regulations are specified
and in which enforcement is carried out. Informal institutions provide a basis for self-
enforcing contracts, as norms and conventions put pressure on people to stay with the
concluded agreement. Formal institutions provide a third party enforcement system to
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enforce contracts (for example courts). On the third level, there is a functional legal
system for the conclusion and enforcement of contracts, which influences the choice of
governance modes (market, hybrid, firms). Transaction cost theory focuses mostly on
explaining the existence of alternative modes of governance and the trade-offs among
them against different institutional backings (see Section 2.4). Coase first mentioned
the existence of transaction costs in his highly influential essay “The Nature of the
Firm”. He pointed out that a firm consists of a system of relationships. When the
costs of establishing, maintaining and using the relationships (price system) become too
high, the organisation of business activities under a central command may become ad-
vantageous (Menard 2005:287; Bickenbach et al. 1999:2). However, Coase’s idea
was extended by North (1990, 1997) and Williamson (1971, 1975, 1985, 1996, 1997,
2005). They structured the concept of the NIE, because they saw that institutions were
the true novelty in Coase’s theory. The creation, organisation and use of institutions
produces transaction costs. The contract theory examines the way in which contracts
can be formed to regulate interests between agents most efficiently (see Section 2.5).
The period over which rules regarding transaction costs are changed is one to ten years.
To analyse governance modes in customer producer relations, the point of time when
relations were established must be noted against the background of institutional change.
Level two and three are typically analysed by the NIE. On the fourth level, firm’s be-
havioural adjustment of governance modes is studied—resource allocation employment
etc. Adjustments are made continuously (Williamson 2000:595–600; Williamson
1998:23–29).
It derives from Williamson (2000) that a change in informal institutions will be fol-
lowed by a change in formal institutions. In reality, a change in formal institutions is not
only driven by a change in informal institutions. Formal institutions can also be trans-
ferred from other economies. Many Western countries have developed a sophisticated
system of rules and laws. Emerging and transitional economies tend to adopt entire
law systems rather than develop their own system, which is costly and time-consuming.
This formal institutional system is not adapted to existing informal institutions. There-
fore, transferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Western market
economies to emerging economies is not a sufficient condition for good economic perfor-
mance. It is essential to change both the formal institutions and the belief systems for
successful reforms (North 1990). Otherwise, firms, led by individuals, will not support
the new economic rules of the game, as their way of doing business is shaped by informal
institutions and is not compatible with the new rules. There is empirical evidence to
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show that although formal rules are introduced, firms do not necessarily comply with
them (Macaulay 1963; DiMaggio and Louch 1998; de Mesquita and Stephen-
son 2006). It is not the existence of formal institutions, but rather the costs, the
efficiency and the willingness to use them which makes them attractive for firms. This
explains why the economic system in some nations still does not work effectively, even
though formal institutions are well developed. Formal rules only take effect if they are
interwoven with the existing informal constraints. Granovetter (1973) argued that
such informal constraints still form the basis of economic relationships even in modern
economies.
In China, the legal system has been transformed, but the way in which firms do
business has not yet adapted to the new rules of the game. Therefore, it seems worth
studying how firms organise their business in an institutional environment in which
formal and informal rules are not perfectly interwoven. With the increasing complexity
of societies, formal institutions complement, revise or replace the effectiveness of informal
constraints.
2.3.2 Regions in Transition
When regions transform from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, as
China is doing, they design a set of formal rules which need to be introduced to com-
bat problems caused by the former leadership. A transition from planned to market
economies implies the transformation from fixed prices and production plans to a sup-
ply and demand oriented production. For this reason, prices could not be taken as a
stimulation measure of economic competition. A lack of product quality was evident.
The collectively-owned capital goods did not stimulate firms to maintain or upgrade
their capital stock. Both deficits account for the inefficient organistion of communist
economies (Lavigne 1995). Moreover, firms did not need to compete on the market be-
cause of the foreign trade monopoly held by the state. The reform of the central planning
system has aimed to establish political stability and pluralism through a competitive le-
gal and administrative system, creating basic financial institutions of capitalism and
implementing a programme of real economic reforms with the evolution of a full market
economy. There is no panacea or universal solution for a transformation process, but
the change of certain elements and actions has been commonly agreed on (Hunter and
Ryan 2008; Revilla Diez 1995).
30
1. Reform of the legal and administrative system
• Establishment of a legal economic security system—trade regulations (new
trade laws, membership of OECD, WTO), property rights, bankruptcy law,
competition law
• Revision of the tax code—enterprise tax, income tax
• Reform of the administrative system—degradation of bureaucracy, develop-
ment of public authorities
2. Reform of the financial system
• Reform of price formation—liberalising prices from state control, stabilising
inflation, new system of public finance
• Reform of the banking system—opening up for foreign banks, establishment
of a functional banking system
• Reform of foreign capital trade—full convertibility of the local currency, free
foreign exchange and capital transfer
3. Establishment of new market institutions
• Reform of the enterprise sector—open market for the establishment of private
enterprises, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, open market for foreign
direct investments
• Development of a stock market
In implementing these changes, two reform strategies may be identified and distin-
guished: slow or gradual transformation (for example China) and rapid or shock tactics
(for example Poland, Estonia). Focussing on the customer producer relations, not all
transitional issues mentioned affect the organisation of trade. The most important is
the establishment of a functional legal economic security system, especially trade and
property rights. Firstly, this leads to a higher attraction and increase of foreign trade
(more customer producer relations) and secondly, firms can rely on contracts and their
enforcement. If those rules are not functioning, firms avoid the market or rely on infor-
mal means to overcome its weaknesses. Equally important is the reform of the enterprise
sector to allow the establishment of private foreign enterprises. Moreover, the reform
of the foreign capital trade system is essential, because firms want to exchange not only
goods, but also capital.
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In economic and political awareness, indicators for institutional change are usually the
development of formal market institutions. Less attention is paid to the fitness of formal
and informal institutions. In transitional regions especially, difficulties arise from the
interplay of formal and informal institutions. Therefore, Yeung and Lin (2003) invite
a context-specific theorising of the economic geographies of Asia, bearing in mind those
difficulties. It is still of importance how far the institutional framework is developed
according to the points indicated above, but attention should also be drawn to how well
the new reforms are applied in actual business practices. Informal institutions might
still shape the way of doing business, as they co-exists with formal institutions. The
focus should be set not only on the introduction of formal institutions, but also on their
enforcement.
Outlook: Formal and Informal Institutions in HK and the PRD
The Chinese reform policy began in 1979 with the introduction of the first market-
oriented regulations. By now, the Chinese government has managed to revise most of
their laws concerning the economy. However, businessmen in China still persist with
their former business practices based on more informal exchanges. This is due to the
persistence of informal constraints despite the introduction of formal rules. Section 4.1.1
in the empirical part will focus on the formal institutional change and the complementary
Section 4.1.2 will outline the informal institutional environment shaping the way of
doing business in China. The empirical part will reveal why Western rules introduced
in emerging economies differ in performance characteristics from the original country.
In contrast to China, the HK territory was shaped by the British from the 19th century
onwards. Western rules and laws were introduced at an early stage. HK firms are now
very used to dealing with Western institutions. Simultaneously, HK entrepreneurs know
about the Chinese norms and values (informal institutions) shaping their way of doing
business. As firms in HK act under a different institutional setting from firms in the
PRD, they are expected to organise their business differently.
Firms in the GPRD are characterised by cross border business organisation, whereas
the border between HK and the PRD separates two distinct institutional environments.
HK firms are familiar with both business systems. They are expected to take the role
of intermediaries. This requires knowledge of formal and informal institutions in both
regions. HK firms are assumed to benefit from this implicit knowledge while applying
a sophisticated mix of formal and informal modes in interactions with customers and
producers. Section 4.1 will provide an overview of the institutional settings in both HK
and the PRD.
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2.3.3 Benefiting from Informality in Interactions
In the literature, the term informality is often vaguely defined and a plurality of in-
terpretions exists. Initially, informality referred to illegality. Later, the phenomenon
changed and informality appeared in conjunction with the informal economy. It referred
to unregulated labour-intensive activities, self-employed entrepreneurs, micro and small
enterprises, activities taking place outside state regulations, unregistered activities, etc.
In recent literature, informality has been related to informal arrangements and behaviour
within formal firms or organisations (Li 2007; Sindzingre 2006).
A distinction must be made between the perspective of institutions creating formal
and informal rules for the game on the one hand, and the perspective of formal and
informal behaviour of firms guided by the rules of the game on the other hand. This
work emphasises the distinction between formal and informal behaviour in terms of
customer producer relations. The perspective of formal and informal institutions only
serves as a framework to explain the behaviour of firms. It is not assumed that formal
behaviour follows formal rules or the other way around. Informal rules can also determine
formal behaviour, for example when it is commonly agreed that contracts need to be
written, although this is not required by the lawmakers. Conversely, formal rules can
determine informal behaviour, for example when parties argue, it is mandatory in some
countries to work on an informal agreement before they are allowed to go to court. Li
(2007) discussed the contrasting terms of formality and informality of firm’s behaviour.
He distinguished between formal and informal attributes of interaction, whereby these
mark the extreme points of a continuum. According to Li (2007:229), informality in
interactions on the micro-level
“refers to the nature of social ties and events as implicitly assumed, endoge-
nously embraced and flexibly enforced by horizontal [. . . ] pressures in a partic-
ularistic personalized process [. . . ], while formality as explicitly prescribed, ex-
ogenously imposed and rigidly enforced by vertical authority powers in a [. . . ]
depersonalized process.”
To study formal and informal behaviour, Li proposed dimensions of informality as a
framework to study and measure empirically formal and informal practices in business
interactions. He recommended taking into account the degree of personalisation in busi-
ness interactions, the form of agreements concluded, the precision of arrangements, the
enforcement mechanisms of contracts and the power of institutions used (see Table 2.1).
Li divided each dimension into a variety of actions ranging from formal to informal.
Business contacts can be highly impersonal (formal) or very personal (informal). Per-
33
Table 2.1: Formal informal dimensions in business interactions
Dimensions Formal Informal
Personalisation impersonal personal
Form of agreements written verbal
Preciseness of agreements precise open-ended
Enforcement of
agreements
tight loose
Power legal (vertical) social (horizontal)
Source: Own composition according to Li (2007:229–231)
sonal processes are based on face-to-face contacts, trust between partners and private
involvement. This may also determine the form of agreements. Contracts can be highly
formalised in a written way or informally agreed on in a verbal way, when partners trust
each other’s word. Agreements can be taken as strongly formal when they are completely
in writing, whereas they are less formal when the key points are fixed in writing but
complemented by further points verbally agreed on. Agreements between parties which
involve no writing are strongly informal. Agreements which consist of rough written
points, but verbally agreed details and specification are less informal. Not only the form
of agreements, but also the precision of agreements can range from very precise (formal)
to open-ended (informal). Business culture can rely on open-ended agreements with
permanent renegotiations instead of specifying details in advance. Formal and informal
agreements rely on different enforcement mechanisms, which can either be very tight
on one extreme and very loose on the other. In the case of conflicts, the power used
to finally enforce agreements can be legal via courts or social power relying on shared
norms within a culture (Li 2007; Sindzingre 2006). A firm can be characterised as
acting on informal constraints in terms of customer producer relations when dimensions
tend to be specified by informal practices. In contrast, a firm is characterised as acting
on formal constraints in terms of customer producer relations when dimensions tend to
have a formal shape. In Section 2.5, the dimensions will be discussed in more detail with
respect to their appearance in the recruitment of customers and producers, contractual
arrangements and enforcement of contracts.
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2.3.4 Informality reaching Flexibility
It can be expected that firms which apply informal practices in interactions with their
customers and producers gain business advantages resulting in more flexible means of
reacting to market and industry changes. According to Section 2.2.2, flexibility combines
the variety of options for reacting and the speed with which they can be applied. In
this section, the different dimensions of informality—personalisation, form and precision
of agreements, enforcement and power—and their contribution to flexibility are taken
into account. A special emphasis is put on personalisation. It can be expected that
personal relationships are the basis for the informal shape of the other dimensions of
informality. Personal trust, reliability, reputation and mutual understanding ensure and
safeguard business in social ways. Social safeguard mechanisms are a precondition for
a verbal and less precise agreement or a loose enforcement of contracts (Powell 1990;
DiMaggio and Louch 1998). Whereas it can be expected that social ties can reduce
the time required to conclude contracts due to the fact that personal trust smooths
businesses relations, one has to consider that it takes a lot of time and effort to build
social ties. Besides, social ties can also lead to lock-in effects, for example when firms are
forced to select customers and producers via social ties instead of choosing the highest
quality partner on a market basis. In other cases, firms cannot enforce contracts without
considering the fact that this could burden the relationship. Lock-ins can negatively
affect the competitiveness of firms (Lorenz 1988).
The interplay and dependency of the five dimensions of informality will be studied
according to the three research areas—recruitment, contractual arrangements and en-
force mechanisms of contracts in customer producer relations. The recruitment process
will be studied to provide an idea of the degree of personalisation of the relationships.
This is essential to understand how firms manage the second research area, contractual
arrangements, regarding the form and precision of agreements. Likewise, the applied
enforcement mechanisms and the power system in terms of conflict solutions, e. g. the
third research area, depend on the degree of personalisation of relationships. In the
following Table 2.2, the three research areas and the corresponding dimensions of infor-
mality are summarised. Furthermore, it is illustrated how an informal shape of those
dimensions contributes to flexibility in terms of variety and speed under consideration
of the negative and positive effects of informality.
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Table 2.2: Informality reaching Flexibility
Research Dimension of Flexibility
Areas Informality Variety Speed
Recruit-
ment
Personalisation The formal options to get
access to partners can be
extended by additional
personal ways to contact
partners (e. g. bidding
competition vs. personal
networks).
The formal process to
recruit customers and
producers can take more
time (deadlines,
bureaucracy), whereas
the personal network is
always ready when
demand is there, but it
needs much more time to
build. Time-consuming
investments in the
beginning lead to quicker
business operations when
demanded.
Contrac-
tual
arrange-
ments
Form and
preciseness of
agreements
When relations to
customers and producers
are on a personal base,
trust is developed which
implies informal
safeguards for contracts.
Contracts which are
verbally concluded and
less precise can easier be
renegotiated, refined, and
adopted in a variety of
ways to changing
economic circumstances.
The process of contract
conclusion and
renegotiation is quicker
when details do not need
to be worked out in
writing.
Enforce-
ment
Mecha-
nisms
• Enforcement
of
agreements
• Power
system
The enforcement of
contracts by social power
extends the variety of
options firms can use to
settle disputes (e. g.
negotiations vs.
litigation).
Using social power and
loose enforcement
mechanisms is quicker
than a formal litigation
process, but social power
also involves the risk not
to find any solution,
because no clear
judgment can be made.
Source: Own composition
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2.3.5 Interplay of Formal and Informal Institutions in Transitional
Economies
Despite the common recognition that informal institutions influence business opera-
tions, there is a wide range of academic literature about their actual importance. Opin-
ion ranges from them having only minor effects to them being very influential. Hart
(2001) contends that although norms are undoubtedly very important, it is still difficult
to incorporate them into the theory of firms. In his opinion, norms have not added
a great deal to understanding the determinants of firm boundaries. Authors such as
Williamson (1991) acknowledge the role of informal institutions, but still treat them
as exogenous sources that smooth formal institutions. Experts with a background in
sociology stress informal mechanisms as being the central way of governing exchanges
both inside and outside the firms (Granovetter 1973; Powell 1990). Although the
different perspectives exist, in almost all studies conducted, formal institutions have
been analysed and evaluated quite independently from informal institutions and the
other way around.
A detailed view shows that those differences complement each other. Hart (2001)
might be right in his opinion that the influence of informal institutions on governance
modes is low. The decision to choose a certain governance mode has serious consequences
for firms, because once a mode is selected, it cannot be changed or revised easily. There-
fore, firms tend to take into account formal rules rather than informal constraints for
their decision. In contrast, when a governance mode is selected, informal practices help
smooth relations. Along with formal mechanisms, they provide one way to practice
business. They influence a firm’s interaction with customers and producers in terms
of recruitment, contracting and enforcement. Formal institutions still dominate crucial
business decisions, but the influence of informal institutions is important for running
the business smoothly. From an economic point of view, the concentration on informal
institutions, as is the preference in the field of sociology, seems inappropriate for the
analysis of customer producer relations.
There are some experts who approve of the view that formal and informal institutions
act as substitutes for one another. Cai and Yang (2008) argue that well developed
informal institutions can take over the functionality of formal institutions. Instead of
safeguarding business by law, it can also be safeguarded by social norms and trust. In
countries where the formal laws and regulations do not fully safeguard transactions, infor-
mal institutions can substitute them. Some experts take an even more extreme position,
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arguing that formal constraints are unnecessary because informal relationships based on
trust and social norms can support cooperation without the costs and complexity associ-
ated with formal arrangements (Uzzi 1996; Powell 1990). Informal institutions reduce
the benefit of using formal institutions. Others argue even more strongly and claim that
formal modes are not only unnecessary when informal practices are applied, but also
affect them in a negative way. Legal security and formal contracting, for instance, can
erode the interpersonal relationship.
An alternative argument is that informal institutions can also complement formal
mechanisms. This view is more common in the academic literature and could be proven
empirically. In countries where the functionality of the formal institutional environment
is ensured, firms combine transactional safeguards of formal and informal institutions
to achieve the best results. As contracts are always incomplete, parts which cannot be
formalised will be settled on an informal basis. If one part is formalised, it facilitates
the enforcement of the non-contractable elements (Zenger et al. 2002). Another ar-
gument is that formal institutions can set the stage for the development of trust for
long-term interactions. Formal detailed contracts shift from specified deliverable out-
comes to framework agreements for bilateral adjustment. This provides the basis for
intensive cooperation. Additionally, informal elements may increase the performance of
formal institutions. They provide ideas for the refinement, specification and optimisa-
tion of formal contracts in the next phase. Zenger et al. (2002) conclude that “formal
and informal institutions are not mere alternative ways to govern exchanges. In most
cases they are employed simultaneously and interact in complex ways.”
When institutions are in transition, it can be expected that in the absence of a func-
tional formal institutional framework, informal institutions substitute formal institu-
tions. But as soon as the formal framework develops, informal institutions change to
complements. A transaction will always be governed by informal and formal constraints.
If informality prevails in institutional transition, then informal interactions in business
are not transitional, but permanent. This leads to the assumption that informality in
business interactions overcomes the institutional constraints. It can be expected that
crucial decisions regarding customer producer relations are oriented towards formal in-
stitutions. But it can also be assumed that informal business interactions retain their
importance even after the transformation is completed, because they provide more ef-
ficient outcomes. To conclude, HK and PRD-based firms are expected to decide on
different governance modes (as it is an essential decision), because the formal insti-
tutional environment differs between the regions (see Section 2.4). In contrast, it is
expected that HK as well as PRD-based firms apply informal modes of interactions in
their daily business (see Section 2.5).
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2.3.6 Interim Conclusion and Hypotheses derived from Section 2.3
B How does the institutional environment in a region determine the behaviour of firms
under special consideration of institutional change in transitional economies?
Formal and informal institutions govern the behaviour of firms in organising their cus-
tomer producer relations. When countries undergo an institutional change, for example
from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, as China is doing, the formal
institutional environment changes through the introduction of new laws and regulations.
According to Williamson (2000:597), the change to informal institutions follows the
change to formal institutions with a time delay. Therefore, businessmen in transitional
economies do not adapt immediately to new laws and regulations, but stay with their
traditional, more informal business culture for a certain time, as the formal institutional
environment is still incomplete or its functionality diminished. Informality is therefore
not associated with illegality or the informal sector, but can be understood as informal
interactions within formal organisations.
Firms’ patterns of organising their customer producer relations can range from very
informal to very formal, referring to the dimensions of informality: personalisation,
form and precision of agreements, enforcement mechanisms and the power used to en-
force agreements (Li 2007:229–231). In this case, informal behaviour completes formal
behaviour. What is expected, but remains to be studied, is whether informality in
interactions vanishes in complete formal institutional settings, or whether it remains
important to a certain degree because it overcomes the paradigm of formal and informal
institutions. Hence, HK firms would still apply informal modes to organise their cus-
tomer producer relations. To prove propositions derived from the conceptual discussion,
the following empirical research question and hypotheses are formulated:
H How well is the formal institutional environment in HK and the PRD developed?
What informal institutions guide the way of doing business in HK and the PRD?
Hypothesis B1 China’s formal institutional environment still has weaknesses concerning
the safeguards for trade between firms.
Hypothesis B2 If the formal institutional framework changes from a planned economy to
a market economy, informal institutions persist for a certain time. The business culture
of HK entrepreneurs has, in general, adapted to the formal market mechanisms, whereas
the Chinese managers still use informal practices more intensively than HK firms.
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Hypothesis B3 Despite HK’s complete establishment of formal institutions, informal
elements in interaction with customers and producers remain important to a certain
degree and complement formal practices.
Hypothesis B4 The use of informal practices in customer producer relations leads to
greater firm flexibility.
2.4 Governance Modes in Customer Producer Relations:
A Firm’s Perspective
In accordance with Lewin et al. (1999), it has been discussed how the market and
industry conditions on a global level (see Section 2.2) and the institutional environment
on a national or regional level (see Section 2.3) influence firms’ behaviour. This section is
aproached from a firm’s perspective and emphasises the adaptation of firms to a changing
industrial and institutional environment. The focus is placed on the governance modes
selected by firms to organise their customer and producer relations. To answer research
question C, this section will give explanations as to:
• why transaction costs define the boundaries of a firm
• how transactional specifications derived from the market and industry conditions
influence the choice of governance modes
• how the institutional environment determines the choice of governance modes
• what governance modes firms can be expected to apply in the GPRD
In Section 2.4.1, the concept of transaction costs and their importance for the gov-
ernance modes of customer producer relations will be explained. Firms tend to choose
the governance modes which result in a minimum of transaction costs. Section 2.4.2
refers to the different governance modes: market, hybrids and hierarchies. It analyses
their strengths and weaknesses comparatively. As the selection of governance modes de-
pends on the transaction costs involved, it will be taken into account which determinants
influence those costs. In Section 2.4.3, transactional specifications will be examined ac-
cording to their impact on governance modes. Section 2.4.4 explains the interplay of the
development status of the institutional environment and the governance modes selected
by firms. The last Section 2.5.1 gives an account of the special situation in HK and the
PRD. Finally, the hypotheses derived from this section are presented.
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2.4.1 Idea and Concept of Transaction Cost Economics
As outlined in Section 2.3.1, Coase (1937) first introduced the idea of transaction
costs to the academic community. Traditional economic theory suggested that because
the market is “efficient”, it should always be cheaper to subcontract than to produce in-
house. But instead of using markets, companies tend to be organised as hierarchies, using
a chain of command and control rather than negotiation, markets and explicit contracts.
Coase (1937) explained that the costs of using the market—he calls them transaction
costs—were too high. Within the firm, the entrepreneur may be able to reduce these
transaction costs by coordinating these activities himself. Williamson (1987:19) sees
transaction costs as “the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems”. When
firms organise their customer and producer relations, initial transaction costs occur
when arranging and organising the transaction in advance (ex-ante transaction cost),
and subsequent transaction costs arise for the implementation of transactions afterwards
(ex-post transaction cost) (Williamson 1987:20–22). Ex-ante transaction costs are
incurred in the following areas:
• Information: Costs occur when a firm is searching for customers and producers.
Firms have to find information about experience, ability, reliability, location and
contact persons of prospective partners. This includes costs for visiting potential
partners, advertising, exhibitions etc. Firms can reduce their transaction costs
using former partners who have already proven their reliability. When firms look
for new customers and producers, business networks help to gain information and
ensure against opportunistic behaviour of potential partners. Recommendations
within business networks, for example, facilitate the access to potential partners
and information (Blumberg 1998:18–19; Richter and Furubotn 1996:51–52).
• Negotiation, drafting and conclusion of agreements: This includes costs
for preparation of information, legal advice, contract draft etc. The more complex
the topic and the more money involved, the more difficult and time-consuming
the negotiations, drafting and conclusion of contracts are. The precise descrip-
tion of contractual details in writing (formal) involves high costs, but makes en-
forcement costs calculable. In contrast, less precise and verbally agreed contracts
(informal) involve lower ex ante costs, but make potential enforcement costs incal-
culable (Blumberg 1998:18–19; Richter and Furubotn 1996:52; Lyons 1994,
Williamson 1987:20).
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The ex-post transaction costs of working with customers and producers include the
costs of running and control transactions, the cost of renegotiations, and the cost of the
enforcement of contracts:
• Running and control: Costs arise from the necessity to control quality and
quantity of products as well as the delivery time. Opportunistic behaviour has to
be reduced to a certain limit. Trust, reputation and reciprocity—typical traits of
business networks—decrease the costs of controlling transactions accurately.
• Renegotiations: Costs occur when transactional details have to be changed,
renegotiated and refined. Renegotiations are either caused by unexpected changes
in demand, or can be knowingly provoked by former incomplete contracts (Klein
2005:436).
• Enforcement: Dispute resolution and the enforcement of contracts involve costs,
as can be seen in litigation processes. But alternatively, more informal forms, such
as negotiation and mediation, can keep these costs to a minimum (Go¨bel 2002:64;
Richter and Furubotn 1996:52–53).
Wallis and North (1986:121) tried to measure the transaction costs as a share of
the GDP in the United States. According to their estimation, transaction costs rose
from 16.1% in 1870 to 54.7% in 1970. Almost all the empirical literature avoids any
attempts to measure transaction costs directly. Instead, they use a reduced model in
which transaction costs are assumed to be minimised by firms. Williamson (1987)
argues that transaction costs vary depending on the institutional environment, because
the use of institutions involves costs. As firms try to minimise transaction costs, they
adopt firm organisation to the institutional environment. They look for the most ef-
ficient way to organise their business with customers and producers. Basically, the
academic literature distinguishes between three governance modes—market, hierarchy
and hybrids—organising the relationships between customers and producers. In real-
ity, many more mixed forms can be observed (Williamson 1979:235). As firms tend
to minimise their costs, they select the optimal governance mode. For example, when
market institutions are not well developed, their use is very costly for firms. However,
firms tend to avoid market relations and organise their customer producer relations in
hybrid modes or hierarchies. The next Section 2.4.2 addresses the traits associated with
the different governance modes (Menard 2005:293; Shelanski and Klein 1995:285).
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2.4.2 Traits of Markets, Hierarchies and Hybrids
Markets
From the economic point of view, markets should be the most efficient governance mode
to organise the production process and herewith relations to customers and producers.
Markets are coordinated by prices. Therefore, they remain highly impersonal in compar-
ison to hybrid forms or hierarchies (Menard 2005:303–305). The existence of a large
number of potential trading partners provides an extensive choice on the one hand, but
on the other hand also increases the cost of finding the right trading partner (Bicken-
bach et al. 1999:6). Customers and producers can be randomly paired and exchanged
(see Table 2.3). Therefore, specific investments are rare on markets. Market transactions
provide players with considerable autonomy and flexibility to exploit profit opportunities
by adjusting their behaviour to unfolding events. But in the case of major events which
require the adaptation of the entire value chain, market-based chains have difficulties
adapting because of their anonymous organisation. Contracts constitute an important
arrangement for organising market transactions, since firms do not have much else for the
parties to rely upon. Different governance modes use distinct forms of contracts. The
classical contracts characterised by legal rules, formal documents and self-liquidating
transactions are typical for market transactions (Menard 2005:304–305). Therefore,
effective third-party enforcement mechanisms (public ordering) are required, which are
usually associated with a market-oriented institutional setting (Menard 2005:304–305).
Markets rely heavily on a formal setting according to the definition of informality. The re-
lationships are usually organised in impersonal ways, and contracts are therefore mostly
written in detail and enforcement is organised by courts.
Hierarchy
As mentioned above, at the other end of the spectrum lies the hierarchical exchange.
It characterises transactions that take place under the unified ownership and control
of one firm (vertical integration). When investments are very specific, vertical integra-
tion is often the best way to protect investments against opportunistic behaviour. The
biggest disadvantage of hierarchies is their low-powered economic stimulation, which
reduces their ability to adapt quickly to unpredictable market changes. Moreover, the
limited external exchange of information and knowledge can lead to lock-in effects (see
Table 2.3). In contrast, hierarchies provide relatively efficient mechanisms for respond-
ing to major market changes where coordinated adaptation of several units of a value
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Table 2.3: Attributes of governance modes
Market Non-equity
Coopera-
tion
Equity Co-
operation
Hierarchy
Theoretical
nature
arm’s length
contracts
commitment
to cooperate
obligation to
cooperate
vertical
integration
Character of
relations
contracting
arrangement
on buying
and selling
framework
agreement
registered
exchange of
equity
establishment
of subsidiary
by parent
company
under unified
ownership
Intimacy impersonal personal personal internal
relations
Asset specificity low medium low medium high high
Frequency of
transactions
low medium low medium high high
Investment not specific moderately
specific
specific very specific
Change of
customers and
producers
very easy easy difficult nearly
impossible
Administrative
control
nil little some much
Quick response
to external
changes
very high high low very low
Adaption of
entire units
very low low high very high
Enforcement
mechanisms
legalistic
(public
ordering)
mixture of
public and
private
ordering
mixture of
public and
private
ordering
private
ordering
Source: own composition according to Williamson (2005:49); Pies (2001:15) and
Wang and Nicholas (2007:131–137)
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chain is necessary (adaptation of entire units). As firms do not need proper contracts
for internal firm organisation, managers can easily react to orders and have the right to
reallocate tasks (Menard 2005:291; Klein 2005:436). It can be expected that HK firms
opt more often for a hierarchical organisation when working in China, because it seems
to be suitable even if environments are no longer so uncertain. Williamson (1998:50)
refers to a third mode of organisation—the T-mode, where T indicates a temporary or
transitional situation. This form can be observed in developing markets where tech-
nology and rivalry are undergoing rapid changes. According to Williamson (1998:50)
“Joint ventures [. . . ] should sometimes be thought of as T-modes of organization that
permit the parties to remain players in a fast-moving environment.” Parties can pool re-
sources to meet market demand for price and quality. Unsuccessful joint ventures (JVs)
will transform to other governance modes later on, while successful JVs will remain in
operation. In this work, T-modes are counted among hybrid forms of organisation (see
next paragraph). It can be expected that during economic transition in China, firms
tend to rely more heavily on those intermediate forms to keep their flexibility.
Hybrids
In between markets and hierarchies, the extreme modes of governance, there is a broad
range of hybrid governance structures. Examples of hybrid modes include the exchange
of shares with trading partners, a joint ownership arrangement, the issuing of a licence
to another firm, long-term contracting (framework agreements), franchising, strategic
alliances etc. (Shelanski and Klein 1995:341; Klein 2005:438; Menard 2004:347–
350). Hybrids develop when markets shape up as being unable to adequately allocate the
relevant resources and capabilities in situations where vertical integration would reduce
flexibility, create irreversibility and weaken market stimulation. In choosing a specific
form of hybrid, contracting parties attempt to retain the respective advantages and avoid
the respective disadvantages of markets and hierarchies for transactions. According
to Menard (2004), three regularities characterise hybrids: pooling of resources, con-
tracting modes and competing. The capitalisation on pooled resources and capabilities
requires inter-firm coordination and cooperation. This involves the risk of opportunis-
tic behaviour. Therefore, the identity of partners is important. Hybrids involve joint
planning and an exchange of codified and tacit knowledge, competencies and technolo-
gies. It can be expected that firms which produce complex products for the high-end
market rely more often on hybrid firms than on hierarchies or markets (Wang and
Nicholas 2007:131–137). They want to avoid opportunistic behaviour—a risk of mar-
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kets. Additionally, they want to facilitate external knowledge transfer, which is difficult
in hierarchies. Pooling resources does not make sense without some continuity in their
relationship. This leads to different contracting modes—the second regularity. Clas-
sical contracts tend only to provide a relatively simple and uniform framework. They
are less suitable for serving hybrids in long-term relationships. This assumes that hy-
brids rely much more on personal issues, because otherwise the risk of opportunistic be-
haviour is too high. Without a certain degree of informal constraints—trust, reputation,
reciprocity—hybrids do not work efficiently (Bickenbach et al. 1999:7–8; Shelanski
and Klein 1995:345; Menard 2005:296). Therefore, hybrid modes are taken as more
informal modes of governance in this work. Section 2.5.1 provides more insights into how
informality in hybrids is applied in China (guanxi). A third determinant is the role of
competition and cooperation among partners. Although they cooperate on some issues,
parties also compete against each other. The risk results from difficulties in changing
trading partners and unforeseeable revisions regarding the cooperation. Moreover, de-
spite the advantage of limited opportunistic behaviour in long-term cooperation, firms
have to bear in mind that they sometimes miss out on good deals from other firms
(McMillan 1995:213). The traits of hybrids seem to be characterised by intimacy,
privacy and interdependency of partners. Different forms provide firms with different
opportunities for doing business. The involvement of equity in hybrid modes seems to
distinguish two fundamental forms of hybrids:
• Equity cooperation: Relations involving capital exchange between partners (for
example JVs) are referred to as equity cooperation (see Table 2.3). Equity co-
operation is more closely related to hierarchies than to markets. The common
ownership provides an incentive for non-opportunistic collaboration and facilitates
the transfer of resources between partners. The complex procedure of register-
ing an equity exchange involves a long-term perspective (Wang and Nicholas
2007:131–137).
• Non-equity cooperation: Hybrids which are organised without any equity rela-
tionships are referred to as non-equity cooperation. Their affinity for cooperation
can be indicated by framework agreements, which can be loosely concluded. Non-
equity cooperation is long-term oriented to reduce uncertainty and support invest-
ments (Goffin et al. 2006:191). This is different to buying-selling agreements on
markets. The non-equity cooperation is more closely related to markets than to
hierarchies. Wang and Nicholas (2007) emphasised the role of equity and non-
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equity cooperation, especially against the background of research in the GPRD.
Incorporation in non-equity cooperation means more openness and greater flexibil-
ity, allowing terms and conditions to be continuously negotiated between partners,
but without being unified under common ownership. Such organisational struc-
ture allows HK firms, for example, to exercise control over Chinese producer firms
without incurring equity investments. Non-equity cooperation is characterised by
a strong commitment of parties to exchanging information, sharing control and
making common decisions. But as no capital exchange has to be registered, trans-
action costs of entering and exiting the partnership are attenuated. Non-equity
relationships can be established quickly in order to take advantage of short-term
business opportunities and dissolved when they have completed their assigned task
(Wang and Nicholas 2007:131–137).
2.4.3 Transactional Specification and Governance Modes
Transaction cost economics assume that there are rational economic reasons for organ-
ising transactions in one way or another. The literature distinguishes between specifi-
cations concerning the transaction and specifications concerning the institutional envi-
ronment as critical factors for determining the governance mode to organise relations to
customers and producers (see Figure 2.6).
Assuming that the institutional setting remains unchanged, transaction specification
should be taken into account first. The attributes discussed in the literature which have a
significant influence on the selection of governance modes are the degree of relationship-
specific assets, market and behavioural uncertainty and the frequency with which the
transaction occurs (Shelanski and Klein 1995:338; Menard 2005:285). In order to
compare alternative governance modes, the analysis focuses on three attributes (indepen-
dent variables) which determine the mode of governance with the minimal transaction
cost (dependent variable). In the following section, the three attributes will be examined
in detail.
Asset specificity is the most influential attribute for transactions. According to
Williamson (1987:55) “asset specificity refers to durable investments that are under-
taken in support of particular transactions”. In fact, it contains the value of investments
which would be lost in any alternative use. Highly specific assets create mutual depen-
dence. The academic literature mainly distinguishes between physical asset specificity
and human asset specificity (Shelanski and Klein 1995:339). Physical asset specificity
refers to special purpose equipment for production. Human asset specificity describes
47
Institutionally
expected
utility
Bounded
Rationality
Opportunistic
Behaviour
Behavioural
Assumptions
Transaction Cost
Formal 
Institutions
Informal 
Institutions
Asset
Specificity
Uncertainty
Frequency
Transaction specific
Environment
Institutional
Environment
Governance Modes
Market
Non-equity
Cooperation
Equity
Cooperation
Hierarchy
Figure 2.6: Determinants of transaction costs and governance modes
Source: Own figure
the worker-specific knowledge, transaction-specific knowledge or human capital. It can
be achieved through specialised training or through learning-by-doing. Human asset
specificity can be measured by technical specifications such as product complexity, the
degree of innovativeness of firms or the qualification of workers (Williamson 1979:242;
Shelanski and Klein 1995; Klein 2005:436–439; Saussier 2000:385). When asset
specificity is high, firms tend to opt for a hierarchical relationship to strongly control
and govern production. If asset specificity is low, firms tend to use market relationships.
Asset specificity gains importance in conjunction with the occurrence of bounded ra-
tionality and opportunism, because it leads to uncertainty about future events. In
the transaction cost theory, there is a distinction between market and behavioural un-
certainy. Market uncertainty derives from volatile and unpredictable market conditions
(Reichhart and Holweg 2007:1153). The more predictable the changing demand
for firms and the lower the competition intensity is, the better firms can cope with
market uncertainty (Krajewski et al. 2005:454; Klein 2005:436–439). In addition to
market uncertainty, behavioural uncertainty has been taken into account (Williamson
1987:58). The probability of behaving opportunistically cannot be measured in advance
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because of the bounded rationality. One can attempt to assess behavioural uncertainty
using industry experience working with partners, the method of choosing partners or the
precision of contractual agreements. In long-term dense cooperation, the ability to antic-
ipate the behaviour of the other party increases. Better knowledge and communication
within customer and producer relations leads to reduced uncertainties.
Figure 2.7 demonstrates the influence of market and behavioural uncertainty in trans-
actions on governance modes. Uncertainty is measured by k, whereas k0 = 0 indicates
that no uncertainty is involved and k3 indicates the highest uncertainty. It follows that
k0 < k1 < k2 < k3. A pure market relationship M(k) is appropriate if k0 ≤ k < k1.
When markets and behaviour are not uncertain, transactions do not require special safe-
guards. The advantage of market stimulation and quick adaptation can be realised (see
Table 2.3). It follows that when only a few safeguards are needed, markets provide an
efficient mode to manage customer producer relations. k1 indicates the trade-off point
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between markets M(k) and non-equity cooperation X(k). When firms face greater un-
certainty regarding the reliability of customers and producers (k1 ≤ k < k2), they can
either opt for more complex contracts and safeguards, which involve higher transaction
costs, or they can transform their governance mode to partnerships in non-equity coop-
eration, which provides them with the minimal transaction cost for higher uncertainty.
Although there is a widespread agreement that the discrete transaction paradigm “sharp
in by clear agreement, sharp out by clear performance” has served both law and eco-
nomics well, there is increasing awareness that many complex contracts are not of this
well-defined kind (Williamson 1979:235–248; Bickenbach et al. 1999:6; Menard
2005:305). In non-equity cooperation, specific investments can be protected by personal
trust and commitment. This results in the conclusion of framework agreements as a
sign of long-term cooperation and trust in the fact that remaining points can be set-
tled harmoniously at a later date. When the degree of uncertainty increases further
(k2 ≤ k < k3), equity-based cooperation Y (k) provides the lowest transaction costs for
firms. Equity cooperation between firms and their customers or producers provides even
more safeguards than non-equity cooperation. The unified ownership with a long-term
perspective partner commits firms to invest in and support the joint success. The ex-
pectation of better safeguards compensates the burden of a complicated and expensive
procedure to established a jointly owned firm. If the market and behavioural uncertainty
turns out to be very high (k ≥ k3), hierarchies H(k) are the most cost efficient mode
of organisation. Hierarchies offer greater protection for specific investments and provide
relatively efficient mechanisms for responding to change where coordinated adaptation
is necessary. A growing degree of uncertainty in terms of transactions makes the pro-
tection against opportunistic behaviour more expensive in hybrids and markets. These
costs for protection against opportunistic behaviour rise in free markets faster than in
cooperations, and much faster than in hierarchies (Pies 2001:9–18; Zenger et al. 2002;
Williamson 1998:38). In hierarchies, disputes can be settled without the time and costs
of using the legal system. There are other transaction costs, however, namely problems
of information flow, incentives, bureaucracy, monitoring and performance evaluation
(Klein 2005:436; Menard 2005:291).
It is important to understand the economic organisation of interactions between asset
specificity and uncertainty. Generally, it can be assumed that if assets are not specific, it
is less costly for firms to rely on markets, even if they work in an uncertain environment.
If assets are specific and uncertainty is low due to market changes and behaviour of firms
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being predictable, firms are encouraged to shift from hierarchical to equity cooperation
(Shelanski and Klein 1995:339–340; Menard 2005:285; Williamson 1987:60).
The third attribute, frequency, proved to be more difficult to enter into operation.
The frequency of a transaction is important, but depends on specificity and uncertainty
of transactions. For a one-off or occasional transaction, markets seem to be the best
solution, but they are also associated with the highest risk, because the trading partners
have no economic interest in future relations and may behave opportunistically. Only in
the case of less investment in specific assets and low market and behavioural uncertainty
do markets become the appropriate option. Transactions involving specific investments
are rarely organised via markets alone. Frequent transactions are organised better in
hierarchies or cooperative relations, as these are the best ways to learn from each other
and ensure satisfaction (Menard 2005:285).
2.4.4 Institutional Environment and Governance Modes
Besides the transactional specificity, the institutional setting also determines the trans-
action costs of different governance modes. Institutional frameworks can provide well
developed market institutions supporting interorganisational trade, but they can also
be poorly developed, which facilitates control and protection of business in hierarchies.
Markets require a dense web of institutions in order to support their existence and devel-
opment. If a region does not provide appropriate formal institutions to protect transac-
tion on markets, firms tend to organise their relations in hybrid forms, which gives them
more certainty for transactions. In hybrid forms, market failures can be compensated for
by informal institutions. They take over the functionality of formal rules (Cai and Yang
2008). If informal institutions do not provide a framework for safe transactions, firms or-
ganise production in hierarchies, because hierarchies have their own security mechanisms
to guard against market and behavioural uncertainty (Zenger et al. 2002). Moreover,
the dysfunctionality of the legal system does not affect hierarchical relations as much,
because contracts are not necessary and conflicts are usually settled in-house. But as
exchanges with the outside world are limited, hierarchies run the risk of miscalculation
or slower adaptation.
When regions undergo times of institutional change, they have to deal with a steadily
changing but improving market environment. Against the background of the develop-
ment in China, institutional change should be contrasted with the choice of governance
mode, while fixing specification of the attributes in transactions which determine gov-
ernance modes. While assuming that the market and behavioural uncertainty remains
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unchanged, the influence of the institutional setting on governance modes is illustrated
here. If the institutional environment improves and provides more safeguards, gov-
ernance modes start to shift (Pies 2001:17). Whereas transactions with the market
and behavioural uncertainty k > k1 are governed by non-equity relationships in an en-
vironment with poorly developed safeguards and enforcement mechanisms, in regions
providing well-developed safeguards, the same transactions would be organised via mar-
kets (see Figure 2.8). The new trade-off point between markets and non-equity relations
k′1 is associated with a higher uncertainty in transactions. All trade-off points behave
similarly and shift right (k2 → k′2, k3 → k′3).
As argued in Section 2.3.1, it takes some time before firms adapt to the new formal
institutions. Firms with their own production plants will not divest their plant imme-
diately, but will stay with their former business solution for a certain time. In the case
of expansion or completely changing production lines, firms tend to adapt to the new
institutional environment. They do not set up new production plants as they would
have done before, but look instead for a JV partner or a dense cooperation. They begin
to shift from hierarchies to hybrids. Firms safeguard business by relying on newly intro-
duced formal institutions, but they can also revert to informal institutions. Furthermore,
hybrid modes give firms the choice between more market-like and more hierarchical-like
methods. This results in a greater firm flexibility. In contrast, firms engaged in non-
equity cooperation do not switch to markets immediately (shift: k1 → k′1). Trust and
safety in their functional business networks keep them away from an immediate shift
from cooperation to markets. Therefore, it can be expected that more hybrid gover-
nance modes occur during the transformation process (Williamson 1998; Peng and
Zhou 2005), as the shift from hierarchies to hybrid starts early in the process, whereas
the shift from hybrids to markets starts later. The graph connecting all trade-off points
indicates the minimal transaction costs. If the trade-off points shift right, the graph of
minimal transaction costs moves closer to the x-axis. This shift results in lower transac-
tion costs overall in a region, because they can benefit from the lower costs of markets for
more transactions. To sum up, it can be expected that a more developed institutional
framework leads to an increased likelihood that transactions with a certain specificity
can be observed in a less hierarchical mode of governance, in turn leading to lower trans-
action costs. It can also be expected that more relationships are organised in hybrid
modes of governance during times of institutional change.
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2.4.5 Interim Conclusion and Hypotheses derived from Section 2.4
C How does the institutional environment and the transactional specificity affect the
choice of governance modes? What governance modes can be expected in HK and
the PRD?
To answer this research question, transaction cost theory was introduced. It is based
on the assumption that markets are not, as neoclassical theory predicts, necessarily the
most efficient governance mode to organise customer producer relations (Coase 1937).
The use of different governance modes—market, hybrids and hierarchies—is associated
with transaction costs for information about potential customers and producers, costs for
negotiation, draft and conclusion of contracts and costs to enforce contracts. These costs
differ for the three governance modes depending on the institutional environment and the
transactional specificity (Williamson 1987). In a well developed institutional setting,
minimal transaction costs are expected on markets, whereas hierarchies are associated
with high costs. If the institutional environment is poorly developed, hierarchies provide
the lowest costs and the best safeguards for firms against uncertainties. Furthermore,
firms tend to look for better safeguards in hierarchies when more transaction-specific
investments are involved. When institutional change in transitional economies takes
place, firms act in a setting of permanently improving formal institutions. Firms tend
to detach from hierarchical modes and prefer hybrid modes in the first stage. In a
second stage, when formal institutions are completely developed, firms should move to
market relationships. However, it is also argued that the flexibility offered by hybrids
remains attractive for firms. Consequently, they do not switch to markets. In order to
differentiate between types of hybrids, they will be divided into categories of equity and
non-equity cooperation.
The main aim of this paper is to explain the governance of customer and producer
relations of electronics firms in the GPRD by way of institutional factors. With the
beginning of the opening policy in China in 1979, HK firms started to move their pro-
duction plants to the Chinese mainland. At the same time, the demand for consumer
electronics grew and Western LFs decided to outsource production activities to lower-
cost economies. Electronics firms in HK benefited by providing a good deal: legal
security for contract conclusion and enforcement in HK, and cost-saving production in
China. HK firms act as intermediaries between global customers and local Chinese
producers in the electronics industry (Meyer et al. 2009). HK firms are expected to
adapt to the distinct institutional settings which depend on the location of partners.
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It is assumed that relationships with global partners are organised by markets or non-
equity cooperation, as safeguards provided by formal rules guard against opportunistic
behaviour. In contrast, it is assumed that HK firms’ relationships to China are focussed
on strong hierarchies or equity cooperation due to the incomplete institutional setting as
source of uncertainty. Moreover, HK firms rely on supply assurance, which can best be
realised in hierarchies and relationships of control (Bolton and Whinston 1993). As
China is on its way to improving formal rules and stabilising the business environment,
relationships set up recently are expected to be less hierarchically organised than those
set up around the time that China started its economic opening. Although formal in-
stitutions are on their way to adapting to international standards, informal institutions
retained their relevance despite being tailored to new contexts. Therefore, relationships
to Chinese-based firms are expected to be more frequently organised in hybrid forms.
To prove propositions derived from the conceptual discussion, the following empirical
research question and hypotheses were formulated:
I Do HK firms organise their business relations to customers and producers in the
PRD differently from their relations to customers and producers abroad? Is this a
consequence of the different development stages of the institutional environment?
Is there a trend toward hybrid forms of governance in China resulting from the
transitional change?
Hypothesis C1 HK firms are more likely to govern relationships to global customers
and producers via the markets, whereas they are likely to govern relationships to local
Chinese customers and producers in a hierarchical way.
Hypothesis C2 Differences in the applied governance modes of HK firms can be ex-
plained by the distinct institutional settings in the PRD and HK.
Hypothesis C3 With the progress of institutional change in China, HK firms’ relation-
ships to PRD-based firms have shifted from strongly hierarchical organisations to hybrid
modes, and lately to more market-like relationships.
2.5 Formal and Informal Interactions within Customer
Producer Relations: A Firm’s Perspective
The previous section focussed on the institutional environments and the different gover-
nance modes they foster. This section goes beyond the selection of governance modes. It
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will outline the interplay of formal and informal interactions within customer producer
relations, while looking at recruitment procedures, contractual arrangements, enforce-
ment mechanisms. According to the model of Lewin et al. (1999), the interaction pro-
cesses will be analysed against the background of institutional and industrial dynamics.
Answers will be provided for the following (research question D):
• under what circumstances do firms prefer informal to formal practices for organ-
ising their customer producer relations?
• how does the use of informal interactions in recruitment procedures, contractual
arrangements and enforcement mechanisms affect the flexibility of firms?
• what differences are expected between the behaviour of firms in HK and the PRD?
To pursue their business interests, firms need transactional safeguards. Section 2.5.1
focuses on the variety of recruitment procedures for new customers and producers, in-
cluding different ex ante safeguards for transactional success. Those safeguards are
designed to increase the likelihood of conflict-free trade while also choosing the right
partner. Procedures will be divided into formal and informal practices. The way con-
tractual arrangements are concluded provides additional safeguards (see Section 2.5.2).
Section 2.5.3 concentrates on the ex post enforcement mechanisms which come into force
when ex ante safeguards are not sufficient to guarantee smooth trade and when disputes
need to be settled.
This is the foundation for a systematic study of the interaction processes of firms in
China and HK which is designed to illustrate the differences caused by the institutional
environment. It is a response to the request of Coase (1992:719) for empirical data on
contracts to support the theoretical discussion.
“I have come to the conclusion that the main obstacle faced by researchers in
industrial organization is the lack of data on contracts and the activities of firms”
2.5.1 Contacting and Selecting Customers and Producers
In this section, the recruitment procedures for customers and producers are examined.
Recruitment processes are divided firstly according to the channels used to contact
customers and producers, and secondly according to the selection process. In the neo-
classical theory, firms are expected to select their business producers and customers by
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evaluating their rational factors of success (for example firm performance, product qual-
ity etc.). This could be interpreted as an impersonal and therefore formal method of
recruiting customers and producers. But new approaches add softer evaluation criteria
to this collection (for example personal relations, industry experience). These contain
more personal and therefore informal elements. Granovetter (1985) is thought to
be the first person to have intensively studied the effect of social networks on business
success. He found that social networks are transformed into business networks. He devel-
oped the concept of ”embeddedness”. This implies that the structure of social networks
determines the choice of economic trading partners and how to interact with them. Em-
pirical information on social networks proved positive effects on economic development
and democracy (Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000), economic exchange (Coleman 1990;
Burt 1992), education (Coleman 1988) and career success (Baker 2000). Social
networks are particularly beneficial when economic transactions take place in an envi-
ronment of high risk and uncertainty. Elaborating on social networks provides an insight
into why social networks are beneficial for managers. An examination of the Chinese
business culture and their guanxi networks strengthens the assumption that personal
networks have a positive influence on a firm’s flexibility. When managers decide to use
their personal networks to recruit new customers and producers, for example, it usually
takes less time to contact them than using an official bidding process. The informal
character of interactions in social networks and its advantages for the organisation of
customer producer relationships will become clear. According to the definition of in-
formality in Section 2.3.3, the recruitment process via social networks touches on the
dimension of personalisation. Recruitment can be based on personal or impersonal ties,
which refers to informal or formal modes respectively. The way firms choose to recruit
customers and producers provides the basis for the level of informality applied in the
two other dimensions—contractual arrangements and their enforcement.
Guanxi—Chinese Business Networks
In China, business and social networks are not separated, but combined to produce a
mixed form of network, which is called guanxi. Guanxi indicates a personalised network
of influence. Basically, guanxi describes a personal connection between two people or
a network of contacts, the idea of which is to draw on established connections in order
to secure favours in personal interests (Dunning and Kim 2007; Luo and Chen 1997;
Park and Luo 2001). A manager’s guanxi network is part of the Chinese way of doing
business. It can be seen as a special form of business network which has strong affiliations
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Table 2.4: The traits of guanxi
Traits Description
Personal Guanxi is established between individuals
Reciprocal An individual’s reputation is tied up with reciprocal obligations
Intangible Guanxi maintained by an unspoken commitment
Long-term Guanxi is reinforced through long-term cultivation
Transferable Guanxi is transferable through a third party as a referral
Utilitarian Guanxi is purposefully driven by personal interests
Source: According to Dunning and Kim (2007:331)
with social networks. The use of guanxi networks is deeply rooted in Chinese society,
as opposed to an adaptation to the political structure. But it should be mentioned that
guanxi is an instrument with special traits which are used to fill gaps in the formal
institutional setting.
The traits of guanxi are manifold (see Table 2.4). Firstly, guanxi operates on the level
of individuals and is highly personal. Psychological research has shown that in personal
contacts, face-to-face visual clues, such as facial expression, gesture and posture play a
significant role in understanding and trusting the other party and give all participants
the feeling that the other can be influenced more, thus making it appear more worthwhile
to enter into cooperation (Putnam 1993; Misztal 2000). Misztal (2000) proved that
informal meetings still matter, as face-to-face contacts have the potential to draw indi-
viduals deeper into relationships with one another and to develop trust and intimacy.
Macaulay (1963) observed that businessmen still trust in and rely on a man’s word in
a brief letter or a handshake, even if they take higher risks concerning the transaction.
Moreover, experiments revealed that in face-to-face discussion, participants reach agree-
ment sooner than in any other negotiation setting. This leads to greater confidence in
the negotiation processes. Additionally, studies discovered that personal contacts make
negotiations more of an issue between two people than between two firms, and nego-
tiations are less formalised. Secondly, guanxi is reciprocal in the exchange of favours.
Reciprocal processes are seen as a supplement to formal procedural rules. They involve
mutual expectations on the part of the economic agents that a favour granted now will
be repaid later. It is perpetual. Reciprocity can also result in mutual dependency, which
might limit the flexibility to choose between different options. This can negatively ef-
fect the relationship between informality and flexibility. Thirdly, guanxi is an intangible
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asset. People in the network are committed to each other by an informal and unwritten
code of trust. This guards against opportunistic behaviour, as the reputations of indi-
viduals are damaged when they disappoint their partners. Fourthly, guanxi is long-term
oriented. Every guanxi relationship expands the stock of relational capital. It takes time
to establish a functional guanxi network. Investments are initially high, but if a guanxi
network is established it enables firms to react quickly to changes and provides them
with a certain degree of flexibility. Fifthly, guanxi is transferable. If A has guanxi with
B, and B is a friend of C, then B can introduce and recommend A to C. Finally, guanxi
is a utility concept. It is based on the exchange of favours, not on sentiments. If guanxi
with other parties is no longer achieving objectives, it is easily broken (Dunning and
Kim 2007:330–331; Luo and Chen 1997; Park and Luo 2001:457).
In regions such as China, which prosper based on those social networks, the play-
ers usually see their mutual confidence as a natural fact rather than an adaptation to
the political structure. Therefore, guanxi relationships cannot easily be created—they
have their roots in culture and history. Fearon and Laitin (1996:730) found that
social networks are better developed and interactions are more frequent within ethnic
groups, because they share certain similarities. Guanxi provides a good example of that.
Therefore, social networks are not necessarily related to the spatial proximity of players,
although in many cases they are (Sabel 1993:1133; de Mesquita and Stephenson
2006:43–44).
When contrasting the guanxi network in China with business networks in developed
countries, significant differences become apparent. Firstly, the two networks suggest
different steps and methods of doing business. In China, one builds the relationship
first and the transactions will follow. A signed contract marks the end of the first
stage in business dealings. But contracts are not necessarily seen as binding - they are
subject to change. People abide by the content of contracts simply because of their high
personal regard for their business partner. In Western business culture, transactions are
put first. Relationships are the second stage and are sometimes seen as consequences
of transactions. For Westerners, keeping promises results from their respect for the
contract, not for the trading partner. Secondly, the Chinese are more people-oriented,
while Westerners are more task-oriented. They focus on different factors. The Chinese
are more concerned about the harmony of the group, because they believe that respect
and caring for others results in future business advantages. This situation makes business
difficult between Westerners and the Chinese. As Ai (2006:107) put it, “a Westerner
would say that the Chinese cannot be trusted because they will always help their friends,
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and a Chinese would think that he would never trust Westerners since they would not
even help a friend.” Thirdly, the scope of perspectives is different. Westerners tend to
focus on the smallest possible unit of economic exchange—a single transaction—in the
shortest time. In guanxi networks, however, businessmen focus on long-term alliances,
which enables them to react quickly (Ai 2006).
Advantages of Contacting and Selecting within Networks
When firms want to recruit new customers and producers, they can choose from a
variety of methods ranging from very impersonal to very personal. Whereas a bidding
competition or an internet search can be deemed highly impersonal and an exhibition
moderately personal, recruitment through networks is highly personal. Using networks,
firms can either transact with customers and producers they know, or they can use
the transferability of networks and interact with a third party (DiMaggio and Louch
1998). When firms in China use their guanxi networks, they profit from the intangible,
transferable and reciprocal character of the network. Other network members are com-
mitted either to providing their services to the firm (intangible), or they recommend
a third party (transferable). Firms save ex ante transaction costs for screening their
environment for new customers and producers, collecting information and establishing
the first contact (Powell 1990; DiMaggio and Louch 1998; Granovetter 1985).
As networks are reciprocal, firms which profit from other members are willing to repay
favours. Preliminary empirical evidence has been found in the study of Gaston and
Bell (1988). They proved that two-thirds of investors in the informal capital market
find investments through their networks. The most reliable sources are friends and busi-
ness partners. Shiller and Pound (1989) confirmed those findings. They found that
the majority of purchasers of publicly traded common stocks buy based on information
from friends and business associates. Personal relations support the process to gain
information about the expectation of others (Cai and Yang 2008). Here, the issue of
multiple levels in networks must be discussed. Networks are usually developed on an
individual level, but are often transferred to a firm level. This does not skew empirical
finding as long as firms are small and/or family-led. The owner and manager are the
same person and the owner’s network is identical to the firm’s network. This mainly
applies to SMEs in HK and China. In large firms with frequent changes in management
positions, a distinction must be made between the networks of individuals and those of
the firm. This is also the case for large CMs in HK.
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When firms can revert to networks, they enlarge their pool of choices for recruiting
new customers and producers. Very impersonal contact channels are at everybody’s
disposal, but personal channels are not available to all firms. They can be seen as
additional opportunities to use. Moreover, under volatile industry and market conditions
with changing demand, time is essential for a firm’s competitiveness. As a personal
network is always ready to use, it seems to be a quicker way of activating new customers
and producers at short notice (Millington et al. 2006). It can be concluded that
personal contact channels (informal dimension) provide an additional option for firms to
contact potential partners quickly and cost-effectively. As speed is demanded in response
to changing markets, a network helps to identify who has surplus orders and whose
machines are available. Networks smooth the flow of information and resources between
firms and the order-to-delivery cycle time shortens (Lee 1997:194-195). This increases
the flexibility of firms (Volberda 1996:361). Empirically, Menard (2004:361) could
prove that the use of informal modes through networking to recruit new customers and
producers opens up additional opportunities for firms without weakening any formal
modes. Nevertheless, networks can also lead to a lock-in if firms rely on them exclusively.
Once contact channels are established, potential customers and producers have to
be evaluated and selected by firms. Again, the neoclassical literature assumes a
rational selection process (Angeles and Nath 2000; Hitt et al. 2000; Saffu and
Mamman 2000). But bounded rationality limits the scope of firms to assess a potential
partner’s quality and reliability in advance. Firms can decide either to try to assess po-
tential partners quality and reliability within a screening scheme of their own (formal),
or they can trust in a network of firms with pooled experiences (informal). Researchers
such as Duysters et al. (1999) and recently Pidduck (2006:265) argue “that a new
perspective on partnership is needed to handle recent rapid economic and technological
developments, and propose a more personal approach to partnership”. As guanxi net-
works in China provide a personal base, intangible assets and a long-term perspective,
firms can benefit from ex ante safeguards concerning their choice of new partners. In
long-term personal relationships, trust is built on the performance of other parties. For-
mer experiences can be used as an indicator for future satisfaction (MacLeod 2006).
If a firm has no experiences of its own to evaluate, the pooled experiences of the guanxi
network can be used to investigate reputations. If a producer has acquired a good rep-
utation, it is treated as an asset which loses its value should the producer disappoint
customers. In case of a breach, the disappointed party carries out actions that harm the
reputation of the breaching party. Producers would lose their reputation and customers
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would refuse to continue buying, believing that further breaches are likely in the future.
Firms trade off the benefit of breaching against the cost of damaging their reputation
(MacLeod 2006:6; Araujo and Ornelas 2007:3). Using the characteristics of net-
works, firms are able to safeguard the success of their transactions ex ante. The selected
customers and producers are more committed to fulfilling a firm’s requirements, because
they fear losing their reputation otherwise. This reduces the risk of opportunistic be-
haviour. Especially when the formal institutional setting does not provide appropriate
mechanisms to safeguard future transactions by way of precisely written contracts (for-
mal safeguards), firms have to ensure their business success via the selection process of
customers and producers (informal safeguards). As for the contact channels, networks
also provide an additional opportunity for firms to select new customers and producers.
Besides the saving of transaction costs for long screening processes and transactional ex
ante safeguards, firms can speed up their selection process. Again, the use of personal
networks enhances the flexibility of firms (Seabright 2004).
Special Setting in Hong Kong and the PRD
As the institutional setting in the PRD is still in transition, Chinese firms are expected
not to rely on formal safeguards alone to ensure transactional success. The reasons
for this lie in the dysfunctionality of the formal safeguard system. Even though the
Chinese government has improved the legal system and encourages firms to make use
of Western-style contracts, firms cannot rely on the Chinese court system to enforce
contracts in case of conflicts. Therefore, Chinese firms must put great emphasis on the
careful recruitment of producers and customers as a safeguard for their transactions
(Millington et al. 2006). Bringing the recruitment process to a personal level and
therefore using an informal practice, firms hope to achieve better safeguards than in a
formal process. Moreover, firms benefit from a quicker recruitment process via networks.
However, they also have to deal with the disadvantages of networks, which can also
repress and hinder business operations. Humphrey and Ashforth (2000) showed
that interpersonal relationships can also lead customers to award contracts to producers
who have higher unit costs, lower quality and slower delivery times. Therefore, they need
to be supported by formal structures to guard against the negative effects of informality,
such as opportunistic behaviour and its intransparency (Misztal 2000:7). In developed
institutional environments such as HK, firms are expected to take into account formal
and informal recruitment methods and balance them. Although formal safeguards can
be ensured by a functional legal system and transactions with strangers can be ensured
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by contracts, recruitment within networks might still be appealing because of cost and
time-reducing aspects. This raises the question of how guanxi networks are affected
by institutional change. Xin and Pearce (1996) and Nee (1992) see guanxi as a
substitute for the deficiencies of formal institutional artifacts and failures in the legal
system. Proponents of this thesis argue that guanxi will become less important in the
future. On the other hand, other experts argue that guanxi is also transforming into a
more functional business network. Whereas the traditional guanxi network consists of
family (zijiaren) and fellows/helpers (shouren), it has now changed to strangers/business
partners (shengren), which makes it more effective for business (Millington et al.
2006). Studies of business culture in HK or Taiwan are widely used to provide examples
of the transition—but nevertheless survival—of guanxi in the modern market (Fan 2002;
Zhang and Zhang 2006). Therefore, HK firms are expected to recruit customers and
producers in China within guanxi networks, whereas they might apply a mixture of
varieties to recruit customers and producers in Western countries.
2.5.2 Concluding Contractual Arrangements
When a business partner is selected, contractual arrangements have to be discussed.
A variety of contractual agreements ranging from formal to informal provide different
safeguards for transactions. Principle agent theory and contract theory discuss the trade-
off between formal and informal contracting against the background of the institutional
environment.
The contract theory focuses on a group of firms economising on joint surplus. Con-
tractual arrangements are needed to direct the economic exchange. If actions for every
possible state of the world could be specified in a legally enforceable contract—called
complete contract—the organisation of economic exchange would be easy and safe. Par-
ties would design a contract covering all contingencies, future possibilities for deals and
the reaction of both parties to it. Behaviour deviating from the agreements in the con-
tract would result in penalties which could be enforced by courts (Masten 2000). But
in the real world, economic agents firstly behave opportunistically, and secondly act
according to bounded rationality as outlined in the assumptions of the NIE (see Sec-
tion 2.3.1). This leads to (1) information asymmetry between customers (principle) and
producers (agents), and (2) to incomplete contracts.
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Figure 2.9: Principle agent relations
Source: Own draft
(1) Principle Agent Theory
The principle-agent-theory assumes that the principle (customer) entrusts the agent
(producer) with a job. He uses the agent to follow his own goals. The principle expects
the agent to put his entire effort into fulfilling the principle’s job, rather than having
his own goals in mind. But the principle only has limited opportunities to monitor and
control the agent’s engagement (occurrence of hidden actions), because of his bounded
rationality (see Figure 2.9). He only sees the result of his effort (for example the firm’s
sales). It can be assumed that the principle and agent have individual interests and
different aims. Therefore, the agent acts with the advantage of information, because he
knows about both his own interests and those of the principle. He can use information
asymmetry to the principle’s disadvantage (opportunistic behaviour). The fact that
customers have to deal with a lack of information results in two issues typically charac-
terising principle-agent-relationships: moral hazards and adverse selection (McMillan
1995:205).
• Moral hazards: Customers fear moral hazards when agents (producer) deviate
from joint surplus maximising behaviour after an apparent omission of risk. For
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example, it is possible that a customer urgently searching for a specialised producer
may subcontract to that producer before the producer realises the rarity of his
production capabilities. The producer’s awareness of this rarity reduces the risk
of losing the customer. He would then start to strengthen his position against the
customer. Customers fear moral hazards stemming from the information available
to producers.
• Adverse Selection: Adverse selection indicates a situation in which principles
(customers) can only choose between agents (producers) with less desirable charac-
teristics. For example, a customer is looking for a producer, but has no information
about the producer’s quality. Therefore, he is only willing to pay a medium price
(middle-of-the-road-choice) for the producer’s products. However, excellent pro-
ducers are less willing to sell their products for a medium price, whereas producers
with a poor quality are more willing. This leads to poor quality products on
markets, which is less desirable (Masten 2000).
A principle can reduce his risks by selecting the agent carefully. Efficient means of
recruitment are described in Section 2.5.1.
(2) Incomplete Contracts
There are two reasons for the existence of incomplete contracts. Firstly, it has been
shown that bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour on the part of principles
and agents results in information asymmetry. As complete contracts require complete
information, it must be concluded that contracts cannot be completed, but rather always
remain incomplete (Tirole 1999:741; Segal 1999:57; Hart and Moore 1999:116).
The more complex the deal, the more difficult it is for parties to be able to provide a
clear and enforceable contract in advance which can be verified by courts. A second,
but weaker reason for contractual incompleteness is that transactors leave contingen-
cies unfixed when the costs of anticipating, devising optimal responses to and drafting
provisions for future events are higher than the expected gains from doing it. This is
a trade-off between the marginal cost of designing contingencies in a contract and the
marginal utility of gains and risk coverage. As there is no commonly agreed definition
for the incompleteness of contracts in the literature (Tirole 1999:743), this work refers
to contractual incompleteness according to Hart and Moore (1999:134). Firms
“rather [. . . ] write a contract that is incomplete, in the sense that it contains
gaps or missing provisions; that is, the contract will specify some actions the
parties must take but not others; it will mention what should happen in some
states of the world, but not in others. (Hart 1988:123)”
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Masten (2000:29–31) distinguishes between incomplete contract models with and
without renegotiation (dynamic and static models). In static models, the contract theory
assumes that parties agree not to renegotiate the contract even if a Pareto improvement
would be possible for both parties. In dynamic models, “[. . . ] parties agree some things
now and agree to agree other things later” (Hart and Moore 2004:2). This work
follows the suggestion of Masten. It distinguishes the dynamic from the static model.
A dynamic model exists when a framework agreement (FA) is concluded in advance with
an opportunity for renegotiation (RN). A static model exists when a direct contract (DC)
is concluded containing all contractual details without the possibility of renegotiation
(see Figure 2.10).
• Framework agreements (FA) with a renegotiation (RN) process: For some
economic exchanges, the contractual parties decide to conclude a FA in advance
and renegotiate or finalise details when an order is placed (Menard 2004:352).
For example, suppose that a customer and a producer sign a contract to trade
DVD players a year in advance. They may decide now on the price and on the
broad product specification, but may agree that the exact number of items and the
time of delivery will be determined later, when the actual order is placed (Mas-
ten 2000:37). Moreover, FAs often couple a customer’s minimum commitment to
purchase a certain percentage (e. g. 10%) below the forecast with the supplier’s
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guarantee to deliver a certain percentage (e. g. 5%) above if requested. FAs often
include constraints on the frequency of quantity changes by the customer (Kra-
jewski et al. 2005:454). As this requires a critical amount of commitment and
long-term orientation between parties, this process is expected to take place in
non-equity cooperation, equity cooperation or hierarchies, but not in markets. If
no equity is involved in the relationship between customers and producers, FAs are
the only indicator distinguishing non-equity cooperation from markets. If equity
is involved (equity cooperation, hierarchies), FAs might also be used to regulate
transactions between parent companies and their 100%-owned subsidaries, for ex-
ample, or parent companies and their associated JVs.
• Direct contracts (DC) without renegotiation: Contractual parties decide
not to have a supporting FA in advance, but settle all details directly with the
placement of orders. DC and the RN process within FAs take place at the same
time—when an order is placed. In RNs, only final details need to be agreed on,
whereas DCs involve the entire negotiation process being finalised with the place-
ment of orders. Therefore, it is expected that DCs need more time than RN.
Markets are defined by the DC model. Firms in equity cooperation and hier-
archies which strongly control their affiliates are expected to settle transactional
information directly (DC), whereas when they have less control they are expected
to use the FA and RN.
According to the definition of informality in Section 2.3.3, contractual arrangements
touch on the dimension of precision (precise (formal) to open-ended (informal)) and form
of contracts (written (formal) to verbal (informal)). The precision of contracts can be
measured by the level of details fixed. The overall recommendation of the minimum of
details fixed in contracts includes: quantity, quality, specification and price of products
as well as a clause stating what to undertake in case of conflicts (Williamson 2000:602-
603). FAs can be divided into very precise agreements, e. g. when there is little or nothing
to negotiate later, and open-ended agreements, e. g. when there is much to settle later.
The RN contract can again precisely fix the remaining points or leave gaps in contracts.
The same phenomenon is observable with direct contracts. Besides the level of details,
the form of agreements—written or verbal—is an important means of informality. The
more details are agreed on in written form, the more formalised the contract is.
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Institutions, Contracts and Special Situation in HK and the PRD
When the formal institutional environment does not provide safeguards for the enforce-
ment of contracts, firms’ incentive to design precisely written contracts is low. When
formal safeguards are missing, firms have to protect their transactional interests in other
ways. In doing so, it can be important how the relationship to the other parties is char-
acterised. A trust-based relationship, in which parties rely on reputation and reciprocity,
such as guanxi networks, provides informal safeguards which lead to self-enforcing con-
tracts (Menard 2004:362). Even if formal safeguards are available, firms still weigh
the cost of drawing up those contracts against the value which would be lost in case
of conflicts. Only when transaction-specific investments are high is it worth incurring
the considerable costs of administering complex and highly detailed contractual arrange-
ments (see model in Hart and Moore (2004:5–8) and Masten (2000)). In both cases,
agreements must be concluded, but their degree of precision or their form is not pivotal
for the ability to enforce them. Under certain circumstances, firms are expected to try
to agree only on the necessary details (Segal 1999:74). Choosing the informal way
might be associated with the lowest costs, and it is more flexible for firms, because not
all details have to be fixed at the same time. This means that they can speed up the
contractual process and revise and renegotiate on a steady platform in order to adapt
to changing demand.
Despite improvements in China, the institutional framework does not provide firms
with the appropriate safeguards for protecting their transactions efficiently. Even if
contractual details are formally fixed and verifiable, it is still difficult to enforce them
via the courts (Menard 2004:360). Therefore, it can be expected that firms tend to
rely on informal safeguards to protect business while using informal contracting—more
verbal and open-ended agreements. Additionally, the impact of contracts is low in
Chinese business culture. Contracts are not the results of intensive negotiations, but
they are seen rather as the beginning of a relationship over a much longer time period
(see guanxi). Therefore, the permanent renegotiation of contracts is a process which
accompanies the development of the relationship. HK firms act in a well-developed legal
setting which provides a third-party enforcement system for contracts. But even then,
it can be expected that HK firms use informal contracting modes for some parts of their
contracts, depending on external requirements. CMs are expected to be in a position
to formalise contracts with international customers. Contracts with Chinese producers
are assumed to be less formalised. Moreover, large firms are assumed to work more on
a formal contracting basis than SMEs. This fits with the requirement of flexibility of
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Asian producers. In industries with rapidly shifting technologies and markets, LFs have
no way to predict what product specification, capacity and design features are needed
in the next period. The high degree of uncertainty has important implications for the
reorganisation of special contractual arrangements. Firms need adjustable contracts
embedded in networks to ensure the ability to react to changing demand profiles of end
customers (Ernst 2004:106). Lee (1997:189) shows that one-third of the HK managers
rely on verbal contracts. According to Lee (1997:194), “informality provides flexibility
for individual entrepreneurs to deal with accidental changes in the business environment
while the formality provides a last resort to handle breached contracts.” Li-Ka Shing,
HK’s most famous businessman, agreed to deals of hundreds of millions of dollars without
a written contract (Choi 1994:677). Moreover, it can be expected that contracts become
more formalised with the continuation of the transformation process in China, but that
informal aspects retain their importance, as they provide firms with more flexibility in
some cases. Misztal (2000:3) summarises as follows:
“Managers’ appreciation of informal encounters and tacit understanding shows
that, although the process of formalization is the dominant trend in modern social
life, informality is the essential element in constructing trust relationships and,
therefore, in any cooperative arrangement aimed at improving the quality of life.
Nonetheless, [. . . ], managers would not like to abandon the formal guarantees
provided by the contract for the advantages of more personalized arrangements.
[. . . ] it can be said that the positive value of informality is only ensured in the
context of the process of formalization of individual rights and public rules.”
2.5.3 Enforcing Contracts
Although optimal ex ante safeguards for transactions are set (careful selection of part-
ners, contractual arrangements appropriate to the institutional environment), disputes
may still arise. Those disputes must be settled ex post. Firms try to enforce their con-
cluded arrangements, thereby choosing between formal and informal practices (MacLeod
2006; Choi 1994). According to the dimensions of informality and formality, a formal en-
forcement refers to a tight enforcement by legal power. In contrast, informal enforcement
mechanisms refer to a loose enforcement (willingness to deviate from original interests)
by social power. The selection of enforcement mechanisms of contracts depends on the
ex ante safeguards selected and the quality of the institutional environment (Araujo
and Ornelas 2007). For instance, if a contract is mainly settled informally, it will be
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Table 2.5: Safeguard and enforcement mechanisms of contracts with customers and
producers
Formal ←→ Informal
Ex ante
Safeguards
Recruitment
procedure
rational
selection ←→
recommenda-
tion
reputation
Contractual
arrangements
precise,
written ←→
open-ended,
oral
Ex post
Enforcement
Enforcement legal power ←→ social power
mechanisms Litigation Arbitra-
tion
Media-
tion
Negotiation
Source: Own draft
difficult to enforce it via courts. Firms must switch to less formal enforcement mech-
anisms. Furthermore, if a contract is formally specified, but costs and inefficiency are
high, firms avoid formal processes of contract enforcement (Goldsmith et al. 2006:85).
Litigation is widely recognised as the most formal of enforcement mechanisms. How-
ever, the high expenses involved in litigation open up the awareness for Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR). ADR involves arbitration, mediation and negotiation. It is
also interpreted as Appropriate Dispute Resolution. ADR is characterised by its use of
more informal elements in dispute resolution to find the appropriate way to solve prob-
lems while saving time and money. “The question is how one should design the rules
to encourage efficient settlement rather than litigation” (MacLeod 2006:13). Instead
of making a court appeal, firms should carefully choose the most appropriate series of
enforcement mechanisms. This does not mean that formal and informal mechanisms to
settle disputes are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they complement each other.
For example, firms can begin to negotiate or mediate and if no solution is reached, they
can opt for arbitration or litigation (MacLeod 2007). In the following section, the four
main dispute resolution mechanisms will be described and compared (see Table 2.5).
Negotiation is the simplest means of settling disputes. Taylor (2000) examines a
model of the old-boy network, in which conflicts are settled by negotiation. In the
Hanseatic League, businessmen preferred to negotiate their conflicts rather than use lit-
igation processes. The choice of informal enforcement processes is often associated with
informal contracting, since those agreements are less verifiable by courts. Negotiations
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mostly indicate the first step of dispute settlement. They only lead to a loose enforce-
ment, as compromises are usually reached. The power used to enforce results is based
on social rather than on legal mechanisms. Therefore, negotiation can be taken as a
very informal mode to enforce contracts ex post.
Mediation is a voluntary, non-binding, private dispute resolution process, in which a
neutral party helps the parties to reach a negotiated settlement. It is one of the less
formal alternatives to litigation. It is most prevalent in the commonwealth legal system,
especially in Australia. A mediator must be selected collectively by all participating par-
ties. Professional mediators are provided by special mediation associations, but parties
generally have free choice.
At the beginning of the mediation, the mediator explains his/her role, the confiden-
tial nature of the proceedings, any ground rules and the procedural steps that will be
followed. During the fact-gathering stage, the mediator will begin to define the issues,
helping the parties to focus on the issues rather than their positions. A mediation pro-
cess includes caucuses or private sessions. The mediator is not allowed to pass on private
information to the other party without approval. Once a tentative agreement is reached,
the mediator clarifies the terms of the agreement and makes sure all parties understand
the agreement.
Mediation can take place quickly and frequently with relatively little expense com-
pared to a court settlement. It focuses on the parties’ real commercial, emotional and
psychological needs, and not just on their legal rights. The mediator steers the parties
away from past events and focuses them on what they want to see happen in the future.
He/she does not recommend, decide or advise the parties, but only mediates between
the parties. Mediation gives the parties an opportunity to participate directly and in-
formally in resolving their own dispute. It is usually voluntary, although participation
is sometimes required by contract or by court order. Settlement, however, can never
be mandatory. Mediation relies on the will to reach an agreement confidentially. This
increases the probability of staying with the agreement reached in the future, even if it is
not legally binding. As mediation is confidential, it is a means of settling commercial dis-
putes. Nobody loses face or reputation (Hong Kong International Arbitration
Centre (HKIAC) n. d.).
If parties cannot find any solution by themselves, they have the chance to continue
in an arbitration process (International Trade Centre 2001; Goldsmith et al.
2006).
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Arbitration is a private process whereby a neutral third party (arbitrator) hears the
dispute and makes a decision (International Trade Centre 2001:37). In con-
trast to mediators, arbitrators are allowed to make decisions. Arbitration awards are
final and legally binding for the parties, and can only be challenged in very exceptional
circumstances. An arbitration award has a status similar to a judgment. Arbitration
awards are enforceable through the courts of all states which have signed the New York
Convention (1958) (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) n. d.). When arbitration awards cannot be enforced, either because a
country has not signed the New York Convention or it is time and/or cost sensitive,
firms avoid arbitration (International Trade Centre 2001:49–51). Especially in
international commercial disputes, arbitration is more efficient than litigation, because
awards can be enforced in other countries much more easily than court decisions. More-
over, parties can avoid the high costs of legal action. The advantages and disadvantages
of arbitration are outlined in Table 2.6.
Arbitration is typically conducted under rules established by arbitration associations
(for example the American Arbitration Association (AAA), China International Eco-
nomic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETEC), Hong Kong International Arbitra-
tion Centre (HKIAC), Singapore International Arbitration centre (SIAC), International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC)). These rules govern the arbitration process. Parties can
select the arbitration centre and the arbitrators. Moreover, parties have to agree on
the legal system (for example HK law, Chinese law, Singapore law) which they wish to
apply for the arbitration process. The United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (n. d.) designed a Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (1985), which was ratified by the largest trading nations. Firms
are advised to choose a legal system which has adopted the UNCITRAL model law.
Arbitration only takes place when all parties agree to it. Lawyers recommend fixing
an arbitration clause in the contract in advance to avoid conflicts about the arbitration
process later on. Arbitration clauses should contain agreements on the selected arbitra-
tion centre, place of arbitration, the applicable law, number of arbitrators, time limits
and the language of the arbitration (International Trade Centre 2001:125–152).
Despite the legally binding decision, arbitration is not as formal as litigation, because ar-
bitrators, arbitration centres etc. can be selected by the participating parties. However,
the process is more formal than mediation and negotiation.
Litigation refers to the legal procedure of solving commercial disputes. Litigation is a
mechanism for tight contract enforcement based on legal proceedings. It can therefore be
72
Table 2.6: Advantages and disadvantages of arbitration
Advantages Disadvantages
• Own appointment of arbitrators
with the required expertise (e. g.
in highly specialised areas)
• Speed of resolution and the low
cost relative to litigation (but the
arbitrators need to be paid)
• Confidential treatment of par-
ties, proceedings, problems and
awards
• Awards are legally binding and
easier to enforce in other coun-
tries than court judgements (142
countries signed the New York
Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards (1958))
• If the arbitrator is an expert
within a specified field, he may
not have the requisite expertise
when the dispute hinges on dif-
ficult points of law
• Multi-party disputes before the
same arbitral tribunal are impos-
sible
• Arbitral tribunal has no power to
order consolidation of actions
• Each case is decided on its merits
and is therefore no guide to future
similar cases
• If parties agree to solve disputes
by arbitration in advance, they
give up their right to access the
courts
Source: According to United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) (n. d.) and Hong Kong International Arbitra-
tion Centre (HKIAC) (n. d.)
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seen as a very formal enforcement practice. Litigation follows the applied legal system
of a country. The functionality of a legal system depends on the nation’s willingness
and ability to apply formal institutions and their enforcement. Economies in transition
rely on steadily changing laws and regulations. In this situation, it is difficult for firms
to trust and rely on the legal system. Judges are often partial and less familiar with
the new system. Legal judgments are also more difficult to enforce in other countries.
The location of the court decision should be chosen carefully, especially in the case
of international disputes, because this will be the easiest place to enforce judgements.
Furthermore, litigation is often associated with higher costs than ADR.
In China, the legal system and the arbitration clauses are under revision. There is con-
tinuing improvement, but international standards have not yet been reached. Moreover,
China lacks qualified judges because of the variety of new laws they have to deal with.
Most of them are former army employees. They have difficulty handling the multitude
of new laws. Arbitrators are better educated, but the arbitration system in China is
still not up to the international standards. Johnson et al. (2002) found that when the
quality of law is low, there is a greater reliance upon informal contracts, which require
informal enforcement mechanisms. Comparing the Western and the Chinese business
cultures, informal mechanisms are often more convenient for the notion of “losing face”
in Asia (Choi 1994; Goldsmith et al. 2006:274, 282–284). Djankov et al. (2003)
provide evidence of how the quality of law and the cost of litigation vary between coun-
tries and legal systems. In countries with a low quality of law, the litigation process
is more expensive. Therefore, it can be expected that Chinese firms prefer negotiation
and mediation for resolving their disputes and enforcing their contracts. As the law and
arbitration system in HK is already well established, it can be assumed that firms use
a range of different dispute resolution practices depending on the issue to be resolved.
The choice between a range of formal and informal mechanisms opens more opportu-
nities for them, which reduces the time and decreases the cost of resolving disputes
(International Trade Centre 2001:49–51).
2.5.4 Interim Conclusion and Hypotheses derived from Section 2.5
D Under what circumstances do firms prefer informal practices over formal ones to
organise their customer/producer relations? How do informal interactions enhance
the flexibility of firms? In answering these questions, the focus will be on:
• contact and selection procedures for customer and producers
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• contractual arrangements
• enforcement mechanisms
Concepts based on the NIE illustrate that firms in an incomplete formal institu-
tional environment lean towards informalisation when organising customer producer
relations with respect to recruitment procedures, contractual arrangements and enforce-
ment mechanisms. Relying on informal business practices saves them transaction costs,
provides them with better transactional safeguards and makes the relationships more
flexible in adapting and reacting to demand changes at short notice. Particularly in
China, traditional business culture is based on personal relationships (guanxi), which
encourage informal interactions among managers. Therefore, it can be expected that
Chinese managers prefer informal interactions with their customers and producers. Pro-
ponents of the NIE argue that as soon as the institutional environment improves, firms
switch to more formal behaviour. Other experts argue that informal interactions are not
only a substitute for missing or dysfunctional formal rules, but provide advantages even
in complete institutional environments. They complement and support formal behaviour
(Granovetter 1985). The symbiosis of both makes firms highly flexible. The distinct
setting in HK and the PRD is perfect for investigating this issue, as the networks of HK
firms contain Chinese as well as Western customers and producers. It can be investi-
gated whether HK firms prefer informal interactions with customers and producers in
China only, or whether this also applies to Western firms. Preliminary empirical stud-
ies provide evidence that informal practices still remain important to a certain degree.
Firms know about the advantages of flexibility gained from them. By studying three
different aspects of customer producer relations, it will be analysed whether informal
behaviour has the same importance for each aspect. To prove propositions derived from
the conceptual discussion, the following empirical research question and hypotheses were
formulated:
J How high is the degree of informality in customer producer relations of HK-based
and Chinese-based firms? Are there any differences in the behaviour of firms be-
tween the two locations? Does informal behaviour result in greater flexibility? In
answering these questions, the focus will be on:
• contact and selection procedures for customer and producers
• contractual arrangements
• enforcement mechanisms
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Hypothesis D1 Firms in HK apply informal modes to recruit and select producers and
customers, but to a lesser extent than firms in the PRD.
Hypothesis D2 Firms are more flexible and successful in business when using the full
variety of formal and informal practices to recruit customers.
Hypothesis D3 Firms in the GPRD rely on informal contracting modes, but HK firms’
contracts with PRD firms are likely to be more informal than contracts with firms in
the Western world.
Hypothesis D4 Firms using the renegotiable contract model are more flexible than firms
using direct contracts.
Hypothesis D5 Informal contracts enhance the flexibility of firms.
Hypothesis D6 HK firms enhance their flexibility while exploiting the entire spectrum
of formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, whereas in the PRD informal practices
are most popular.
Hypothesis D7 Small firms, young firms and firms with poor technological skills are
more likely to utilise informal enforcement mechanisms.
2.6 Developing a Framework for the Empirical Analysis
Lewin et al. (1999) provide a framework in their paper for conceptually studying firms’
adaptation processes and the coevolution of industrial and institutional dynamics. It has
been shown that leading customers require a high degree of flexibility from Asian-based
producers to integrate themselves into global value chains. Flexibility is defined as the
variety of options for reacting (qualitative flexibility) and the speed (quantitative flexi-
bility) with which they can be applied. In order to reach flexibility, firms are expected to
benefit from using informal means to coordinate their customer producer relations. The
degree of informality applied depends on the completeness of the institutional setting.
Figure 2.11 summarises the conceptually discussed aspects of firm adaptation (see Chap-
ter 2) from a global, regional and firm perspective on the left, additionally indicating
the implications derived for the empirical analysis on the right.
Beginning on the top left hand side, the industry and market conditions (see Sec-
tion 2.2) are conceptually discussed from a global perspective. The discussion shows that
fragmentation and the global spread of production networks lead to the modularisation
of the value chain. Firms in emerging economies take over parts of the module-based
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Figure 2.11: Framework of analysis of customer producer relations
Source: Own draft
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production, but LFs require a high degree of qualitative and quantitative flexibility. The
empirical part of this work aims to provide evidence for the development of the electron-
ics industry and the modularisation of the value chain. Moreover, it is investigated as to
what extent HK and the PRD have benefited from the global growth of the electronics
industry. It will be established whether manufacturing firms in HK and the PRD are
required to work in an unpredictable market environment (see Section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).
A low predictability of market changes requires a high degree of flexibility of firms if
they are to operate successfully on markets.
Informality can be a means of achieving flexibility. Informality in interactions is
sometimes a necessity, as formal institutions do not provide sufficient safeguards for
transactions. But informality in interactions can also be seen as an opportunity to deal
more efficiently with customers or producers. This mainly depends on the informal and
formal institutional environment, which has been conceptually discussed in Section 2.3
(bottom left hand side of the figure). Here, it is assumed that institutions take effect
on a regional level. The empirical analysis will show whether the institutional setting,
which differs in HK and the PRD, is responsible for the informal interactions within
customer producer relations, or whether informal interactions are independent of the in-
stitutional setting and can be expected to be market-driven. Therefore, the institutional
environment in the GPRD supporting customer producer relations will be evaluated in
Section 4.1 (see bottom right hand side of the figure).
Lewin et al. argued that the industrial and institutional dynamics influence (1) the
governance modes (discussed in Section 2.4) and (2) the formal and informal interactions
in customer producer relations (discussed in Section 2.5) at a firm level. The two points
are illustrated in the centre of the figure’s left hand side.
Firstly, the governance modes represented are markets (dotted line), non-equity coop-
eration (dashed line), equity cooperation (thin line) and hierarchies (thick line). Initial
findings provide a detailed insight into the modes used by firms in HK and the PRD
to govern their customer and producer relationships (see Chapter 5). There will be a
comparative study which takes into account the governance modes of HK firms to their
worldwide customers and their producers in the PRD. Furthermore, the relationships of
PRD firms to their customers and producers will be investigated. It will become clear
how the industrial and institutional environment influences the selection of governance
modes. The corresponding empirical section is depicted in the centre of the figure’s right
hand side.
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Secondly, the formal and informal interactions in the three research areas—recruitment,
agreements, enforcement—have been discussed conceptually in Section 2.5 (grey bar in
the centre of the figure’s left hand side). Here, five dimensions of informality have been
identified. The empirical part will focus on the interplay of formal and informal inter-
actions between HK and global firms, and between firms in HK and the PRD. It will be
shown under what circumstances firms rely on informal interactions and whether this
increases their flexibility. This issue will be addressed in Chapter 6 and is indicated by
the grey bars in the centre of the figure’s right hand side.
Before empirical results are presented, the next section will discuss how informality
and flexibility can be operationalised and how they were measured in HK and the PRD.
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3 Operationalisation, Methods and Data
This work aims to measure how informal interaction of firms with their customers and
producers affects the flexibility of firms in terms of variety and speed. Although the
importance of informality is recognised in the academic literature, secondary data are
rarely available. The combination of informality and flexibility in particular has not been
studied systematically until now. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct a study collect-
ing primary data on this relationship. This chapter aims to answer research question
E and F regarding the operationalisation and measurement of informality and flexibil-
ity. Section 3.2 concentrates on the operationalisation of informality and flexibility by
the identification of indicators. Section 3.3 discusses which qualitative and quantitative
methods were applied to collect and analyse data. Emphasis is put on the assessment
of the research methods. Firstly though, Section 3.1 briefly describes the selection of
the research region and sector. Finally, Section 3.4 analyses the validity of data and the
limitations of generalisation.
3.1 Selecting Research Region and Sector
This work is developed within the project “Agile Firm Organisation in the Greater Pearl
River Delta”, which is in turn one of nine projects in the Priority Programme (SPP)
1233 ”Megacities—Megachallenge: Informal Dynamics of Global Change”, funded by
the German Research Foundation (DFG). The Greater Pearl River Delta (GPRD) was
selected as the research region because of the two distinct institutional settings. The
GPRD consists of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HK), the Macau Spe-
cial Administrative Region and the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone (PRD), a part of
the Guangdong province (Enright et al. 2006). In HK, one finds a complete institu-
tional setting, whereas in the PRD, there is ongoing institutional change. The intensive
interaction between HK and the PRD has contributed greatly to making the GPRD
one of the world’s leading manufacturing centres. HK is the centre for management,
information, coordination, finance and professional services, while the PRD is the centre
for production and operational services. Macau is not considered in this work because
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its economic power in manufacturing is insignificant compared to HK and the PRD,
its economic competitiveness largely resulting from tourism and gambling. The PRD
economic zone consists of nine of the 21 cities in the Guangdong province—Guangzhou
(GZ), Shenzhen (SZ), Dongguan (DG), Foshan, Zhongshan, Zhuhai, Jiangmen and parts
of Huizhou and Zhaoqing. For the purposes of a survey, it is best to remain within par-
ticular municiple boundaries (jurisdictions).
Instead of studying the manufacturing industry broadly, the research team decided to
concentrate on only one industry—the electronics industry. Reasons for this were:
• the novelty of the research objective (informality achieving flexibility) which re-
quires an explorative approach concentrating on the content
• differences between the structure of industries, because what seems to be very
important in one industry may be rated differently in another (the textile industry
in China, for example, was long subject to the allocation of quotas, whereas the
electronics industry has always been liberalised). Concentrating on one industry
also allows for the exclusion of influencing variables other than transaction costs
(Menard 2005:293; Shelanski and Klein 1995:285)
• the concentration on the largest industry, because it best mirrors the business
interactions in which firms are typically involved (see Figure 3.1)
• the electronics industry is subject to the regional division of work (see Enright
et al. (2005:111))
• the electronics industry is modularised and subject to many interactions along the
value chain
• the electronics industry provides researchers with a variety of products ranging
from high to low technology, which allows a comparison between single segments
of the electronics industry
• the electronics industry is subject to steadily changing demand and pressure to
adapt to customers’ requirements.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the impact of the electronics industry in different PRD cities.
The gross industrial output value (GIO) of the electronics industry in 2005 shows that
most cities in the PRD are dominated by the electronics industry. Petroleum and chem-
istry, textile and garment, food and beverages and building materials only play a minor
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Figure 3.1: Industrial split of the gross industrial output value in the PRD 2005
Source: Own map according to Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statistics
(2006)
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role. The selection of cities was made on the basis of economic density in terms of the
electronics industry. The research team agreed to concentrate on GZ and DG for the
PRD survey. GZ was selected as one of the cities with a high density for the electronics
industry. It was preferred to Foshan and SZ, which are also hubs of the electronics
industry, because of better accessibility. GZ, the capital of GD, is the economic center
of the PRD. It is characterised by state-owned and domestic enterprises. In contrast,
more foreign firms are located in DG because it was opened for foreign investments
earlier than GZ. In DG, the economic structure is more diverse than in GZ. DG was
preferred to Jiangmen, which is also characterised by a mix of industries, because it has
a greater absolute power in manufacturing. Additionally, firms in DG were easier to
access for the research team. The research team thus decided to select two cities: one
absolutely dominated by the electronics industry and one which is characterised by a
mix of industries. Moreover, differing business models were expected in GZ and DG.
While DG was one of the first cities to be industrialised by HK firms in the 1980s (along
with SZ), GZ developed its economic power later involving less investment from HK.
The two jurisdictions are also expected to connect differently to HK.
Because of the dynamic of the electronics industry, which is characterised by the per-
manent introduction of new products and changing technological standards, an objective
definition of the industry is difficult to come up with (Ernst 2000:1). Basically, elec-
tronics firms can be divided into firms which produce final products and those which
focus on parts and components. According to Hobday (2001:14), final products in the
electronics industry can be divided into the categories of consumer electronics (such
as hair dryers, toasters, DVD-players), telecommunications products (such as mobile
phones, landline telephones, routers), computer equipment (such as personal comput-
ers, notebooks, hard disks) and electrical machinery (such as robotics, instruments of
measurement and control). The most important components for electronics products
are semiconductors. The share of electronics products consumed by other industries,
for example the automobile industry, has increased rapidly. The electronics industry is
therefore a key industry, as other industries profit from it.
A study by the Federation of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI) (2007) has
proven the relevance of HK firms in the PRD. They estimated that about half of ma-
nufacturing enterprises in the PRD are HK-funded or HK-related firms. These firms
employ approximately 9.6 million people. Major investments in the PRD are also made
by HK firms. This was the basis for the decision to concentrate on HK-owned and
Chinese-owned electronic firms in the GPRD, although multinational or foreign firms
were only of minor importance at this explorative stage.
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3.2 Operationalising Informality and Flexibility in the
Electronics Industry
3.2.1 Recording Data on the Need for Flexibility
First of all, the need for flexibility must be measured in order to gauge the pressure
exerted on firms to adapt to market changes in the electronics industry. General trends
in the electronics industry illustrate its long-term development. As firms in the GPRD
depend on the global development of the electronics industry, a global perspective has
to be applied in order to study the need for flexibility. To gain insights into the special
development and growth of electronics firms in the GPRD, however, a regional perspective
is required to see how firms in the GPRD act under global pressure.
The global pressure to be flexible can be assessed by studying the shorter product life
cycles and the high market volatility. This must be contrasted with the proportion of
firms in the GPRD which are actually integrated into global value chains. Only these
firms have to deal with global pressures. The global impact of electronics firms in the
GPRD can be measured by the foreign direct investments (FDI) and the volume of trade
and production in the GPRD for the world market. How far-reaching the global pressures
are can be seen by the proportion of firms in the GPRD integrated into global value
chains. To study the structure of the value chain in the GPRD, the spatial distribution
of firms must be analysed. Firms in HK and the PRD were asked to indicate the location
of their most important customer and producer to illustrate the network structure (see
Chapter 4). The research team decided to focus on the most important customers and
producers, as firms are expected to have a large number of both (compare Cai and
Yang (2008:61)). The most important producer is defined as the one who produces the
largest share of products in terms of value. The most important customer is the one
with the highest volume of sales.
From a regional perspective, a growth in the electronics industry and its integration
into global networks implies that a larger number of firms are affected by the require-
ments of flexibility. Besides the global driving forces for flexibility, institutional incom-
pleteness or changes of rules and laws also necessitate corporate flexibility at a regional
level.
Secondary data can provide an overview of the global and regional development of
the electronics industry. Although electronics firms in the GPRD are affected by the
same global and regional forces, the ability of firms to deal with them differs. Therefore,
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primary data should be collected about a firm’s individual estimation regarding the
intensity of competition and the predictability of industrial changes. If a firm’s ability
to predict industrial changes is low, that firm will need greater flexibility.
3.2.2 Identifying Indicators for Governance Modes
The governance modes selected to organise customer producer relations can be seen as
an adaptation to the need for flexibility. The freedom to select the appropriate gov-
ernance mode is predetermined by the institutional environment within a region and
within a particular industrial dynamic. Firms in HK and the PRD were asked to pro-
vide information about what governance modes they have selected to maintain their
relationship to their most important customer and producer (see Chapter 5). Gover-
nance modes will be divided into market, non-equity cooperation, equity cooperation
and hierarchies, as the academic literature suggests. Table 3.1 should give insights into
how these terms can be better understood and operationalised in terms of contractual
arrangements. Markets are characterised by direct buying and selling contracts with-
out any further agreed cooperation (DC). When firms have agreed to cooperate on a
market basis, it is expected that a framework agreement (FA) exists which covers those
terms. When an order is placed, final details will be renegotiated (FA+RN). A market
relationship changes to cooperation on a non-equity basis. A hierarchical relationship
to customers is assumed when a 100%-owned affiliate, subsidiary or parent company
places orders with the firm. A hierarchical relationship to producers is assumed when
firms have 100%-owned production sites with which they place orders. It is expected
that HK firms mainly have their own production sites in the PRD. With respect to con-
tractual relationships, hierarchies can be organised in two ways. Firstly, a hierarchical
relationship can be organised via direct contracting (DC), meaning that firms only pass
on their orders to their own affiliates within their own company structure via fax, phone
call, email or computer-based supply systems. Firms govern, control and monitor the
production site completely—this can be referred to as a tight hierarchy. Secondly, when
firms consider their (possibly multiple) 100%-owned production sites as independently
led firms, they might use framework agreements (FA) outlining what each production
site has to achieve. Production sites might compete with each other. This is often ob-
served when leading global firms have their own production sites in different countries
which compete for production. Hierarchies which use the second contracting model are
called loose hierarchies. When firms opt for an equity cooperation with customers and
producers, they are assumed to have an equity exchange which is not a 100% equity
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Table 3.1: Relation of governance modes and contracts
Simple classification of
governance modes
Contractual
Characteristics
Extended classification
of governance modes
Hierarchy
Tight Hierarchy DC
Loose Hierarchy FA+RN
Hybrid
Tight Equity Cooperation DC
Loose Equity Cooperation FA+RN
Non-Equity Cooperation FA+RN
Market Pure Market DC
FA = Framework agreement, RN = Renegotiation, DC = Direct contracting
Source: Own composition
connection, for example JV or exchange of shares. Again, equity cooperation can be
either tightly governed while only using DC or loosely governed while using FA + RN.
In order to establish the determinants of selected governance modes, the location of
customers and producers must be taken into account. As a location is always related
to a certain institutional environment, it can be investigated whether the institutional
environment affects the choice of governance modes, as theoretically expected. The
relevance of the institutional environment must be established in comparison to other
variables potentially influencing the choice. In order to collect information about the
dependency of the customers and producers, which could affect the governance mode,
firms were asked to indicate the share of sales or procurement covered by those customers
and producers. Additionally, firms were asked to indicate their amount of industry
experience (time), allowing an analysis of governance modes in correlation with this
factor. Information about other determinants, such as firm size, age, innovativeness,
was also collected to measure their influence.
3.2.3 Identifying Indicators for Informality and Flexibility
The research team decided to operationalise and measure informality in contrast to for-
mality. In doing so, the focus was placed on interactions and processes designed by firms
or managers. Viewing interactions as a continuum from very informal to very formal
gives a better insight into (1) how important informal interactions are in comparison to
formal interactions and (2) whether they are seen as the only possible way of organising
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customer producer relations, or rather as one of several options. The research team de-
cided to ask indirectly, rather than directly, about informal modes applied in customer
producer relations. Reasons for this were:
1. the term informality is not clear and uniformly defined for everybody
2. informality can be sensitive, as it touches on personal impressions and relationships
3. informality is associated with “illegality” in HK and China when translated
4. an indirect answer provides additional information about the actual actions of
firms in their customer producer relations.
In the following paragraphs, the operationalisation of the three research areas—contact
and selection processes for customers and producers, contractual arrangements and en-
forcement mechanisms—is described with respect to the dimensions of informality and
the flexibility implied by different interactions.
Studying informality in contact and selection processes for customers and producers,
touches on the dimension of personalisation (see Table 2.1). Bidding competition is a
very formal process. Firms can announce a bidding competition or file a tender to gain
new customers or producers. This usually happens over a certain time period and cannot
be applied for at short notice. This process is highly impersonal and therefore very formal
(see Table 3.2). Contacting new partners on the internet is still impersonal, but a certain
preselection can at least be made. This process is not time-dependent and is therefore
quicker and more flexible. Exhibitions and fairs as well as sales or sourcing agents work
on a formal basis, but they must still win over new customers and producers personally.
These procedures are therefore related to some degree of informality. Exhibitions and
fairs only take place on certain days each year, which makes this procedure inflexible,
whereas sales or sourcing agents can start looking for new customers and producers
at short notice, but still need some time until they have successfully contacted them.
Former employer-employee relationships are based on personal contacts (informal). They
are flexible and can be used at short notice to contact potential customers and producers.
Using a network of business or private contacts to recruit customers and producers is
highly personal, and therefore informal. These contact channels also provide very quick
access to new customers and producers (very flexible).
Moreover, these channels are intrinsically associated with a certain speed which can
reflect their quantitative flexibility. Firms also have the option of relying on only one or
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Table 3.2: Formal to informal contact channels
Questionnaire Association with Informality
Bidding competition very formal
Internet (e. g. e-commerce, direct contact) ↑
Exhibitions and fairs |
Sales/Sourcing agents |
Using former employer-employee relationships |
Business contacts ↓
Private contacts very informal
Source: Own composition
two contact channels, or of using the entire spectrum, which increases their opportunity
to select the appropriate channel to contact customers and producers. A similar approach
was chosen for the selection criteria for customers and producers.
Informality in contractual arrangements can be measured on two scales: the degree
of precision and the form of agreements. A contract is assumed to be precise when all
necessary details recommended by lawyers are covered in the contract. The necessary
details involve:
• product specifications
• quantity of products
• price of products
• delivery time
• conflict resolution
The specification of products, quantity, price and delivery time are essential for the
production process and supply management. Lawyers strongly recommended including
details about conflict resolution, especially when trade becomes international. As two
different contract models are considered in this work, it should be established what
(precision) and how (form) details are fixed in those models. Firstly, if firms use FAs,
they might fix some points in advance in the FA, while renegotiating or adding details
when the actual order is placed. Which details they fix in FAs and which ones they
renegotiate or add in the final agreement will be investigated. It is expected that all
88
essential details are covered either in the FA or the RN process. This allows the precision
of the FA and the RN to be studied. The fewer details fixed in the FA and the RN
respectively, the more informal it is. Secondly, if firms opt for DC, it is assumed that they
fix all details when an order is placed. What is fixed in agreements entails the question
as to how it is fixed. The details of contracts can be fixed either in writing (formal),
verbally (informal) or both. As orders are often placed at short notice and production is
delayed when contract negotiations take a long time, firms must be interested in a quick
placement of orders. This means that the time for RN and DC is limited. It should be
established how much time firms need to agree on final details when an order is placed.
Quick contracting is a response to the required flexibility. It can thus be shown whether
informal contracts in terms of precision and form lead to a quicker placement of orders.
This would confirm the hypothesis that informality achieves flexibility. Furthermore, the
two contracting schemes will be compared taking into account the different governance
modes.
The study of enforcement mechanisms touches on the two dimensions of informality—
enforcement and power. Enforcement mechanisms range from simple negotiations (very
informal), through mediation processes to arbitration and litigation (very formal). To
find out whether firms favour informal or formal mechanisms for settling disputes, they
were asked to indicate which mechanisms they are willing to use. In terms of the applied
flexibility, it must firstly be established how much time certain mechanisms require
to settle disputes (quantitative flexibility), and secondly the variety of options firms
consider to settle disputes (qualitative flexibility).
3.3 Measuring Informality and Flexibility in the
Electronics Industry
In line with the project proposal, the research methods had already been specified and
could largely be implemented successfully. The research topic required an analysis of
primary and secondary data which complement each other. The illustration of the devel-
opment of the institutional system in HK and the PRD is mainly based on the analysis of
secondary literature (see Section 4.1). Additionally, interviews with regional stakehold-
ers were deemed important in understanding the economic environment in HK and the
PRD. The global and regional development of the electronics industry is analysed using
secondary data (see Section 4.2 and 4.3). Assessing a firm’s individual ability to deal
with the surrounding conditions required the collection of primary data, as secondary
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data were not available. As previously mentioned, the idea was to concentrate on the
HK and PRD-owned firms, because they have the greatest impact for the economic de-
velopment of the GPRD. The research team decided to follow the trail of the electronics
value chain from the Western world’s customers via HK-based CMs to HK-based SMEs,
and finally to plants operated in the PRD. This research model enables an analysis of:
• the spatial construction of the value chain in the GPRD
• a comparison of governance modes applied in customer producer relations differ-
entiated according to locations of partners (HK firms’ relationships to global and
PRD firms)
• the need for flexibility and the informalisation of interactions at different levels of
the value chain
In order to study the performance of CMs and SMEs in HK as well as the organisation of
electronics manufacturing plants in the PRD, clear research methods were needed. Data
about CMs in HK were collected in qualitative interviews, as strategic orientation and
firm operations differ, making a standardised survey seem inappropriate. In contrast,
SMEs in HK and production-oriented firms in the PRD were surveyed using quantitative
methods. They seemed to be more suitable to avoid individual cases being generalised.
Although the nature of the study is explorative, it is a basis for further research. The
research team agreed that a standardised approach seems to provide a better picture of
how firms behave in general. The following paragraphs describe—and more importantly
assess—the research methods applied.
1. Analysis of Secondary Data about the Electronics Industry in Hong Kong and
the PRD
Data about the electronics industry are available on an international (for example WTO,
UNCTAD), national (for example the China Statistical Office) and regional level (for
example the Guangdong Statistical Bureau). Secondary data on the activities of firms in
the electronics industry must, however, be distinguished from data on product categories.
The United Nations Statistics Devision provides an International Standard In-
dustrial Classification (ISIC) for firms’ activities and a Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) for product categories. HK and China have only adjusted part
of their national classification to the international standards. This implies difficulties
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in cross-nation analyses or longitudinal analyses (when nations have changed their clas-
sification system). However, the research team carefully compared the figures of the
different statistical standard classifications and selected those which represent the elec-
tronics industry. This allows a comparison of data from different statistical sources (see
Appendix A).
Additionally, there is a large and growing difference between the official trade statis-
tics released by China and those released by HK and other countries (Martin 2007).
Schindler and Beckett (2005:1) reported that “Hong Kong plays a prominent role
as a re-exporter of a large percentage of trade bound for or coming from China. Current
reporting practices in China and its trading partners do not fully reflect this role and
therefore provide a misleading picture of the origin or ultimate destination of Chinese
exports and imports.” In this work, an attempt has been made to rely on international
sources to report trade data.
When using secondary data from the PRD, one must be aware that it is not fully
correct. Population figures reveal the largest discrepancies between the various statistical
sources in the PRD. China’s statistical approach to population has not kept pace with
the actual demographic change. The “registered population” in 2005 was only half of the
“interim census” population, as the latter includes migrants. Experts claim that even
the “interim census” underestimates the population. Statistically, the recommendation
is to work with the census data. The gross domestic product (GDP) in the PRD is
measured in accordance with internationally accepted standards and methods, but one
has to be aware that firms tend to underreport their sales and earnings in order to
avoid taxation. When GDP per capita is calculated, using the registered population
should be avoided. Statistics produced in the PRD tend to use these data because an
increased GDP per capita suggests economic power. The gross industrial output (GIO)
is the volume of industrial products sold in value terms by companies. As the value
chain is fragmented, all firms report the value of their products sold, thereby leading to
double counting among many enterprises. In contrast, small firms are excluded from the
calculation. This leads to an underestimation of the GIO, as the PRD is characterised
by SMEs. Moreover, some cities include or exclude certain types of firms, while export
processing firms have a special status. There is some evidence to suggest that capital
goods associated with export processing do not appear in the statistics. Furthermore,
although the system of measuring FDI changed in 2002, many cities in China have not
yet adjusted to the new measurement system and many give little indication as to which
system they employ. This means that FDI statistics after 2002 differ from earlier ones
(Enright et al. 2006:27–58).
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Another difficulty is the definition of the PRD economic zone. Two cities—Huizhou
and Zhaoqing—are only partly included. Although secondary data in the official statis-
tics are mainly limited to the administrative border of cities, secondary data in this work
include Huizhou and Zhaoqing completely. In case no data on the level of cities are
available, this work refers to Guangdong with the knowledge that 80% of the gross value
added is concentrated in the PRD (Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statistics
2006). To conclude, available secondary data from Chinese statistics will be used in this
work due to the lack of other more convienent and trustworthy data, but one has to be
aware of their weaknesses.
2. Interviews with Large Electronics Firms in Hong Kong
Method: As the operations of large firms are much more diverse than those of small
firms, it was decided that a case study approach is most appropriate to gain infor-
mation about large players’ interaction with their customers and producers.
Selection of firms: For the identification of large electronics firms, different sources
were used. Firstly, the HK stock exchange (Hong Kong Exchanges and
Clearing Ltd (HKEx) n. d.) was helpful in identifying large listed HK firms
in the electronics industry. Secondly, a screening of members of business associa-
tions helped to add large non-listed firms to the collection. Thirdly, managers of
business associations and organisations rechecked the list of large firms. 25 firms
were identified in total.
Implementation: All 25 firms were contacted and asked for an interview with the CEO
or one of the senior managers. Some firms could be won through direct contact,
but the network approach was generally more successful. Interested and powerful
managers of business associations and organisations established the contact to
CEOs. Ten firms agreed to a personal interview. Each interview was conducted
by between one and three researchers. The rate of return was 40%. The interview
followed a guideline which was discussed and agreed on by the entire research
team. The interviews were kept to one hour if possible, as HK managers tend to
have limited time. All interviews were conducted in English and recorded for a
later in-depth analysis. The interviews were prepared in summer 2007 and were
conducted between September and November 2007.
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Content: The guided interviews covered (i) organisation of production activities in the
PRD, (ii) informal aspects in customer producer organisation, and (iii) informal
knowledge transfer within innovation activities.
Evaluation: The CEOs of large electronics firms in HK were surprisingly open. Detailed
descriptions were given of the organisation of activities and the importance of
informal elements to enhance flexibility. The interviews gave a great insight into
the strategies of HK firms in coping with uncertainties.
3. Standardised Interviews with SMEs in Hong Kong
Method: The project proposal required 100 firms to be surveyed. The research team
decided on standardised interviews, because (1) the standardisation ensures valid
and reliable information about the relations between informal interactions and firm
flexibility and (2) personal interviews provide the opportunity for interviewees to
understand all questions and increase the rate of return.
Selection of firms: For the selection of firms, the research team cooperated with the
Research Division of the Trade Development Council (TDC). They provided a
database of firms engaged in the electronics sector. According to the HK statistical
standard, firms there with more than 100 employees are defined as large, whereas
firms with 100 employees or fewer are deemed small and medium sized. The data
bank of the TDC contained 4,903 HK SMEs. A random sample of 2,000 firms was
the basis for the Social Science Research Centre (SSRC) to conduct the survey.
Implementation: During preparation of the questionnaires in spring 2007, development
topics and methods were intensively discussed with the Department of Geography
and the Faculty of Business and Economics at Hong Kong University, the Hong
Kong Trade Development Council (TDC), the Research Division of the Federation
of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI) and the Civic Exchange Research Centre. As
native speakers were required for the interviews, the research team decided to au-
thorise the SSRC of Hong Kong University to conduct the interviews. In summer
2007, the questionnaire was completed and translated by a bilingual member of
the research team. A letter of recommendation was provided by the TDC. Five
interviewers from the SSRC were trained by the bilingual researcher and three
pilot interviews were conducted by the trained interviewers accompanied by the
bilingual researcher. After contacting the firms to ensure the CEOs’ contact de-
tails, the SSRC posted the questionnaire to the firms. Afterwards they agreed
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to an appointment with the CEO for a one-hour interview. The survey ran from
August to December 2007. The first 15 interviews were accompanied by the bilin-
gual researcher to ensure data quality. The SSRC completed 104 questionnaires.
90% of the interviews were face-to-face, while 10% of the firms asked for a self-
administered version of the questionnaire accompanied by a follow-up telephone
interview because the CEOs were spending most of the time in the PRD.
Content: The SME survey in HK addressed the following topics: (i) industry and mar-
ket conditions, (ii) firm strategy, (iii) organisation of relationships to customers
and producers and (iv) organisation of innovation activities.
Evaluation: The SSRC used highly skilled and experienced interviewers for the face-to-
face interviews, so the quality of the answers is extraordinarily high. Unfortunately,
the original idea of following the links of HK firms to the PRD and identifying their
producers for the PRD survey did not work. Firms were reluctant to personally
identify their producers in the PRD. The research team had to identify firms in
the PRD itself. Industry experience in the GPRD indicates that the timing of the
survey should take summer holidays and fair periods in September/October and
March/April in HK into account. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that HK
CEOs spend much of their time in their PRD factories, which makes it difficult to
arrange interviews. For this reason, the research team agreed on self-administered
interviews in exceptional cases. To conclude, the face-to-face interviews seem to be
a highly appropriate method of collecting data on firms in HK while simultaneously
ensuring data quality.
4. Posting to Electronics Firms in the PRD
Method: From an exchange of experiences with partners from the Center for Urban
and Regional Studies at the Sun-Yat-Sen University in GZ, it became evident that
Chinese managers are reluctant to provide information to researchers. They fear
losing their anonymity in personal interviews and tend to give biased information.
It was strongly recommended to work with self-administered questionnaires com-
bined with a follow-up telephone interview. As described in Section 3.1, the survey
concentrated on the cities of DG and GZ. 53% of the firms in the PRD survey are
located in GZ and another 41% are located in DG. In GZ, the Tianhe, Panyu and
Huadu districts were most relevant, while in DG the Changan, Dongcheng and
Houjie districts were selected.
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Selection of firms: In DG, firm data were taken from the Guangdong Electronics Com-
pany Catalogue 2007. For the survey in GZ, a list of firms was provided by the
Statistical Bureau of GZ. Districts with a high density of electronics companies
were identified and firms were randomly selected. Additionally, firms in Zhong-
shan, SZ, Zhuhai and Foshan were surveyed through acquaintances with the CEO
or manager.
Implementation: In a joint workshop with the Center for Urban and Regional Stud-
ies at the Sun-Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou, the questionnaire was discussed
and students were trained in a two-day session in order to be able to understand
the questionnaire and conduct a professional telephone follow-up. Students first
rechecked the contact details of CEOs and their willingness to complete the ques-
tionnaire by telephone. 300 questionnaires were equally distributed to randomly
selected firms in DG and GZ according to the preselection of districts. After their
return, students followed up unanswered questions by telephone. In DG, 89 ques-
tionnaires were returned (59%). In GZ, 116 of the 150 firms called returned the
questionnaire (77%). In the remaining cities, all firms returned the questionnaire.
In total, 222 firms participated in the survey. The survey ran from October 2007
to February 2008.
Content: The survey in the PRD addressed the following topics: (i) industry and market
conditions, (ii) production system, (iii) employment and (iv) innovation activities.
Evaluation: Difficulties encountered included the high fluctuation of firms, which made
it complicated to identify operating from non-operating firms. Some firms also have
double registrations. A reliable database of firms is not available and information
about the population is virtually nonexistant. Data quality is assumed to be lower
than in the HK survey due to less control over the filling in of questionnaires.
5. Interviews with Regional Stakeholders in Hong Kong and the PRD
Method: The position and expertise of regional stakeholders varies greatly, which means
that dealing with them requires an individual approach to each case. The research
team therefore decided on personal interviews with guided but individually adapted
questions.
Selection of stakeholders: The selection of stakeholders was based on content-related
specifications. Attention was firstly directed towards firms providing services
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which contribute to the flexibility of other firms, such as financial or legal service
providers. When large orders by international customers require a pre-financing
of components, financial service providers become important. Legal advisers, in
turn, provide support for the conclusion and enforcement of contracts. The re-
search team then interviewed organisations which support manufacturing firms—
business/industry associations and organisations supporting innovation . This
provided insights into the general organisation and development of HK and its
electronics industry. Finally, academics with experience in researching the HK
and PRD regions and persons of authority were selected for an interview.
Implementation: A pool of questions was developed by the research team. The guided
interviews contained a selection of questions according to the expertise of the
interviewees. The selected stakeholders were contacted directly. The language of
the interview was English. 34 interviews were conducted by the research team
between September and November 2007, of which 82% were in Hong Kong, with:
• financial service providers (6)
• legal advisers (6)
• business/industry associations (8)
• organisations supporting innovation (6)
• persons of authority (2)
• academics (6)
Content: The interviews provided a comprehensive overview of the historical develop-
ment of the electronics industry in the GPRD, including the political changes as
well as the financial and legal background of the firms.
Evaluation: Regional stakeholders agreed relatively easily to an interview. The overview
of the GPRD development provided was detailed and varied, and gives a compre-
hensive basis for understanding the behaviour of firms. This part of the fieldwork
was also designed to arouse the interest of regional stakeholders in the research
objectives.
In general, all the surveys conducted in this project are of an explorative nature and
an attempt has not been made to produce representative information at this stage.
Since the topic of informality defined in an institutional way is rather new, one aim has
also been to develop an analytical framework and to test qualitative and quantitative
methods of studying informality and flexibility in interactions.
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3.4 Assessing Data Validity: Comparison between
Sample and Population
The sample data of the HK and PRD survey will be used for further quantitative analysis.
This section, therefore, compares the sample data with the population data according
to the selection criteria to show whether a generalisation is principally possible.
The SMEs in HK were selected according to their affiliation with the electronics in-
dustry (see Appendix A) and because of their size of 100 employees or fewer. The TDC
in HK provided a databank of 4,903 enterprises fulfilling the selection criteria (Hong
Kong Trade Development Council Research Department (HKTDC) n. d.).
Two samples of 1,000 enterprises each were randomly preselected. Of the 2,000 enter-
prises, 104 were interviewed in HK. The TDC data bank provided a classified number
of employees. This is comparable to the sample, as the number of employees was indi-
cated in the questionnaire. Table 3.3 thus presents the distribution of firms according
to classes of employment size for the population and for the sample in HK. One can
see that most firms fall into the category of 1-5 or 6-10 employees both in the sample
as well as in the population. The χ2-test verifies that sample and population do not
significantly differ (p = 0.58). It is assumed that the sample mirrors the population in
HK according to the selection criteria.
Because sources of data were different in the PRD depending on the location of firms
(see Section 3.3), a comparison of sample and population is impossible, as data about
the population are not available. Data validity and quality from the PRD survey cannot
be guaranteed as in the case of HK data. Because of this lack of knowledge about the
data, more care must be taken with the generalisation of empirical evidence yielded by
the PRD data.
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Table 3.3: Comparison sample to population according to the number of employees in
electronic firms in HK (2006)
Number of Employees Share of firms in %
Samplea (n = 104) Population (N = 4903)
1–5 43.3 50.5
6–10 27.6 28.3
11–15 8.7 6.1
16–25 9.5 8.1
26–50 7.3 4.0
51–100 3.5 3.0
Total 100.0 100.0
aχ2 = 3.76, p = 0.58
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007] and
Hong Kong Trade Development Council Research Department
(HKTDC) (n. d.)
3.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings in Section 3
E How can informality and flexibility be operationalised in customer and producer
relations?
F Which methods are suitable for measuring informality and flexibility in customer
producer relations?
This section has introduced and defined the GPRD as a research region with limited
availability of secondary data. Additionally, the electronics industry has been identified
as being the most appropriate to study informality and flexibility due to its relevance in
the PRD. To operationalise informality, the five dimensions of informality (see Table 2.1)
were applied. Using this method, informal interactions can be compared with formal
interactions in terms of relevance, importance, frequency, etc. The three main research
areas with respect to informality (recruitment, contractual arrangements, enforcement
mechanisms) each study one or two dimensions of informality. It was decided to collect
data about informality in an indirect way, rather than asking directly. This ensures that
the same definition of informality is applied for all interactions, preventing the definition
from differing between respondents. The quantitative flexibility can be operationalised
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using the speed involved in the different methods of interaction. The qualitative flexi-
bility can be operationalised using the varieties of ways firms consider interacting with
customers and producers. This answers research questions E related to how informality
and flexibility can be operationalised in customer and producer relations.
In order to measure informality and flexibility, a combination of qualitative and quan-
titative methods was applied and assessed (research question F). The need for flexibility
can be assessed using secondary data and literature review combined with expert in-
terviews. The way firms deal with the need for flexibility can only be measured by
collecting primary data, as there is a lack of secondary data due to the novelty of the
field of research. Different research methods were applied to collect primary data on
informality and flexibility in interactions with customers and producers. It was decided
to follow the value chain from large HK firms via SMEs in HK to firms in the PRD,
because this is the way in which flexibility is required. For the large firms in HK, a
case study approach was chosen due to the diverse field of operations. For SMEs in
HK, a standardised survey was conducted, but personal interviews were arranged to
ensure that questionnaires were understandood. Firms in the PRD were surveyed using
a standardised letter. Regional stakeholders in the PRD and HK were also interviewed.
For all different measurements, the topic of informality and flexibility was touched on
indirectly by assessing firms’ interactions with customers and producers according to
their degree of informality and flexibility. It turned out that the accessibility and the
quality of interviews in HK was surprisingly high. Furthermore, the standardised, but
personally conducted survey of SMEs in HK was also found to be of high quality. PRD
data need to be analysed more carefully, especially with regard to possible generalisation.
The following empirical sections will analyse the primary and secondary data according
to their availability and suitability of the specified research topic.
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4 Firm Conditions in the GPRD: Institutional
Change and Development of the Electronics
Industry
This chapter focuses on the economic impact of firms in the GPRD on the global electron-
ics industry and their competitive advantage within it. It provides empirical evidence
to answer research question G. The chapter will:
• document how electronics firms in HK and the PRD are integrated into global
value chains
• analyse the flexibility required by globally integrated firms in the GPRD
• report how the division of labour between HK and the PRD is organised and how
this translates into business success
The Chinese transformation process, including the formal and informal institutional
change, is described in Section 4.1. When China began to attract FDI, HK was in
favour of a complete institutional setting with sufficient trading safeguards, so Western
LFs started to outsource production activities there. A shortage of factory space and
higher labour costs in HK led HK firms to take the opportunity of moving production
activities to China during the first phase of opening, especially to the PRD. Geographical
and social proximity provided HK firms with a competitive advantage over other foreign
firms for success in China . Since then, China has further renewed its formal institutional
environment. At the same time, the global development of the electronics industry (see
Section 4.2) provides evidence for the increasing modularisation and outsourcing ac-
tivities of the industry since the 1980s. A change from hierarchically organised value
chains to a modularised system has taken place. In Section 4.3, the economic growth
and increasing prosperity in the PRD is outlined. This results from the international
integration of electronics firms into modular value chains and the simultaneous require-
ment for flexibility. In Section 4.4, the spatial distribution of GPRD firms integrated
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into global value chains is studied. HK firms tend to have a global customer base and a
locally concentrated network of producers. The unique economic setting—the complete
institutional environment in HK and a transitional setting in the PRD—is responsible
for the distinctive organisation of customer and producer relations.
4.1 Transformation and Institutional Change in the
GPRD
The rise of the electronics industry in the GPRD is strongly connected to the opening
of China and formal institutional changes (see Section 4.1.1). The attraction of FDI
gave impulses for the shift of production facilities of HK firms to the Chinese mainland,
especially to the Guangdong province. The similarity of informal institutions (culture,
values, language, business culture) led to the decision for HK firms to move to the
Guangdong province (see Section 4.1.2). The effectiveness of economic reforms in China
can be proven by analysing international governance indicators (see Section 4.1.3) and
economic performance figures (see Section 4.1.4).
4.1.1 Reform Policies in China and Challenges for the GPRD
China’s Reform Policy
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the leader of the communist party in China. He started
to reform the economic system in a gradual way. The other party members followed
his idea of liberalising markets. China converted its economy from an administratively
driven command economy to a price driven market economy, although the government
still kept control over certain sectors (state capitalism). The Chinese leadership used
reforms and improvements rather than replacing existing institutions. Referring to Sec-
tion 2.3.1, the following reform policies were crucial for a successful transition in China:
liberalisation, privatisation, industrial and foreign investment policy, enterprise income
tax policy, legal reforms and financial policy (Noel 1997). The change to the formal
institutional environment aimed to achieve the following outcomes in the GPRD:
• fewer state-owned businesses and market activities
• economic growth
• increasing trade and foreign investments
• international competitiveness (Zhou 2006)
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The following paragraphs focus on different reform policies relevant for the organisa-
tion of customer producer relations of firms in the GPRD.
Liberalisation: The liberalisation of the national economy was the main focus during the
first years of transition (1979–1989). The state withdrew its influence in the agricultural
and industrial sector. A contract responsibility system of production in agriculture
was introduced in 1979—a policy that allowed farming families to work a piece of land
under contract and to keep whatever profits they earned. In most other sectors, the
role of government was reduced between 1983 and 1988. Managers were given more
autonomy, the government reduced emphasis on planned quotas, allowed enterprises
to produce goods outside the plan for sale on the market and permitted enterprises to
experiment with the use of bonuses to reward higher productivity. In essence, the central
government gave away more authority to provincial and local governments and allowed
them to act on their own initiatives. From the mid-1980s, the government gradually
began to implement the deregulation of prices for selected goods. By the early 1990s,
this had been extended to included almost all goods. Only some goods, such as rice or
fuel, are still subject to price control to ensure equal distribution and to support rural
households (Zhou 2006).
Privatisation: Until the end of the 1970s, three quarters of the industrial production
was generated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the first phase of privatisation,
SOEs’ managers were given more decision-making power and incentives. After the 15th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1997, fundamental changes in
the ownership and management of SOEs were decided upon in an attempt to address
the persistent inefficiency of SOEs. Existing SOEs still cede market shares to private
enterprises today. Private enterprises were set up rapidly after basic steps for private
business activities were established at the beginning of 1980s (legalisation of private
business activities, bank loans to private enterprises). The private sector consists of
FIEs and domestic private enterprises. By now, SOEs account for 50% of the enterprises,
but they are only responsible for 40% of the GIO. Private enterprises and FIE generate
55% of the GIO. The state sector relinquished its dominant role to the private sector.
Private firms are allowed to select their customers and producers freely. The privatisation
process started earlier in the PRD region, since it was an experimental zone for the
central government. Private enterprises are of higher importance there than in the
rest of China (Liefner 2006; Han and Pannell 1999; Zhou 2006; Park and Luo
2001:460–461).
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Industrial Policy and FDI attraction: Before the reform policies were implemented,
China had virtually no involvement in foreign trade. The state held a monopoly on
external trade. In 1979, China began to open up with the formal establishment of for-
eign trade organisations, which functioned as transmitters for external trading firms,
but which still followed the state-set trading plans. FDIs formed the central element of
the opening and modernisation strategy in China, because they provided technology and
management expertise. Because the central government decided on a gradual transfor-
mation of institutions, it was able to begin attracting FDIs, but at the same time protect
its domestic firms. In 1980, the central government carried out preliminary opening ex-
periments with a designed blueprint of economic zones in coastal regions, to which firms
were attracted by the offer of special treatment. The first special economic zones (SEZs)
to be opened up were SZ near HK, Zhuhai near Macau, Shantou with a good overseas
Chinese network and Xiamen opposite Taiwan. These zones in the southern provinces
are geographically distant from the political and economic centres of China. The initial
size of zones was small, but they swelled into big cities once capital and labour flowed in
and the necessary infrastructure was developed. HK and overseas Chinese firms started
to move in later (at the end of 1980), capital from HK taking the biggest share. Foreign
trade procedures were greatly relaxed between 1979 and 1981, which led to a higher
number of customer producer relationships. SEZs are mainly characterised by:
• attracting and utilising foreign capital
• special tax incentives for foreign investments
• greater dependence on international trade activities
• export-oriented production
• sino-foreign JVs and partnerships as well as wholly foreign-owned enterprises
In 1984, the central government opened 14 coastal cities to the outside world, including
GZ. They enjoyed more favourable policies than inland regions, but were not given the
same status and treatment as those special economic zones.
In the beginning, Chinese law allowed foreign capital to flow in only through JVs
(Chinese majority shareholding). Partners in the PRD were a necessity. The Chinese
partner was responsible for providing buildings, workers and infrastructure, whereas the
foreign partner provided machines and raw material. Export-oriented firms were the
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main target group of the central government. Since the early 1990s, the central govern-
ment has allowed foreign partners to become chairs of JV boards, and has authorised
the establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises, now the preferred form of FDI.
An increasing competition between foreign and domestic firms led to an adaptation of
the domestic firms to new technology and prices (Liefner 2006).
Moreover, Deng achieved a positive result in negotiations with the British government.
They agreed to return HK to China in 1997. The slogan for the reintegration of HK
into China was ”one country, two systems”. According to this slogan, HK kept its own
government, currency and laws. The reintegration of HK boosted the quantity and
quality of economic links between HK and the PRD (Zhou 2006).
Tax Policy and FDI attraction: To attract FIEs, the central government introduced
preferential tax treatment (1) on imports and exports and (2) on incomes. Both are
important for the organisation of customer producer relations.
(1) Soon after the opening, the Chinese government set up its processing trade policy.
Processing trade refers to the business activity of importing all parts and components
from abroad and re-exporting the finished products after processing or assembly by en-
terprises on the mainland, where the import and export of products is subject to value
added tax (VAT) rebates. FIEs carry out processing or assembly for a processing fee.
To guide the flow of FDIs and encourage processing trade, the central government de-
veloped a system which divides foreign investment projects into four categories: namely
encouraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited. A product catalogue was developed in
1995 (major revisions made in 1997, 2002, 2007), which listed all manufacturing goods
in the different categories. FIEs which carry out projects in the encouraged category
(including foreign-invested R&D centres, high-tech and export-oriented FIEs) enjoy the
most preferential tax treatment, followed by FIEs carrying out projects in the permitted
category (Hong Kong Trade Development Council Research Department
(HKTDC) 2004b). Through this measure, the central government can control and guide
FDI according to the attainment of national goals in different sectors and regions. This
policy avoids undesired effects on the national economy and limits the power of transna-
tional companies (Hayter and Han 1998). In August 2007, the categories of restricted
and prohibited goods were expanded from 394 to 2,247 items in the Guangdong province
(Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) 2007d). The central gov-
ernment is trying to move export processing firms to the Western provinces, where they
can still enjoy the tax exemption. The category of encouraged and permitted goods was
reduced to capital-, knowledge- and technology-intensive products. An upgrade of tech-
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nology was initiated in the Guangdong province. Firms in Guangdong can continue to
engage in processing trade of products under the restricted category, provided that they
pay customs duty deposits. These new regulations hit electronics firms in Guangdong
especially hard, as many electronic items are now in the restricted category. Since the
beginning of the Chinese opening policy, processing trade has solved China’s shortage of
capital and technology-related expertise. Moreover, it has functioned as a job-creating
machine. 70,000 of the 90,000 export processing firms were located in Guangdong in
2006. More than 16 million people are estimated to be working for processing trade
enterprises in Guangdong. 47% of the total foreign trade results from export processing
enterprises. The policy forces firms in the GPRD to make major changes—either to up-
grade or to relocate (see paragraph below). Due to the sudden changes to the categories
of restricted and prohibited goods, it is expected that firms in the GPRD will close down,
because they are not able to relocate or upgrade immediately (The Greater Pearl
River Delta Business Council 2007). The recent economic crisis in 2008/2009 has
accelerated the closing down of companies. In autum 2008, 15% of firms in the PRD
had to close their businesses.
(2) At the beginning of China’s opening, the central government reduced the income
tax for FIEs in order to attract FDIs. FIEs established in special economic zones, hi-
tech industrial zones and state-level economic development zones had to pay enterprise
income tax at a rate of 15%. JVs were granted to FIEs. FIEs in costal open areas and
provincial capitals were subject to a tax rate of 24%. SOEs had to pay 55% income
tax and domestic enterprises 33% (Hong Kong Trade Development Council
Research Department (HKTDC) 2004b). Effective from January 2008, the central
government changed the enterprise income tax law. It unifies the income tax systems
to 25% for both domestically-funded enterprises and FIEs. Most of the enterprises with
foreign investment had previously enjoyed a lower tax rate. This was announced only
eight months before taking effect. Grandfather clauses are included in the new law to
ensure a smooth changeover. Exemptions of 15% income tax only apply to high-tech
firms. It is still undecided whether special treatment should continue for firms in SEZs.
Besides the new financial burden of tax on imports and exports, FIEs in the Guangdong
province also suffer from higher income tax rates (Etgen 2007; Zhou 2006).
Legal Reforms: The central government in China put into effect four major changes in
order to reform the legal system. (1) The central government changed the property rights
from emphasising socialist public ownership to protecting private ownership. Personal
and public property rights were declared protected by law, thus reducing the risks of
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doing business. This process has still not been completed sufficiently, particularly the
protection of IPRs. (2) Lawyers are allowed to practice again in China. Great efforts
have been made to improve the quantity and quality of lawyers with many training and
exchange programmes. The quality and education of judges is improving, but is still
not sufficient for FIEs to ensure a fair judgment. This affects how firms choose to settle
disputes with customers and producers. (3) The introduction of more business-related
laws has led to an improvement of the business environment and legal protection of
business practice. It was also partly carried out in compliance with the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) rules. Relevant laws include the enterprise law and banking law.
(4) The establishment of new laws has seen major improvements, but enforcement is
still lacking. To make the ”rule of law” applicable in economic and social life, the
government began to put emphasis on legal procedures. More parties involved in business
stand to profit from cases heard and disputes resolved. Although new laws are building
market-related institutions in China, their enforcement needs major improvements, as
corruption of Chinese officials is still a daily occurrence. Moreover, China does not
offer international security standards for protecting international contract conclusion and
enforcement. In case of conflicts between international parties, arbitration is a common
way of settling disputes. While HK possesses an excellent dispute settlement system,
China lacks the required institutions (Zhou 2006). For example, the UN model law on
International Commercial Arbitration (1985) has not yet been implemented, but China’s
arbitration law is under revision for improvement (United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) n. d.). Even if the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) is ratified in China, it
is nevertheless difficult and time-consuming to deal with the Chinese courts in order to
enforce a foreign arbitration award reached with international customers and producers.
Financial Policy: The implications of the economic reforms for the financial sector are
tremendous. The privatisation of enterprises and the liberalisation of prices require (1) a
bank reform to ensure business financing and (2) the introduction of a new functional
tax system to generate public revenue. Although the central government has reformed
the tax law, the enforcement of a standardised tax system is difficult, because firms are
used to tax exemptions. Furthermore, the central government has introduced a two-
tiered banking system. When FIEs seek financing in China, Chinese commercial banks
are allowed to accept guarantees from foreign shareholders, but the central government
still controls the establishment of foreign banks and branches. In 1995, China linked
the RMB to the USD for currency convertibility. In the course of its accession to the
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WTO, China had to open its banking sector. Since 2007, China has opened up for
foreign banks but has limited the establishment of branches. Chinese banks are still not
subject to international competition. Chinese banks do not provide a good alternative
to foreign banks, especially for FIEs. This limited availability of capital for FIEs reduces
the attractiveness of China and increases business risks. Therefore, many firms tend to
organise their capital flows to customers and producers via HK (Liefner 2006; Okura
1996; Agarwal 1999; Hong Kong Trade Development Council Research
Department (HKTDC) 2004b).
Newest Trends and Challenges for Firms in the GPRD
Upgrading or Relocating: Since the beginning of 2000, the central government has
started to encourage firms to relocate to the central and western regions. Projects
concerning energy and transportation infrastructure are especially likely to enjoy pref-
erential treatment. As described above, the Chinese government attracts and controls
FDIs in western provinces through tax exemptions for imports and exports for certain
goods and also by offering a reduced rate of income tax (15%). Just as they make the
western provinces attractive for export-oriented FIEs, they reduce the attractiveness of
the Guangdong province for those enterprises. In 2007, the central government expanded
the list of restricted and prohibited goods for tax-free import and export for enterprises
set up in Guangdong (Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC)
2006b). China continues to support the Guangdong province in terms of FDI attrac-
tion for capital- and technology-intensive industries through lower income taxes, despite
the fact that FIEs actually should have adapted to the new enterprise tax law in 2008.
Moreover, environmental production standards were introduced. Enterprises failing to
meet eco-standards will be refused registration in Guangdong (Hong Kong Trade
Development Council (HKTDC) 2007a). These three changes to the legal systems
hit Guangdong province especially hard, as many FIEs relying on export processing are
set up there. They must either decide to adopt a new upgrading strategy to meet the
defined requirements of capital- or technology-intensive products, or they must relocate
to the western provinces and continue business operations there (Berger and Lester
1997; Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) 2006a). This greatly
affects customer producer relations. Firms must not only upgrade their own business
activities, but those of their producers as well. When firms relocate, they either have to
take their producers with them to the new location, or they must build a new producer
network. Moreover, production costs in the PRD have risen due to increased labour
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costs (minimum wages and social security costs) and additional utility charges (such as
costs for electricity). By July 2007, the RMB exchange rate had crept up to 9.3% against
the USD. While most HK manufacturers still receive USD payments for their exports,
the appreciation of the RMB means that the part of production costs settled in RMB
would increase in terms of the USD, which diminishes export margins (Hong Kong
Trade Development Council (HKTDC) 2007c). Moreover, in January 2008, the
new Labour Contract Law came into effect, which protects employees’ rights even fur-
ther. The new law brings new requirements for the termination of labour contracts.
It encourages employers to sign a long-term labour contract with their employee. This
means a loss of manufacturing flexibility for the firms in the GPRD.
The Opening of China for FDI in Services: HK, like most Western countries, has
been a member of the WTO since 1995. China, however, did not enter the WTO until
2001. After that, China had to open its economy further and adapt its governmental
functions to a more liberalised policy. Numerous government regulations and internal
rules had—and still have—to be revised. Government efficiency and effectiveness in im-
plementing laws is also in question, judging by international standards. In other words,
with the WTO accession, the business environment in China had to improve rapidly to
avoid penalties and retaliation. China was requested to offer a standardised and trans-
parent legal environment for FIEs, a better protection of intellectual property rights
(IPRs) and a reduction of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. However, after just seven
years of WTO membership, China’s reforms on theses issues are obviously not yet suffi-
cient. Moreover, service industries had to be opened for foreign investments within five
years of accession, including telecommunication, banking, insurance, securities, foreign
trade and legal services. For the Guangdong province, the opening of the banking and
insurance sector is of particular relevance. Banking and insurance firms could serve
FIEs with branches in their neighbourhood, making communication and administrative
procedures easier. In 2006, China’s WTO five-year-implementation phase for opening
its banking and insurance sector for foreign firms ended. But it must be noted that
some regulations for implementations have still not been finally set (Schueller 2002;
Yeung 2002; Hong Kong Trade Development Council Research Depart-
ment (HKTDC) 2000a; Hong Kong Trade Development Council Research
Department (HKTDC) 2001).
CEPA 2004–2007 and other Trade Agreements: To foster the cooperation between
the Guangdong province and HK, the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA)
was established in 2004. CEPA derives essentially from a response by the HK business
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community to China’s WTO accession. It is based on the idea of extending free trade
between HK and the Chinese mainland in order to gain significant benefits to offset
the impact of post-WTO entry competition. Gradually, HK firms were granted more
preferential treatment than other FIEs in Guangdong. CEPA came into force in five
steps from 2004 to 2007. Zero tariffs were applied on goods originally from HK (tariff
rates which would otherwise apply range from 4 to 30%). The corresponding catalogue
contains 273 items. Under CEPA, 90% of the HK domestic exports to the mainland are
free of tariffs. Special emphasis is placed on the liberalisation of different service sectors,
for example management consultant services, exhibitions and conventions, real estate,
distribution services, logistics services, legal services, banking, insurance (Hong Kong
Trade Development Council Research Department (HKTDC) 2003a; Hong
Kong Trade Development Council Research Department (HKTDC) 2004a;
Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC) 2007b; Hong Kong Gen-
eral Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC) 2003). The mainland had opened service
industries and markets to HK businesses prior to the overall opening to international
businesses required by WTO rules. To strengthen international trade, China concluded
several bilateral free trade agreements and reached a regional free trade agreement with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). From 2007 to 2010, trade in goods
and services with the ASEAN members will be liberalised.
Economic Crisis 2008: As a financial centre, HK has been hit heavily by the recent
financial crisis. To help SMEs in HK get credit, a Loan Guarantee Scheme and a SME
Export Marketing Fund were implemented. Moreover, the PRD as an export-oriented
region suffered from the sharp decline in demand from leading global firms. The customer
producer relationships were put under pressure as orders were reduced and competition
grew. The HK government is trying to strengthen cooperation with Guangdong in order
to maintain the competitive edge of the GPRD. Mainland enterprises were encouraged
to use HK as a platform to develop international business. The central government in
China will further adjust the tax rebate rates for exports, improve the labour system
to reduce the burden on enterprises, facilitate the development of the domestic market
for processing trade enterprises and develop a guarantee mechanism for SME financing.
Despite these efforts, about 15% of firms in the PRD have already closed down (Invest
in Hong Kong 2008).
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4.1.2 Shaping of the Business Environment by Informal Institutions
The business environment in HK and the PRD is not only shaped by formal institutions,
but is also characterised by the Chinese way of doing business while relying on informal
institutions. The way the Chinese acquire and organise their business differs from West-
ern ways. HK firms can take advantage of their special ability to deal simultaneously
with both the Chinese transitional setting and global markets (Li et al. 2004:71). They
are famous for their Janus-faced business organisation (Meyer et al. 2009). The fact
that the Chinese way of doing business has not been sufficiently studied and considered
by foreign firms causes them to fail in China. Chinese firms are on their way to imitating
HK firms in dealing with both settings.
Corresponding to Section 2.3.5 in the conceptual part of this work, informal institu-
tions must be taken into account when analysing the environmental conditions in the
GPRD. Chinese business organisation relies on the personal and business networks of
individual merchants, which results in informal rules difficult to understand for West-
erners. This business model, best represented by the HK experience, is characterised by
its flexibility and the absence of state patronage (Loh 2002:14). The following traits
describe the Chinese way of understanding and organising business. They give an insight
into what rules informally shape the business environment.
Family Business: Small and medium sized family businesses are the most common
type of firms. The reliance on ethnic and community bonds in business operation is
widespread. Firms organise themselves into tight mutual aid associations. The authority
of top management remains in the hands of family members with an authoritarian
leadership style. Decisions can be made very quickly. Family businesses fit very well
with the Chinese culture as the family is the centre of society. The cohesion of the
family and the firm provides stability to the business and builds up reputation, especially
during the initial years of foundation. Younger generations in HK have obtained a more
extensive education in the West and have gained deeper understanding of the way in
which Western businesses work. This has provided them with a combination of the
Chinese and the Western way of thinking, which increases their scope for flexible firm
organisation. Today, family businesses, especially in the PRD, face three problems.
Firstly, the process of transition is opening a gap between family-controlled businesses
on the one hand and open market competition and the successful attraction of outside
talent on the other hand. Secondly, there are problems in handling the growing size of
their businesses. A larger firm requires more management skills, which are not always
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available to Chinese family firms. Thirdly, it is a big challenge to combine growth and
the necessary professionalisation of management with the typical flexibility and reaction
rate of the firms (Loh 2002; Zhou 2006:45-67). Nevertheless, family-owned firms are
not just a hallmark of HK and the PRD - their flexibility makes them the crucial factor
in the region’s success.
Business Networks: In recent years, several studies have been carried out claiming to
investigate the “Chinese economic model”. An important finding of these studies is
that behind the aimless and opaque appearance, there is a complex and competitive
organisational model (Loh 2002). Network structures among family businesses are fun-
damental to these flexible firm organisations. In Chinese society, the sense of community
and responsibility plays an important role. This also extends into the business world.
Therefore, strategically important positions in a firm are occupied by family members,
and firms belonging to individual family members work together closely. Firms are of-
ten supported by family members and family members are frequently given preferential
treatment in commissioning. Swift and direct communication is possible, even concern-
ing large assignments, due to a high degree of trust. Additionally, the success of the
Chinese way of doing business can be attributed to an enlarged contact network among
classmates, military service colleagues, home town friends and friends of friends (guanxi).
Trust and partial lifelong reciprocity between people who have guanxi with each other
results in help when difficulties arise, access to rare resources and the opportunity to ob-
tain political support for personal projects. Loyalty and respect towards the leaders and
towards business partners is responsible for stability and smooth business operations.
Executives need to spend much of their time dealing with partners and exercise extreme
control over strategies. These informal interactions are essential to a company’s high
degree of flexibility. The main reason for a corporation’s success is the degree to which it
is embedded in guanxi-networks (Loh 2002; Park and Luo 2001). The majority of the
literature today accepts the prevalence of guanxi as a Chinese asset of personalised social
capital (Li 2007). Recently, functional or utilitarian aspects of guanxi have become more
important than emotional aspects (Park and Luo 2001:457). Guanxi has transformed
into an informal channel of doing business, which promises to be more successful than
relying on formal methods alone. This finding goes beyond the standard expectation
of institutional economics, which maintains that informality in China is a transitional
phenomenon and a substitute for formal institutional support (Xin and Pearce 1996).
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Experience in Risk-Taking: Many studies emphasise not only network structures as
a crucial factor of success, but also the company’s ability to compete with others and
grow despite market uncertainty. Over and above that, many business families who have
been successful in HK for decades had already been successful businessmen in China
before fleeing to HK during the Cultural Revolution (Lee 1997:195-205). However,
unpredictable political and economic circumstances both during and after the British
rule forced HK companies to develop strategies and measures for reducing insecurity
on a permanent basis. HK firms tend to rely on intuition to anticipate eventualities,
rather than on quantitative information and calculations. Other typical methods include
spreading the risk over several persons and companies, building up financial reserves,
diversifying business fields and selecting personnel carefully (Sull 2005). This pool of
experiences leads to the conclusion that insecurity not only holds risks, but also offers
opportunities (Loh 2002; Zhou 2006:45-67).
Guerrilla Entrepreneurship: HK companies have learned how to manage insecurity and
how to recognise new, short-term business opportunities successfully using small family
businesses working within a large network. This “guerrilla strategy” facilitates their
international competitiveness (Yu 2000). For a very short time, the companies specialise
in goods with a high profit margin and exploit the situation by overstocking the world
market. Established companies can only act with a delay in such cases. After short-term
profits, HK companies leave the market and focus on other products. The electronics
industry in particular is very well known for this strategy. The Tamagochi, an electronic
toy invented in Japan, was mostly produced in the PRD after its successful introduction
to the market. Japanese companies were not able to modify their production quickly
enough, so PRD companies drew high profits. A widely spread and reliable supplier
network is a big part of the companies’ guerrilla strategy (Lee 1997:195-205). After
accepting a production order, a HK company not only has access to its own factory but
also to those of their partners and suppliers. If their own capacities are exhausted, orders
can be passed on. Hence, there is no need to decline additional orders. Because of the
great diversity of supply networks, low investment is required, fluctuations of demand
can be balanced out much more effectively and the whole process accelerates thanks
to the geographical proximity of all participants. This allows the transaction costs to
remain low. Emerging Chinese firms try to follow HK firms’ most effective practice
model (Loh 2002; Zhou 2006:45-67).
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4.1.3 Putting China’s Institutional Environment into a Global
Perspective
The central government is gradually reforming the rules of law in China. The reform
process is combined with the informal institutional environment, which is only adapting
slowly to the new rules of law. The annual collected factors of the economic freedom
index calculated by the Heritage Foundation (n. d.) provides a longitudinal and a
cross-regional analysis to put China’s institutional environment into a global perspective.
The economic freedom index can be taken as an objective measurement with which to
follow the development of China’s institutional environment. The economic freedom
factors cover the firm-specific environment in a country. It consists of ten factors. Each
one of the ten factors is graded using a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents the
maximum economic freedom. In evaluating the criteria for each factor, the Heritage
Foundation (n. d.) has used a range of authoritative sources. The first factor, for
example, business freedom, consists of indicators collected by the Worldbank’s “Doing
Business” study. It covers the ability to create, operate, and close an enterprise quickly
and easily. Cumbersome, redundant regulatory rules are the most harmful barriers to
business freedom. Trade freedom is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-
tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. Sources for that are
World Bank indicators, WTO indicators and Economist Intelligence Unit measurements.
Fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax burden from the revenue side. Government
size is defined to include all government expenditures. Ideally, the state will provide
only true public goods, with an absolute minimum of expenditure. Monetary freedom
combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls. Investment
freedom is an assessment of the free flow of capital, especially foreign capital. Financial
freedom is a measure of banking security as well as independence from government
control. State ownership of banks and other financial institutions, such as insurer and
capital markets, is a burden on efficiency, and political favoritism has no place in a
free capital market. Property rights is an assessment of the ability of individuals to
accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state.
Freedom from corruption is based on quantitative data that assess the perception of
corruption in the business environment, including levels of governmental, legal, judicial,
and administrative corruption. This factor reverts to the corruption perceptions index
of Transparency International (n. d.). The last indicator, labour freedom, is not
taken into account here because of missing data for the years in question. Because the
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Figure 4.1: Development of the institutional environment in China
Source: Heritage Foundation (n. d.)
economic freedom index summarises a range of other indicators, it seems to be the most
suitable index with which firstly to follow China’s development over a period of years,
and secondly to compare China’s state-of-the-art institutional environment to that of
HK.
Figure 4.1 shows China’s development in terms of the nine factors comparing the years
1997 (HK’s return to China), 2001 (WTO accession) and 2008 (today). To put China’s
figures into perspective, HK’s data are added for 2008. When comparing the China
curve and the HK curve, one can see that HK reaches between 80 and 90 points out of
100 for all factors of the economic freedom index. HK provides excellent institutions to
support firms and enables free flow of investment and trade. China is still struggling to
reach half of the points for some factors.
When examining the development of China over time in terms of the different factors,
one notices that the business freedom factor has not increased within the last eleven
years. The number of days and procedures for starting and closing a business has not
been reduced. Moreover, the indices for getting credits and protecting investors have
hardly changed (Worldbank n. d.). In contrast, there is a large improvement in the
area of trade freedom. The scale has increased from 30 to 70 points. China’s accession
to the WTO, the CEPA agreement and the profits made by exports have boosted the
opening of China for foreign trade. Fiscal freedom in terms of tax burden has remained
on the same high level for the last eleven years. It is expected that the fiscal freedom
will improve within the coming years due to the new enterprise tax law reducing the
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rate for Chinese firms. In terms of government size, China has reached the HK level
and does not need to hide its competence. In terms of monetary freedom, China has
improved greatly in recent years. Prices have become more stable, which encourages
investments. However, when comparing 1997 to 2008, one notices that China has become
less attractive in terms of the free flow of capital (investment freedom) and the high
dependency of the banking system on the central government (financial freedom). In
terms of services, China has still not opened enough for foreign firms to protect their
own businesses sufficiently. Even if the WTO accession demands this opening, it is
only taking place very slowly. These results confirm what has been said about the
limited opening for services in Section 4.1.1. The protection of property rights is also
in a poor condition and is always criticised by firms. The scale has even fallen from
30 points in 1997 to 20 points in 2008. The corruption factor also shows China to be
in a bad position. Although improvements could be seen in the increase from 22 to
33 points, the overall level is low. China’s major weaknesses in terms of institutions
are its susceptibility to corruption, its poor protection of property rights, especially
IPRs, and its limited opening for financial services. Although those weaknesses are well
known, there has hardly been any improvement in recent years. China could have taken
a major leap forward in terms of free trade flow. Taking objective measurements into
account shows that China may have improved in some areas in recent years, but is still
in a poor condition in others. In comparison with HK, China can only compete in
terms of government size (government expenditures) and monetary price stability. In
all other fields, HK provides firms with much better and more stable conditions. When
comparing China as a whole with the PRD, one can expect that trade freedom for HK
firms is higher in the PRD than in the rest of China due to the CEPA. Additionally, the
financial and monetary freedom is less relevant in the PRD, because firms can also get
loans from HK banks. Government size and control is generally lower in the PRD than
in the rest of China. It can be expected that the PRD is sightly better situated in terms
of the institutional environment than China as a whole. The next section focuses on the
development of economic figures in the GPRD to complete the picture of the situation
in the research region.
4.1.4 The GPRD in Figures
The outsourcing strategy of Western LFs in the 1980s was closely linked to the rise of
the four tiger states: HK, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. They benefited mainly
from the transfer of production capacity and knowledge from Western firms fostered by
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strong political support. The rise of HK was closely connected with the growth of the
PRD region due to two parallel developments. On the one hand, growing prosperity in
the 1980s in Europe and the United States (US) led to an increasing demand for con-
sumer products, especially electronic devices (see Section 4.2). As competition between
Western firms grew, they looked for attractive production locations with cost-efficient
assets. At the same time, HK became an attractive location for production outsourcing
for leading Western firms because of its well functional legal system. However, factory
space became limited in HK due to the increasing foreign demand for the production
activities of HK firms. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the leader of the communist
party in China. Under his leadership, a SEZ was established in SZ in 1980 because of
its proximity to the economically successful city of HK (see Section 4.1.1). Deng hoped
that China would profit from HK’s economic growth with this experiment, and in case of
failure, it was politically far removed from Beijing. But the SEZ in SZ did not fail. Deng
allowed foreign goods and capital to be moved into China. Investments from HK firms
were especially welcome. By then, HK firms were following Deng’s invitation to set up
plants in SZ. The proximity to HK and the opportunity of keeping control of production
activities in the PRD led HK entrepreneurs to take the risk of producing in China. The
success of HK firms led Taiwanese and other foreign firms to follow this path. Further
liberalisation policies, China’s accession to the WTO and the introduction of the CEPA
increased the attractiveness of the entire PRD.
The results of the tremendous change of institutions—the economic growth in the
PRD—can be verified by the increase of FDIs, GIO and the trade volume. Table 4.1
shows the time series (1980–2005) of economic figures in Guangdong, GZ and DG. Since
1980, a rapid increase of FDIs can be recognised, with the largest boom coming between
1990 and 2000. Since 2000, the FDI flow has stagnated in both the Guangdong province
and in GZ (compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2000–2005: 0% or −2% respectively).
In DG, the rapid flow has continued. GZ and DG were responsible for nearly half
of all FDIs in the Guangdong province in 2005. GZ is characterised by more local
Chinese enterprises, whereas DG remains a well known destination for Taiwan and HK
investments. The different characteristics can also be seen in the development of the
GIO. Despite a rapid growth of GIO in both cities, DG was able to reach a CAGR of 22%
from 1980–2005, whereas GZ only reached 11%. This is clearly a consequence of more
FDIs in DG during that time. Foreign firms can usually reach a higher GIO. Despite
this fact, the GIO in GZ has taken the edge off DG in recent years. Looking at the
CAGR 2000–2005, DG still registered a higher growth rate of GIO than GZ, but the gap
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Table 4.1: Time series analysis of economic indicators in the PRD 1980–2005
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 CAGR
80–05 90–05 00–05
FDI inflow (in 100 mill. USD)
GD 1.2 5.2 14.6 101.8 122.4 123.6 20% 15% 0%
GZ 0.1 1.0 1.9 21.4 29.9 26.5 24% 19% −2%
DG 0.0 0.1 1.0 6.7 10.9 28.2 53% 25% 21%
GIOa (in 100 mill. USD)
GD 165.8 182.1 397.6 1, 164.0 2, 042.0 5, 085.8 15% 19% 20%
GZ 58.7 60.6 92.5 206.3 374.5 826.2 11% 16% 17%
DG 3.9 5.9 20.6 62.6 183.6 545.7 22% 24% 24%
Trade Volume (in 100 mill. USD)
GD 419.0 1, 039.7 1, 701.1 4, 280.0 17% 20%
GZ 41.8 167.0 233.5 534.8 19% 18%
DG 10.8 153.9 320.5 743.7 33% 18%
asince 1995 new classification decreasing values slightly
Source: Own calculations based on Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statis-
tics (2007), Guangzhou Muncipal Statistics Bureau (GMSB) (2007),
Dongguan Municipal Statistics Bureau (2007)
between both was reduced. This shows that GZ became more economically powerful,
despite the fact that GZ hosts more domestic firms. Besides a tremendeous increase
in trade, DG, with its emphasis on foreign firms, has higher foreign trade figures than
GZ. Although GZ firms have a higher GIO, they focus more on the domestic market,
whereas DG firms are oriented towards global markets.
The last figure shows how tremendous the economic growth in the PRD has been.
The following figures from 2006 show how important the PRD is for China, which role
firms in GZ and DG play in the PRD and what impact the electronics industry has for
the economic development of the region:
Impact of PRD electronics firms for China: The PRD is responsible for 30% of Chi-
nese exports, 18% of FDIs and 12% of the GIO. The impact of the electronics
industry in the PRD for China is even higher. Electronics firms in the PRD ac-
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count for 38% of all Chinese electronics exports and they are responsible for 32%
of the GIO reached by the Chinese electronics firms.
Impact of GZ and DG electronics firms for the PRD: Electronics firms in DG gen-
erate 13% of the GIO of all electronics firms in the PRD. Electronics firms in GZ
account for 7.2% of the GIO in the PRD and 6.9% of the exports of all electronics
products in the PRD.
Impact of HK firms in the PRD: 32% of China’s FDI inflows originally come from
HK, Taiwan or Macau. In the Guangdong province, these numbers are even higher
because of the proximity to HK. In Guangdong, 47% of all FDIs come from HK,
Taiwan or Macau, in GZ 43% and in DG as much as 58%. It is assumed that not
all FDI come direcly from HK firms, but also originate in other countries. They
are only invested via HK. How high the share is cannot be determined from the
official statistics. This also results in a high share of GIO generated by FIEs from
HK, Taiwan or Macau. In DG, firms from HK, Taiwan or Macau are responsible
for 49% of the GIO, while in GZ they account for 26% and in Guangdong province
for 30%.
GDP per Capita: As a result of the economic boom described above, the GDP per
capita has grown tremendously. Calculations for 2006 are difficult, because the
official figure is based on the registered population. Migrant workers are not in-
cluded. For 2005, figures are available based on the census population. For the
Guangdong province, the GDP per capita was 2,882 USD. In the PRD, this figure
rose to 4,865. In DG, GDP per capita was 6,142 in 2005 and in GZ 6,574. The
slightly higher figure in GZ can be explained by its functionality as a service and
financial centre in Guangdong (Enright et al. 2006).
As previously indicated, growth differences between the cities within the PRD can be
recognised. A shift-share analysis was conducted to characterise the growth differences
between cities and to establish which role is taken by the research cities DG and GZ
(Schaetzl 2000). The differences in economic growth are measured by the Total Net
Shift (TNS). The TNS is the difference between the actual change of GIO in a city over
a certain time period and the potential change, assuming that the economic activity of
one city would have developed in accordance with the average for the entire PRD region.
This deviation is measured in percentage points. A positive value corresponds to the
above average growth of a city in comparison to the entire PRD region, and a negative
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value to below average growth. Reasons for that can be quantified by the Net Differential
Shift (NDS), which relies on an initial locational effect, and the Net Proportionality Shift
(NPS), which is based on an effect of the sectoral structure. A positive (or negative)
locational effect (NDS) means a relative locational advantage (or disadvantage), because
growth of certain sectors is encouraged (or limited) in a city due to other locational
characteristics (for example poor infrastructure or accessibility, certain city government
regulations). The structural effect (NPS) of a city is positive (or negative) when the share
of sectors with above average growth is higher (or lower) than for the entire PRD due
to a beneficial split of industries. For the PRD region, the economic growth is measured
by the change of the GIO in the five major industrial sectors (Electronics, Petroleum
and Chemistry, Textile and Garments, Food and Beverage, Building Materials).
Comparing the results of the shift share analysis of the GIO in the PRD from the
periods 1990–2000 and 2000–2006, the characteristics of different cities can be shown (see
Table 4.2). In the period 1990–2000, cities in proximity to HK showed an above average
development in comparison to the total development in the PRD region. DG (54%),
SZ (16%) and Huizhou (54%) had positive values in TNS due to the close proximity
to HK, while Zhuhai (19%) and Foshan (25%) are in spatial proximity to Macau. The
development in the first few years was a matter of proximity to HK, which can be
confirmed by the high positive locational effects in those cities. Accessability caused
by the development of infrastructure was the basic argument. GZ indicates a negative
value. Although the provincial capital, Guangzhou, was already well linked to HK,
the accessibility of the remote areas of the province was poor. The sectoral structure
had only a small impact on the economic growth in this period. This picture changed
when looking at the development of the GIO between 2000 and 2006. DG and SZ still
benefited most in the PRD region, which can mainly be explained by the location. For
other cities, the structural effect drove development more than the location effect (for
example Zhuhai and Huizhou). Although GZ still had a below average development,
the city profited more from its sectoral structure than from its location. In general, a
shift from advantages in location to advantages in sectoral structure is recognisable in
the PRD. This is a consequence of the high investment in infrastructure. For future
development, it can be expected that the remote cities, especially in the west, will
report the highest growth rates (Greater Pearl River Delta Council 2006). HK
firms view the progress of the western PRD positively, as they are looking for expansion
within the PRD area rather than moving to other provinces, as desired by the central
government.
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Table 4.2: Shift-Share analysis of the gross industrial output in the PRD
1990–2000 2000–2006
TNSa NDSb NPSc TNS NDS NPS
Total Location Sectors Total Location Sectors
Dongguan 54% 56% −1% 40% 32% 8%
Shenzhen 16% 6% 9% 37% 21% 16%
Zhuhai 19% 26% −6% 1% −17% 18%
Huizhou 54% 49% 4% −15% −46% 31%
Foshan 25% 21% 4% −70% −24% −46%
Zhongshan −60% −65% 5% 38% 42% −4%
Guangzhou −48% −54% −5% −29% −23% −6%
Jiangmen −63% −37% −26% −87% −58% −28%
Zhaoqing −96% −84% −12% −174% −146% −28%
aTotal Net Shift
bNet Differential Shift
cNet Proportionality Shift
Source: Own calculations based on Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statistics
(2007)
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A rapid increase in FDI, GIO and trade has occurred since China opened the region
for FIEs. The geographical and cultural proximity to HK has contributed greatly to its
economic growth. HK firms have invested heavily in the PRD and have provided exper-
tise in technology and management for the Chinese firms. Those investments were driven
by (1) the introduction of market-like institutions in China (see Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.3),
(2) the close links between HK and China shaped by common informal institutions (see
Section 4.1.2) and (3) the increasing global demand for products manufactured in the
PRD, especially electronics products (see Section 4.2). Although the PRD has reported
amazing economic growth rates, differences in growth between the PRD cities were dis-
covered. This section has only given a brief overview of the development in the PRD.
As the emphasis of this work is on the electronics industry, the following section stresses
the development and characteristics of the electronics industry in the GPRD and its
integration into the world economy.
4.2 Global Development of the Electronics Industry
This section gives an introduction to how the electronics industry is globally organised.
It documents major steps in its development since the 1960s. It describes the shift from
integrated firms to modular value chains, concentrating on the participation of firms in
developing countries.
The development of the global electronics industry can be divided into four areas:
growth of demand, modularisation, shorter product life cycles and outsourcing. The de-
velopment phases of the electronics industry and the emergence of modular value chains
are the results of changes which began in the US. For most of the twentieth century,
the electronics industry in the US was dominated by large, vertically integrated firms
with component divisions. In the 1960s and 1970s, with the push for better semiconduc-
tors for military use and aerospace application, the growth of the electronics industry
accelerated. In the 1980s, the consumer electronics industry began to develop rapidly
with the introduction of personal computers. Demand for consumer electronics products
grew tremendously.
A phenomenon developed which still poses challenges for the electronics industry
today—speed-to-market necessitated by shorter product life cycles. Bayus (1998) and
Kaipia et al. (2006) studied the reduction of product life cycles. Bayus (1998) in-
vestigated the mean length of product life cycles for products made by internationally
renowned electronics firms. Life cycles range from 2.45 years (Samsung) to 5.47 years
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(IBM). Kaipia et al. (2006) complemented his research by studying an augmentation of
product families and product introductions per year, which is not only a sign of increas-
ing product diversity, but also of a shorter life time of product series. They found that
production and delivery quantity must be planned on a weekly basis, which shows the
high volatility of markets. Moreover, they discovered huge differences in the planning
accuracy of firms at different stages of the value chain. Planning accuracy of CMs is rel-
atively poor. Even for the following week, inaccuracy of plans comes to more than 70%.
CSs have a good planning accuracy fu¨r standardised material, because raw material
planning requires long planning horizons, but planning accuracy is worse for variable
materials. Their results show the high degree of flexibility expected from electronics
firms at the lower end of the value chain.
The increasing market pressure of quick response was no longer manageable for US
firms in the age of the new economy. US firms changed their production structure from
the earlier in-house production to wholly-owned component divisions. Thus began the
modularisation process in the electronics value chain.
At the same time, the Japanese electronics industry began to develop. Instead of
relying on component division of production, the Japanese built a network model of
captive suppliers in Japan. The practice of Japanese firms seemed to work more suc-
cessfully, with US firms losing market share. Therefore, in the 1990s the US LFs started
to change from in-house manufacturing and component divisions to external suppliers
in Asia, Europe and North America. The era of production outsourcing started. But
whereas Japanese firms used a tight supplier network to meet the demand for flexibility,
Western firms—especially those from the US—tended to outsource their entire produc-
tion capacities to large CMs. This enabled them to compete with the Japanese firms in
cost and production organisation. Hewlett Packard and IBM led the way, selling most of
their worldwide manufacturing facilities to CMs (see Section 2.2.1) such as Solectron and
Flextronics (Sturgeon 2003:12–13). Standardised protocols were developed to hand
off design files to CMs and manufacturing processes became highly automated.
With the internet boom in the mid-1990s, new US-firms (for example Sun Microsys-
tems) appeared which never established their own manufacturing sites. Some CMs
emerged in North America, but later the assembly and even some of the designing of
notebooks and desktop personal computers was outsourced to “original equipment” and
“original design” CMs based in Taiwan, Singapore and HK. By the end of the 1990s,
much of the manufacturing capacity of the Taiwan-based and HK-based CMs had shifted
to mainland China, especially to the Guangdong province. Big US CMs established a
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network of factories on a global scale. Around that time, the European communication
companies (Nokia, Ericsson, Alcatel) also started to outsource their production. By
the end of the 1990s, value chain “modules”, such as design or production, were highly
developed with a global scope. Even though the internet boom began to stall in 1999,
large outsourcing deals continued to be announced. The first Chinese CMs appeared
during that time, and CMs began taking over more functions: distribution, product
development and the development of company brands. The value chain was no longer
organised in a strong hierarchical form controlled by US firms, but had developed into a
modular value chain (Sturgeon 2006b). Even Japanese firms have recently established
large production alliances for technology development, patent sharing and joint compo-
nent divisions. Others have started to relocate low-end in-house operations to low-cost
locations such as China. At the beginning of the 2000s, large Japanese electronics firms,
for example NEC and Sony, started to sell their production facilities to CMs. By then,
Japanese firms had also started to modularise their production (Sturgeon 2006b).
It could be shown that the electronics industry has been driven by a high dynamic
since the 1960s. With increasing prosperity during the economic boom of the 1970s and
1980s, the demand for electronics products grew. This went along with the phenomenon
of shorter product life cycles, which arose from the demand of a greater speed-to-market.
To better adapt to this requirement, electronics firms in the US, and later in Japan,
started to modularise and outsource production activities to CMs in Asia. This resulted
in a modular organised value chain. HK was one of the major destinations. Problems
of low planning accuracy and quick response were shifted from Western firms to Asian
firms, which could better deal with the requested flexibility.
4.3 The Electronics Industry in the GPRD and Modular
Value Chains
After giving a short introduction to the institutional and general economic setting in the
GPRD, this section will outline how the electronics industry in the GPRD has developed
(see Section 4.3.1) and what global impact it has (see Section 4.3.2). Reasons for the
rising impact of the electronics industry in the GPRD will be discussed in Section 4.3.3
under consideration of the unique economic setting.
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4.3.1 Development of the Electronics Industry in HK and the PRD
The HK electronics industry has undergone substantial changes in the past few decades.
Evolving from the manufacturing of simple items like torches, electronic toys and land
line telephone sets, the electronics industry took off in the 1970s when semiconductors
started to be widely applied to electronic circuits. As described above, in the 1980s and
especially in the 1990s Western LFs responded to rising domestic labour costs and in-
creasing competition by outsourcing the production to CMs in HK, Taiwan or Singapore.
CMs mainly produced on an OEM basis. HK benefited from this trend for three reasons.
Firstly, the HK government started to promote domestic entrepreneurship because of
its lack of substantial natural resources. Secondly, Western LFs looked for cost-efficient
production in Asia, but also needed institutional safeguards for their business. HK, as
a British colony, provided a functional legal system as a safe trading platform. Thirdly,
leading Western firms were unfamiliar with local conditions in Asia, especially in China.
They typically preferred to contract with first tier trading organisations in HK that han-
dled local bureaucratic procedures and further subcontracted orders to smaller second
tier producers in China. With an increasing demand for electronics products on the part
of HK firms, there was a shortage of factory space in HK.
In the first phase of development in the 1980s, China started to attract FDI by opening
the country for FIE and providing them with reduced taxes (see paragraph liberalisation,
privatisation, industrial and tax policy). HK CMs took advantage of the opportunity to
shift production to the Chinese mainland. Taiwanese and international CMs followed
this path. This large scale relocation of production lengthened the commodity chain and
led to a large number of greenfield factories in the first development phase 1979–1990
(Carney 2005:344–345). The primary destination of investments was SZ, and later
DG, because of their close proximity to HK. The lack of developed infrastructure made
the proximity necessary, because personnel had to travel between HK and the PRD
on a regular basis. HK firms concentrated on the production and assembly of simple
electronic devices (The Greater Pearl River Delta Business Council 2007).
In the second development phase 1991–1996, this trend was strengthened by the im-
mense demand for electronics items and the improvement of China’s institutional en-
vironment (for example the allowance of wholly-owned FIEs, legal reforms). Foreign
firms, particularly those other than HK and Taiwanese firms, set up factories in the
PRD. Because infrastructure such as motorways and ports was developed, firms set up
factories in neighbouring cities such as GZ, Foshan, Zhongshan and Zhuhai.
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The third development phase 1997–2000 was influenced by HK’s return to China
in 1997, followed by the Asian Financial Crisis 1997–1998. By that time, electronics
firms had started efforts to add value to their products and to take over more functions
in the value chain (Enright et al. 2005). A survey conducted by the Hong Kong
Trade Development Council Research Department (HKTDC) (2000b) in
HK in 1999 showed that although 82% of the companies surveyed were engaged in
OEM production (Original Equipment Manufacturing), 62% identified themselves as
being involved in ODM production arrangements (Original Design Manufacturer) and
36% also had original brand name production (OBM). The total does not add up to
100% because some companies may have engaged in more than one type of production
arrangement. In fact, the trend is towards branching out to ODM and more particularly
to OBM.
In the next development phase 2001–2006, firms in the GPRD continued their upgrad-
ing strategy. A repetition of the same survey in 2003 revealed that the share of firms
engaged in ODM (63%) and OBM (41%) had increased (Hong Kong Trade Devel-
opment Council Research Department (HKTDC) 2003b). With its accession to
the WTO in 2001, China had to further improve business conditions for FIEs. A major
problem was the low protection of IPRs (Schueller 2002; Yeung 2002). The central
government was confident of making the right improvements and established high-tech
parks. FIEs and local firms started to set up their research and development (R&D)
centres, and although firms still complained about the inadequate protection of IPRs,
they continued to carry out innovation activities using their own production systems.
HK engineers trained their Chinese colleagues. The demand for engineers—especially
electrical engineering technicians—grew rapidly. Firms had to—and still have to—deal
with a shortage of engineers. Knowledge transfer and problems of copying driven by
a high fluctuation of labour became problematic for electronics firms. Moreover, the
WTO rules demanded that China open its service sector. HK firms can now enjoy
greater support from HK services (for example legal services) in the PRD.
The fifth phase started in 2007 and is characterised by a strict upgrading strategy on
the part of the Chinese government. The incentives of the processing trade policy were
rapidly reduced. Electronic firms are affected by this because cheaply imported com-
ponents of electronics products are no longer subject to VAT rebates. The new labour
contract law and the new enterprise tax law equate foreign and domestic firms in the
PRD. Additionally, the Chinese government hopes to developed the western provinces
in its 11th five year plan. Production of simple electronic items, like torches, electronic
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toys or land line telephones, and pollutive firms (for example battery producers) are
being pushed to relocate to the western provinces or upgrade their production activities.
The production of high-tech goods, like mobile phones, cameras, laboratory equipment
or semiconductors, is subject to incentives. HK firms know that upgrading is their only
opportunity for survival in the GPRD. Therefore, some firms concentrate almost exclu-
sively on product development and design. Production activities are frequently carried
out by qualified Chinese suppliers. The recent economic crisis has pushed the process
for upgrading and relocating, because only firms with a competitive business concept
will survive.
4.3.2 Integrating Hong Kong Firms into Modular Value Chains
The global impact of the electronics industry in the GPRD can be studied by looking
at the increasing share of trade with electronics products. Table 4.3 shows the export
volume and the CAGR of electronics exports to the world. Asia and Europe registered
the highest exports of electronics products. However, Asia (20%) had a higher CAGR
during the period 2002–2006 than Europe (15%). Exports from the USA are of only
marginal importance. On the national level, China reported the highest exports and
the highest growth rate (GR) in exports of electronic items. China is responsible for
13% of the world’s exports. It also reports a tremendous CAGR 2002–2006 with 38%.
The Guangdong province alone counts for 5% of global electronics exports. The rapid
growth of exports can be explained by two factors. Firstly, Araujo and Ornelas
(2007) found that an improvement of the institutional environment of a country increases
trade volume, as it changes the incentives for customers. Secondly, fragmentation and
the global scope of the value chain cause trade numbers to rise. Table 4.3 also indicates
similar export numbers for Guangdong and HK. As production capacities in HK are
reduced to a minimum, the figure suggests that HK is used as a trading hub for goods
manufactured in the neighbour province of Guangdong. It can be assumed that end
products find their way from the Guangdong province to the world via HK. This can
be proven by a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the electronics industy in the
GPRD. It can be expected that large HK-owned CMs provide the gateway to the global
market, although they have set up their production activities and their supplier networks
in the PRD.
Empirical evidence for the development of CMs as a sign of global integration and
modularisation of the electronics value chain can be found in the annual publication
of Reed Business Information (n. d.) about the Top 100 Contract Manufacturers.
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Table 4.3: Exports in billion USD and growth rates of electronics products to the world
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 GR CAGR
2005–2006 2002–2006
Exports of electronics productsa in billion USD
World 1, 877 2, 177 2, 655 2, 968 3, 384 14% 16%
Asia 671 832 1, 065 1, 221 1, 398 15% 20%
Europe 795 921 1, 107 1, 217 1, 385 14% 15%
North America 318 325 368 400 443 11% 9%
China 123 183 264 347 447 29% 38%
Guangdongb − − − 136 171 25% −
Hong Kong 94 112 138 162 183 13% 18%
Japan 197 226 275 278 289 4% 10%
Germany 209 242 304 337 380 13% 16%
USA 282 287 325 351 390 11% 8%
Share of world’s exports of electronics products
Asia 36% 38% 40% 41% 41%
Europe 42% 42% 42% 41% 41%
North America 17% 15% 14% 13% 13%
China 7% 8% 10% 12% 13%
Guangdongb − − − 5% 5%
Hong Kong 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Japan 11% 10% 10% 9% 9%
Germany 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
USA 15% 13% 12% 12% 12%
aElectronics products according to HS 2002 (see Appendix A)
bno data available for 2002–2004
Source: Own calculation based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database (n. d.), Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statistics (2007)
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Table 4.4: Impact of HK based CMs for the global electronics industry 2003–2007
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 CAGR
Number of CMs (TOP 100) in
Asia, thereof 13 16 23 30 33 26%
Hong Kong 4 7 9 9 10 26%
China 0 0 0 2 2 −
Annual turnover of CMs (TOP 100) in 100 million USD
in total 681 707 1, 073 1, 324 1, 998 31%
Asia, thereof 180 201 501 736 1, 349 65%
Hong Kong 8 18 31 36 110 91%
China 0 0 0 6 7 −
Source: Own calculation based on Reed Business Information (n. d.)
Table 4.4 emphasises the development of CMs from 2003 to 2007, but places special
focus on the contribution of HK-based CMs. The table shows the increasing impact of
Asian-based CMs for the electronics industry. In 2003, only 13 CMs of the TOP 100
were based in Asia, but by 2007, this number had increased to 33. Now, one third
of the TOP 100 CMs of the electronics sector are based in Asia. In 2007, 10 of the
world’s TOP 100 CMs were HK-owned, with 2 having their origin in China. This shows
the impact of HK entrepreneurs on the world’s electronics platform. Taking the annual
turnover of CMs into account, the CAGR (2003–2007) of Asian CMs was 65%. HK CMs
had an even higher CAGR (91%). Although HK firms account for 10% of the world’s
TOP 100 CMs in the electronics industry, they are only responsible for 6% of the annual
turnover. HK CMs can be characterised as small on an international scale. It can be
confirmed that HK firms take over the role of CMs in the modular organised value chain
of electronics products. The upper end of the value chain (LFs to CMs) is well covered
in the academic literature. What is still underrepresented is how the lower end of the
value chain is organised (CMs to CSs).
When looking at the lower end of the value chain, SMEs in HK mainly work on an
OEM basis. 30% of the firms surveyed indicated relying 100% on OEM production,
while another 46% of the firms produce more than 50% of their output on an OEM basis
(see Table 4.5). SMEs in HK seem to serve CMs as producers, getting clear directions
as to what and how to produce. The picture changes significantly (χ2 = 41.51, p =
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Table 4.5: Manufacturing position of HK and PRD firms in the value chain
OEM OEM ODM/OBM ODM/OBM in total
= 100% > 50% > 50% = 100%
HK firms (n = 102)a 30% 46% 8% 16% 100%
PRD firms (n = 194) 28% 22% 16% 35% 100%
Note: For the entire thesis stars mark the significance of a result. Thereby, (∗) indicate
the significance on the 0.1 level, (∗∗) indicate the significance on the 0.05 level and (∗∗∗)
indicate the significance on the 0.01 level.
aχ2 = 41.51, p = 0.000∗∗∗
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
0.000∗∗∗) when turning to the PRD firms. 35% of the PRD firms indicated having only
ODM or OBM production. Fewer firms than in HK make their profits with OEM.
This certainly shows that the modular value chain pattern does not work in every case.
Some firms in the PRD seem to break through the chain by producing and designing
their own products. Another reason for this result, which fits well with the modular
value chain pattern, could be that PRD firms are specialised in simple production.
They produce items such as conductors, wires or other simple electronic components.
For those components, no blueprints are necessary for the production. They have the
freedom to design and produce those components. Therefore, they indicated working on
an ODM or OBM basis. There seem to be firms which fit well with the modular value
chain pattern, but there are also firms which do not. Although the general integration
of GPRD firms into modular value chains could be proven, one has to keep in mind that
this might not be the case for all firms. The next sections will examine the organisation
of the lower end supply chain in more detail.
4.3.3 Unique Locational Setting of the GPRD Region
Trading Links between Hong Kong and the PRD
The special nature of the GPRD does not only refer to its global impact for the electronics
industry (see Section 4.3.2), but also to its unique locational setting. It has been shown
that Guangdong is responsible for 5% of the world’s exports of electronics products, but
it also has to be expected that most of them find their way to the global market via
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Table 4.6: Trade flow of selected electronics products in million USD in 2006
in total Wireless Electronic
Telephonesa Calculatorsb
Chinese exports to the world 969, 070 100% 1, 777 100% 814 100%
thereof exports from Guangdong 301, 948 31% 1, 724 97% 525 64%
HK imports from China 153, 402 16% 1, 060 60% 267 33%
HK exports to the world 316, 463 100% 1, 407 100% 313 100%
thereof re-exports 299, 165 95% 1, 407 100% 313 100%
aHS 2002 code 851711
bHS 2002 code 847010
Source: Own calculation based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database (n. d.), Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statistics (2007)
HK. This can be explained by the existence of tax-free import and export regulations for
several goods between HK and the PRD. The way products manufactured in the PRD
reach final markets is illustrated in Table 4.6. The Guangdong province is responsible
for 31% of the Chinese exports. 16% of the products are exported to HK. 95% of the HK
exports are actually re-exports. It can be assumed that most of the products exported
to HK are produced in Guangdong and account for most of the re-exports. A look at
two products—cordless telephones and electronic calculators—shows that for electronics
products, the links between HK and Guangdong are even closer. 97% of the telephones
and 64% of the calculators exported from China actually come from the Guangdong
province. 60% of the telephones and 33% of the calculators are exported from China to
HK, most of them probably originating in the Guangdong province. For both electronic
devices, HK reported re-exporting 100% of the items. The local specialisation—HK as
a long-term and safe trading platform combined with Guangdong as a cost- and time-
sensitive location for production—is pivotal for the success of the GPRD in the global
electronics industry. Although Guangdong has improved infrastructural capacities to
ship products to the world (expansion of ports in GZ and SZ), a major proportion is
still freighted from HK. A study conducted by the Federation of Hong Kong In-
dustries (FHKI) (2003) confirms these results empirically. 67% of the firms surveyed
in the PRD indicated exporting all products via HK. 15% reported exporting selected
goods to HK, and only 18% of the firms said that HK is of no importance for their
export channels.
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Although the PRD is known as a production and export area for electronics products
as shown above, it is not able to produce all the varieties of components needed for end
products, due to the limited capabilities of firms. High quality components, such as
semiconductors, integrated circuits and printed circuit boards, must still be imported
from countries including Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the US, or from Europe. The commu-
nist party is pushing the development of high-tech industries, especially the development
of semiconductors, in its 11th five year plan, but the quality has still not reached inter-
national standards. Although high-end electronic devices are exported from the PRD,
integrated high-tech components originally come from developed economies and are only
assembled in the PRD. This pattern can be proven using the revealed comparative ad-
vantage (RCA) analysis. The RCA analysis relates the export-import-relation of one
subsector and the export-import-relation of all sectors in one region. A positive RCA
value implies a comparative advantage in the production of an item, because exports
are higher than imports. A negative value demonstrates a relative comparative disad-
vantage in the production of a certain item. The higher or lower the values of RCA,
the higher or lower the comparative advantage is (Schaetzl 2000). Table 4.7 presents
the RCA-values for selected electronic sectors and products in China and Guangdong.
Air conditioners, colour TV sets (low-tech) and data processing equipment, for exam-
ple PCs, monitors, printers (high-tech), have a positive value, which confirms the ex-
pertise of firms in China and Guangdong for producing and exporting lower- as well
as higher-end products. A comparison of the two regions shows that Guangdong has
higher RCA-values for air conditioners and TV sets and a lower value in data processing
equipment. This makes it clear that firms in Guangdong still concentrate more on the
production of lower-end items than Chinese firms in general, assuming that the produc-
tion of data processing equipment requires more expertise. Both China and Guangdong
have a negative RCA value for ICs. This confirms again that China still needs to im-
port high-tech products. Again, the Guangdong value is lower than the Chinese value,
which shows that Guangdong lacks high-tech firms in comparison to the Chinese aver-
age. Sturgeon (2003:12–13) confirmed this finding in his studies. He found that the
Guangdong province is predominantly responsible for simple standardised products such
as personal computers, mobile phones and consumer electronics manufactured on the
Chinese mainland.
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Table 4.7: Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) value for selected product categories
in China and Guangdong 2006
RCA-valuea
China Guangdong
Boilers, Mechanic Equipments and Accessories (84b) 33.4 47.5
Air Conditioners (84.15) 215.2 419.6
Data Processing Equipments (84.71) 133.9 109.5
Machinery, Electric Equipments, TV Sets, Sound Appl. (85) −16.4 −16.3
Colour TV Sets (85.28) 403.9 469.5
Integrated Circuits (85.42) −180.6 −308.8
Optical, Photographic, Film, Medial Instruments (90) −79.3 −81.4
aRCAij = 100 · ln
(
xij
mij
/
∑m
j=1
xij∑m
j=1
mij
)
with
RCAij = “Revealed comparative advantage of subspace i in subsector j
xij = Export value of subspace i in subsector j
mij = Import value of subspace i in subsector j
baccording to HS 2002
Source: Own calculation based on United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database (n. d.), Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statistics (2007)
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Division of Labour between Hong Kong and the PRD
The GPRD region is not only unique in its specific trading pattern within the region
resulting from the two different institutional environments, but also because of the di-
vision of labour between the two regions. Both regions provide comparative advantages
for certain business activities. This leads to an increase in the overall regional compet-
itiveness. In the beginning, the PRD region only held production advantages over HK
in the areas of factory space, special tax conditions and cheap labour. But nowadays
the division of labour is more specific. The PRD provides excellent conditions for estab-
lishing service activities which were formerly located in HK. When looking at customer
producer relations, it is of interest where firms in HK and the PRD have set up their
sales and procurement activities. Table 4.8 shows where electronics firms surveyed in
HK and the PRD mainly apply their management, production, procurement and sales
activities. The share of firms active in HK and the PRD together does not add up to
100%, as some firms use locations outside the GPRD. The table comparatively presents
the responses of firms in the HK survey, the PRD survey (differentiated according to
location and ownership of firms) and for validity provement responses of firms from a
survey conducted by the Federation of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI) (2003).
Firms in HK tend to keep their management activities mainly in HK (72%), because
HK usually serves as the regional headquarters. Production activities are located in the
PRD (90%). Nearly half of HK firms have their procurement activities located mainly
in HK, while the other half has them located in the PRD. This fits the findings that
procurement of raw materials and simple components takes place in China, whereas
high-tech components are sourced abroad. As products are produced predominately
for the international market, HK is known as the “front shop” of the GPRD-region.
Therefore, 87% of the HK firms set up their sales activities in HK.
A study published by the Federation of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI) (2003)
aimed to identify the close relationship between HK and the PRD by interviewing firms
in the PRD with links to HK. Although they did not focus on the electronics industry
itself, their study produced similar results. The sales and production figures are nearly
identical. The FHKI survey indicates a greater share of firms having their management
activities in HK. This can either be explained by the specific focus on the electronics
industry, which is more often managed in the PRD than other industries, or by the time
difference between the two surveys (2003 and 2007) considering the continuous trend
of outsourcing management and service activities (Baldwin 2006). Firms in the PRD
usually carry out their activities in the PRD. But differences between the locations GZ
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Table 4.8: Division of business activities between HK and the PRD
Unit Location Management Production Procurement Sales
HK survey HK 72% 8% 52% 87%
PRD 28% 90% 48% 13%
FHKI survey HK 90% 11% 64% 86%
PRD 10% 89% 36% 14%
PRD survey HK 4% 0% 5% 15%
PRD 92% 97% 87% 71%
/Guangzhou HK 3% 1% 10% 18%
PRD 93% 93% 83% 70%
/Dongguan HK 12% 4% 14% 26%
PRD 82% 95% 74% 58%
/CN owned HK 1% 1% 7% 7%
PRD 94% 94% 83% 81%
/HK owned HK 18% 6% 28% 44%
PRD 82% 94% 73% 54%
Source: Data based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007], Federation
of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI) (2003)
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and DG are evident. GZ figures behave similarly to the average, but DG firms more
often carry out sales and procurement activities in HK. This can be explained by a higher
concentration of foreign firms in DG, whose links to HK are usually closer. Foreign firms
are able to localise their business activities where they are of most benefit. For Chinese
firms, it involves more capital, expertise and administrative effort to set up business
activities in HK. This can be confirmed by comparing the behaviour of HK and Chinese
(CN)-owned firms. Whereas Chinese-owned firms keep management and production
activities strictly in the PRD and rarely set up procurement or sales activities in HK,
HK-owned firms more often take advantage of the two different regional settings in the
GPRD. This suggests that now, not all firms are able to take advantage of the division of
business activities between HK and the PRD. HK-owned firms in particular profit from
the opportunity to shift some of their activities into the PRD. Chinese-owned firms’
opportunity to benefit from the unique locational setting is limited due to difficulties in
accessing HK.
Predictability of Industry Conditions of Hong Kong and PRD Firms
The different spatial distribution of the business activities of firms surveyed in HK
and the PRD interferes with the ability to gain information for predicting industry
conditions related to sales and procurement activities. HK-based firms usually have
their sales division in HK, while PRD firms keep their sales offices in the PRD. The
surveys conducted clearly show that HK firms profit from their informational edge over
firms in the PRD. They could predict industry conditions related to customer activities
(price, volume, quality, delivery time) significantly better (χ2 = 5.83, p = 0.054∗) than
PRD firms in the last five year period (2002–2007). 36% of the HK-based firms indicated
that they find changes in price, volume, quality and delivery time very predictable, in
comparison to only 30% of the firms in the PRD (see Table 4.9). There are three
explanations for this. Firstly, HK firms have a locational advantage in being able to
set up their sales office in HK, which provides better access to customers (for example
fairs, business organisations). Secondly, HK firms have more experience on international
markets and better forecasting systems. Thirdly, HK firms enjoy a better relationship
to customers (longer relationships, better reputation, greater reliability). Taking the
predictability of producer-related information into account (availability of resources and
suppliers, labour, governmental regulations in China), HK firms and PRD firms indicated
no signifcant difference (χ2 = 3.93, p = 0.140). The data reveal that PRD firms cannot
predict sourcing-related industry conditions better than HK firms, although they mainly
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Table 4.9: Firm’s ability to predict changes of industry conditions related to customers
and producers 2002–2007
Related to customersac Related to producersbd
HK samplee PRD samplef HK sample PRD sample
n = 104 n = 221 n = 104 n = 219
very predictable 36% 30% 20% 16%
moderate predictable 53% 49% 37% 46%
not predictable 12% 21% 43% 38%
in total 100% 100% 100% 100%
aprice, volume, quality, delivery time
bavailability of resources and suppliers, labour, governmental regulations in China
cHK:PRD variable customer χ2 = 5.83, p = 0.054∗
dHK:PRD variable producer χ2 = 3.93, p = 0.140
ecustomer:producer variable HK χ2 = 98.24, p = 0.001∗∗∗
fcustomer:producer variable PRD χ2 = 43.23, p = 0.001∗∗∗
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
carry out their activities in the PRD. HK firms’ long-term activities in the PRD seem
to enable them to forecast industry conditions as well as PRD firms do. For both HK
and PRD firms, it is true that the ability to predict changes related to customers is
higher than that of changes related to producers (HK: χ2 = 98.24, p = 0.001∗∗∗, PRD:
χ2 = 43.23, p = 0.001∗∗∗). Overall, Table 4.9 indicates that only a few firms are able
to predict industry and market changes. This implies a high market volatility and the
need for flexibility if firms are to compete on international markets.
To summarise, the electronics firms in the GPRD were responsible for 5% of all global
exports of electronic products in 2006. Electronics firms in the GPRD are highly inte-
grated into the modular global value chains. HK hosts 10% of the world’s largest CMs.
These produce in the PRD and set up their network of component suppliers there. The
unique setting of the PRD can be attributed to a clear division of business activities
between HK and the PRD. Whereas firms prefer to organise their management and sales
in HK, they go for production and procurement activities in the PRD. The PRD is spe-
cialised in the export-oriented production of consumer electronic items like telephones
or calculators. However, high-tech products such as laboratory equipment and cameras
are becoming more important. The sourcing of simple components is usually done in
the PRD or China, but high-tech components such as semiconductors are still imported
136
from developed countries. Investigations revealed that HK firms are able to profit more
from the unique locational setting in the GPRD. Their access to information, provided
by management activities in HK, allows them them to predict market and industry
conditions more accurately regarding customer and producer relations.
The market success of firms is not limited to the performance of a single firm, but to
an entire production network. Only if the entire network of customers and producers
is arranged flexibly are firms able to succeed on the world market. Therefore, the
next section explicitly focuses on the spatial distribution of customers and producers
of HK and PRD firms. The location of customers and producers heavily influences the
organisational modes applied in customer and producer relations, which are ultimately
responsible for a flexible network of firms.
4.4 Spatial Distribution of Customers and Producers
This section focuses on the spatial distribution of customers and producers of HK and
PRD-based electronics firms. This provides information as to how electronics firms in
the GPRD combine global links and local concentration in production.
To illustrate network activities in the GPRD, firms in HK and the PRD were asked
to provide information about the location of their most important producer and their
major customer as suggested in Section 3.2.1 about operationalisation. HK firms’ most
important customers are mainly located in final markets, meaning North America and
Europe (52%). The proportion of Japanese customers is only 8% (see Figure 4.2). 15%
of the HK firms’ most important customers come from China. 14% of the products are
indicated as being consumed in HK. This high number can be explained by firms that
do not have complete knowledge of their final markets (for example producers of parts
and components). They indicated the final market as being in HK. In contrast, 41%
of firms surveyed in the PRD indicated having their most important customer in HK.
However, their final markets (China 38%, North America and Europe 23%, Japan 8%,
HK 13%) differ substantially from the location of their most important customer. This
implies that firms in the PRD only partly work with customers located in the markets
of their final products. Before their products reach the final markets, other firms step
in. They are apparently at the lower end of the value chain system in comparison to
firms in HK. Firms in the PRD are less likely to produce final products. This illustrates
that firms in HK play an essential role as a customer for products manufactured in the
PRD.
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Figure 4.2: Location of final markets and sales channels of firms in the GPRD
Source: Own draft and calculations based on DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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As the location of final markets and the location of the major customers for firms
in HK are identical, a direct product flow to final markets is assumed. However, this
pattern could not be found for firms in the PRD. To understand how products of firms in
the PRD are transferred to their final markets, firms in the PRD had to indicate which
sales channels they use. According to the survey in the PRD, 28% of all PRD sales are
organised via HK. They are distributed as follows: 13% of all PRD sales are managed
by HK-based affiliates, 8% via HK-based trading companies and 7% via other HK-based
firms. Products sold via HK are intended either for the Chinese or for the international
market. 38% of the PRD sales go directly to international markets and another 34% are
sold directly to China. A differentiation according to the ownership structure reveals
that HK-owned firms in the PRD are responsible for the biggest share of products sold
via HK, whereas Chinese and Taiwanese-owned firms in the PRD account for the high
share of products sold directly to the Chinese market. For HK entrepreneurs in the
PRD, it is profitable to use their sales and distribution networks in HK, which were
established in the 1980s and 1990s.
Firms in HK and the PRD are integrated into the global value chain system. Products
are mainly produced for the international markets. Lall et al. (2004) studied the frag-
mentation of electronics products. They also identified a high export rate of electronics
products from HK and China, which shows the global integration of the GPRD. But a
distinction must be made between firms in HK and those in the PRD. HK firms tend to
occupy a position at the upper end of the value chain, but this is only partially true of
firms in the PRD. About one third of sales are made via HK. Another third of sales are
not designated for the international market, but rather for China.
In contrast to the international distribution of customers, firms in HK responded that
39% of their producers were located in SZ and the same proportion in DG. Another
13% of producers could be found in first ring cities (GZ, Foshan, Zhongshan, Zhuhai)
and 8% within the second ring (Huizhou, Zhaoqing, Jiangmen). The clustering of HK
producers in the core cities SZ and DG is caused by large HK firms establishing their
first PRD link in those cities immediately after the first Chinese opening. Interviews
conducted showed that SZ’s and DG’s proximity to HK was pivotal, because personnel
(CEO, managers, engineers) travel between firms on a regular basis for a period of two
to three days a week. Other criteria named were the infrastructural development, the
proximity to other firms and personal relationships within those cities. A distribution
test for a bias in firms’ age, innovativeness and the share of OBM/ODM production in
the cities of SZ and DG showed these factors to be insignificant.
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Although firms in HK indicated having their most important producers in SZ and DG,
the PRD survey focussed mainly on DG and GZ (for reasons see Section 3.1). 41% of
the firms in the PRD survey are located in DG and another 53% are located in GZ, while
only 6% are located elsewhere in the PRD. In both cities, districts with a high density
of electronics firms were selected. The data set shows that in GZ, 61% of the firms are
mainly Chinese-owned, while in DG only 41% are. Foreign firms in GZ are most likely to
be from HK, whereas a foreign-owned firm in DG is most likely to be Taiwanese-owned.
Differences in the ownership structure are significant (χ2 = 21.2, p = 0.001∗∗∗). Taking
the age of firms into account, firms have been classified according to their foundation
year: before 1990, 1991–1996, 1997–2000, 2001–2003 and 2004–2007. Firms in DG were
found to be slightly older than in GZ. The share of firms set up in 1990 or earlier differs
the most (DG: 12%, GZ: 7%). Comparing firms set up from 2004 to 2007, a reverse figure
can be recognised (DG: 14%, GZ: 21%). The bias in age also turns out to be significant,
but only on the 0.10 level (χ2 = 9.1, p = 0.057∗). A look at the manufacturing type
(OEM=100%, OEM>50%, ODM/OBM>50%, ODM/OBM=100%) shows that firms in
DG are more likely to be engaged in OEM production. 27% of the firms reported only
focussing on OEM production, while another 31% generate at least half of their sales in
OEM production (GZ: OEM = 100%: 29%, OEM>50%: 14%). The share of firms with
ODM/OBM>50% is 16% for both cities. Huge differences are evident when looking at
the share of firms with ODM/OBM=100%. In GZ, 41% of the firms reported being in
this category, whereas in DG the figure is only 27% (χ2 = 9.1, p = 0.028∗∗). It reveals
that in DG, foreign electronics firms were set up early and concentrated on the OEM
production for exports. In GZ, firms were set up later, but did not focus so much
on OEM, concentrating instead on the ODM/OBM business immediately. Although
differences in the type of manufacturing were evident, innovation activities were not
found to be higher in GZ than in DG.
It has been shown that orders placed to HK firms are forwarded to the first tier pro-
ducer in the PRD. In order to follow the value chain, PRD firms were asked to indicate
the spatial distribution of their producer network. This second tier or component pro-
ducer network is also located in the PRD in proximity to the first tier producers (see
Table 4.10). 16% of the firms in DG reported having their most important producers in
the same city. 19% indicated having their most important producer in SZ and another
33% reported the producer being located elsewhere in Guangdong. 13% of the firms
work with a producer in China, but outside Guangdong. Producers in GZ indicated
having 36% of their producers in in same city and 24% elsewhere in Guangdong. Firms
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Table 4.10: Geographical proximity of firms in the PRD and their most important
producers
Location of producersa if firm in Dongguan if firm in Guangzhou
n = 108 n = 83
Same city 16% 36%
Guangzhou/Dongguan respectively 2% 5%
Shenzhen 19% 7%
Guangdong (elsewhere) 33% 24%
China (elsewhere) 13% 10%
abroad 17% 18%
total 100% 100%
aχ2 = 66.5, p = 0.001∗∗∗
Source: Data based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
in DG and SZ are underrepresented. In DG and GZ, about 17% and 18% respectively
of the main producers are located abroad. It has already been shown that high quality
products such as semiconductors are sourced abroad (see Table 4.7). This is confirmed
in the data set as well. For component sourcing other than for technologically very
sophisticated products, the producer networks in the PRD seem to be locally concen-
trated within the PRD without far-reaching interweavement. A comparison between
firms in DG and GZ shows that producers of firms in GZ are significantly more spatially
concentrated than producers of firms in DG (χ2 = 66.5, p = 0.001∗∗∗). Firms in GZ
are mostly small and Chinese-owned. They are apparently prone to local clustering.
Another explanation is that DG was developed first. Firms there can be expected to
have more interrelations with firms in other areas of the PRD. Additionally, firms in DG
are more often foreign-owned, which provides them with an extended network.
DG and GZ were selected as research areas because differences in the connections to
HK are expected. Table 4.11 compares the different types of HK connection of firms
surveyed in DG and GZ. In total, 65% of the firms surveyed in the PRD reported having
at least one HK connection. A distinction between GZ and DG shows that more firms
in DG (78%) are connected to HK than firms in GZ (53%). Having the most important
customer in HK was the most frequently indicated HK connection (40%). HK’s role as
a major supplier for components proved to be unimportant (5%), but 27% of all firms
source or import at least some of their components from HK, especially high-tech goods.
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Table 4.11: Type of HK connection of firms in the PRD
Percentage of firms
in total Guangzhou Dongguan
n = 222 n = 116 n = 89
Any HK connection 65% 53% 78%
No HK connection 35% 47% 22%
Main customer in HK 40% 29% 53%
Main supplier in HK 5% 8% 2%
HK as market for sales 32% 25% 39%
HK as market for sales of innovative products 22% 14% 33%
Sourcing/Import from HK 27% 25% 30%
Firm is mainly HK owned 18% 21% 15%
Sales/Marketing unit is located in HK 19% 15% 26%
Logistics/Distribution unit is located in HK 15% 13% 19%
Financing unit is located in HK 11% 7% 17%
Procurement unit is located in HK 10% 9% 12%
Management unit is located in HK 6% 3% 10%
Innovation activities are located in HK 4% 2% 7%
Production unit is located in HK 2% 1% 3%
HK as sales channel: via HK bases affiliates 18% 14% 25%
HK as sales channel: via HK based traders 14% 8% 19%
HK as sales channel: via other HK based firms 9% 8% 9%
Source: Data based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
Of secondary importance are the sales relations to HK (32%). DG firms’ share thereof is
higher (39%) than the GZ firms’ share (25%). HK is of major importance for innovative
products in particular. Additionally, 18% of the PRD firms are HK-owned, with the
share in DG being slighly lower than in GZ due to the fact that firms in DG often come
from Taiwan (Yang 2007). Although the share of HK firms is higher in GZ, DG hosts
more foreign firms overall (63% in GZ and 45% in DG). This also explains why a larger
share of firms in DG indicated using HK-based affiliates or traders as sales channels to
final markets. To conclude, firms in DG have stronger and more diverse connections to
HK than firms in GZ. For both cities though, HK firms act mainly as customers or sales
agents.
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To conclude, the surveys showed that HK firms mainly use a global customer base.
In contrast, PRD firms focus on both the Chinese and the international market. PRD
firms sometimes deal directly with their customers in international markets but also use
HK firms as transmitters because of their own limited sales network. Feenstra et al.
(2002) compared Chinese firms that export through HK to those that do not do. They
calculated that Chinese firms profit from exporting through HK due to a concentration
of the comparative advantages. A detailed view of the production networks of HK-based
firms in the PRD shows that HK firms’ producers are mainly located in DG and SZ. HK
firms were the first to move their production into the PRD and concentrated on these two
cities. Although HK firms have a relatively low preference for GZ, a comparative survey
of firms in DG and GZ shows that producers in GZ also have strong indirect connections
to HK. The network of second tier producers in DG and GZ is mostly located in close
proximity. Despite the extensive international distribution network of customers, one
characteristic of the production network is its local concentration.
4.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings in Section 4
It could be shown that the global electronics industry has undergone major changes
since the 1990s. A growth in demand, shorter product life cycles, modularisation and
outsourcing activities have changed the chain structure from a hierarchical to a mod-
ular value chain. Western LFs outsourced production activities to CMs in developing
countries in Asia. HK firms were favoured because HK offered an appropriate institu-
tional setting to safeguard contracts while organising low-cost production activities in
the PRD. HK’s CMs increased their impact rapidly. In 2003, HK hosted four of the 100
TOP CMs in the electronics industry, and by 2007 the number had increased to ten.
The network of CSs of HK firms is mainly located in the PRD. Proximity facilitates
exchange. Hypothesis A3—HK and PRD firms integrate themselves into modular value
chains—can be confirmed. Large HK firms function as CMs, whereas small or medium
sized firms in the PRD take the role of CSs. HK firms build their producer networks
mainly in the PRD, with SZ and DG being of greatest importance. Following the value
chain, firms in the PRD also prefer having their producers in geographical proximity.
About 70% of the PRD firms’ producers are located in the PRD. Only some high-tech
components are sourced from producers abroad.
In contrast, HK firms have their most important customers located in their final
markets. PRD firms partly serve HK firms and partly reach the same position in the
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value chain as HK firms, dealing on the global market. This can also be confirmed by
the appearance of the first Chinese-owned CMs. Hypothesis A5—the production system
relies on a global customer base and a spatially concentrated producer network—can only
be partly confirmed. It is mainly HK firms which have globally spread customers and
locally concentrated producers. For PRD firms, customers are partly located in HK and
partly firms also deal directly with overseas customers. Additionally, components are
not exclusively sourced from China, but also from abroad.
The economic growth of the Guangdong province due to outsourcing tendencies of
Western LFs could be shown by an immense annual growth during the period 1980–2005
of FDIs (20%), GIO (15%) and trade volume (17%). In 2006, electronics firms in Guang-
dong exported 5% of the world’s electronics products. The GDP per capita in Guang-
dong rose to 2,882 USD in 2005. HK firms have had an enourmeous impact for the
economic growth of the PRD. They were responsible for 47% of the FDI and 30% of
the GIO in 2006. Hypothesis A1—electronics firms in the GPRD increased their mar-
ket share in a growing industry sector due to outsourcing tendencies of leading Western
firms—cannot be rejected. But on a city level, it could be shown that some cities in the
PRD profited more than others.
Hypothesis A4—the GPRD region profits from a clear division of labour—could be
proven for HK firms. They organise their management and sales activities in HK, but
have moved production and procurement activities to the PRD. In contrast, the business
activities of Chinese firms are more locally concentrated. They hardly profit from the
division of labour. The majority of HK-owned firms capitalise on the unique locational
setting and feel the freedom to set up units where they are most likely to be profitable.
Hypothesis B1—China’s formal institutional environment still has weaknesses con-
cerning the safeguards of trade between firms—could also be proven. Although major
reforms have been applied and improvements achieved, firms still complain of insufficient
protection of property rights, especially IPRs, and the restricted opening for legal and
financial services.
The global integration of the electronics industry in the GPRD seems to have allowed
firms to meet the requirement of flexibility. Product life cycles have shortened, leading
to the need for more frequent changes to product features and cosmetic design in order to
lure consumers. This makes predictability and planning difficult. It could be shown that
HK firms can predict customer-related information significantly better than PRD firms,
but the majority of firms still indicated only moderate or zero predictability. Producer-
related information was even more difficult to predict for both HK and PRD firms.
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Hypothesis A2—low predictability of market-related information—cannot be rejected.
Market volatility is strong and predictability low. Although HK-based firms still have
access to more and better customer-related information, planning accuracy is still low
and quick response is required by most of the firms. Moreover, CMs have to fulfil the
high demands for product variety and quickly changing collections and series. They are
in competition to receive orders from international customers. CMs can then pick the
appropriate CSs in the PRD, which may be more specialised. To conclude, firms in the
GPRD are asked to provide LFs with a certain degree of quantitative and qualitative
flexibility (see Figure 2.4). This confirms Hypothesis A6.
G How are electronics firms in HK and the PRD integrated into global value chains?
How is the division of work spatially organised between HK and the PRD?
H How well is the formal institutional environment in HK and the PRD developed?
What informal institutions guide the way of doing business in HK and the PRD?
Finally, research questions G and H can be answered. It could be shown that firms
in the GPRD are integrated into global value chains. Their global impact is increasing.
With integration into the global system, firms must respond to the flexibility required
by global customers. Firms in the GPRD succeed in doing so. The two different insti-
tutional systems facilitate a clear division of labour. HK functions as a front shop with
institutions built on an international level, whereas the PRD is in the position of a back
factory providing good production conditions, but still lacks institutional safeguards.
However, geographical and cultural proximity help firms respond to the need for flex-
ibility. Moreover, this pattern makes outsourcing to the GPRD safe and cost-efficient
for Western LFs. But it has to be kept in mind that the division of work is changing.
The central government encourages firms to upgrade their business activities or relocate.
Moreover, China has opened for the service sector. Whereas the PRD will specialise on
high-tech production, HK’s challenge is to concentrate on specialised and extravagant
services for those enterprises. The region will remain important for the international
economy in future, but on a different level.
It could be shown that HK and Chinese electronics firms are integrated into a modular
value chain. Large CMs are located in HK and a few of them in China. The theory of
global value chain analyses the relationship between Western LFs and CMs in detail,
but gives few clues as to how the CS network is organised. This chapter shows that CSs
usually cluster in close proximity to CMs. This seems to be especially crucial when the
institutional setting does not provide enough safeguards and firms must compensate for
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the lack formal rules by way of informal safeguards requiring geographical and cultural
proximity. The next chapter will analyse more accurately which governance modes are
applied between HK firms and their producers in the PRD to provide more information
about how the production network is organised, taking the two institutional settings
into account. This should shed light on the lacking discussion about the organisation
of CSs at the lower end of the value chain. The value chain could be modular at the
first level (LFs—CMs in Asia) but differently organised at the second level (CMs—first
tier producers) or at the third level (first tier producer—second tier producer). The
electronics value chain could be characterised by different governance modes regulating
the relationships between customers and producers on different levels. The conceptual
discussion in Chapter 2.4 showed that governance modes are associated with different
types of institutional settings. Which governance modes characterise the lower end of the
value chain is examined in the next section. It is expected that governance modes differ
according to the location of customers and producers. This implies that the value chain
might not be purely hierarchical or market-oriented, but can switch modes according to
its environment.
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5 Governance Modes and Characteristics in
Customer Producer Relations
This chapter focuses on the applied governance modes and their relations to the insti-
tutional environment and special firm characteristics. It addresses research question I
and investigates:
• whether HK firms organise their business relationships to customers and producers
in China differently from those to their customers and producers abroad
• whether this a consequence of the different development stages of the institutional
environment.
First of all, the applied governance modes in customer producer relations of HK firms
as well as those of PRD firms will be focussed on in Section 5.1. In order to prove the
formulated hypotheses, different variables will be tested as to their significance for the
choice of governance modes. Two logit models have been applied in Section 5.2 to prove
the association.
The first model was selected to show whether the institutional environment influences
the organisation of relationships to customers and producers. The distinct institutional
settings in China and abroad may have a statistically significant influence on the choice of
governance modes, as suggested by economic theories. This model concentrates more on
relationship-specific variables of customers and producers, rather than on the structure
of firms. The second model focuses on the PRD producers of HK firms in order to
show (1) the flexibility applied in the different governance modes and (2) the change of
governance modes in recent years. Here, the structure of firms is taken into account.
It is predominantly the governance modes of HK firms which are studied, because they
seem to be of more value in testing the theoretically supported hypotheses. Finally,
results are summarised and an answer to the research question is given.
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5.1 Applied Governance Modes in Customer Producer
Relations in Hong Kong and the PRD
This section briefly concentrates on the applied governance modes towards customers
and producers, firstly for HK firms and then for PRD firms. According to the theoretical
discussion in Section 2.4.4, firms in HK are expected to organise their relationships to
producers or customers in the PRD in a hierarchical-related construction because of the
incomplete institutional setting. In contrast, relationships to international producers
or customers are assumed to be organised on a market basis. Section 4.4 outlined that
firms in HK tend to be linked to producers concentrated in the PRD, but have customers
spread internationally. Firms in HK were explicitly asked to indicate which governance
mode they use to organise their relationships to their most important customer and
producer respectively.
Indeed, for 55% of the HK electronics firms the most important producer is a wholly-
owned affiliate in the PRD (see Table 5.1). In the 1980s and 1990s, when most HK firms
shifted their production to the PRD, firms feared high legal uncertainty. In the case
of conflicts with market-related producers, the production process could be negatively
affected. Even though the situation has gradually improved over time, for example
following China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, firms have generally stayed with their
own production plants. Another 16% of HK firms hold shares in their PRD producers
in the form of equity cooperation (EC). That way, HK firms still have the power to
influence and direct their PRD producers. From 1978–1986, it was not allowed to register
a completely foreign-owned firm. Foreign firms were forced by the central government to
take on a Chinese partner. Even though this is related to an earlier period, the history
of dependency is still recognisable in remaining JVs of HK and Chinese entrepreneurs.
Besides, JVs still provide competitive advantages for certain business activities. In
addition, some HK firms are targeting a long-term relationship with their producers
indicated by framework agreements. It is a way to connect more closely to producers and
to share business targets as well as information without equity relationships. Non-equity
cooperation (NEC) between HK firms and PRD producers could be observed in 16% of
cases. In comparison, only 13% of HK electronics firms work through a pure market
relationship (buying and selling agreements) with their most important producer. This
study reveals a mostly hierarchically organised cross border production organisation.
Wei et al. (2004) studied entry modes of foreign firms in China. They also found that
hierarchies are the first choice when foreign firms enter China for the first time. But
Krug and Hendrischke (2006a) claim that cooperative forms have also become more
common in countries with incomplete but improving institutions.
148
Table 5.1: Governance modes applied in customer and producer relations of firms in HK
and the PRD
Firms
in
most important Hierarchy EC NEC Market total
HK
Customer 2 (02%) 4 (04%) 29 (28%) 69 (66%) 104 (100%)
Producer 57 (55%) 17 (16%) 17 (16%) 13 (13%) 104 (100%)
PRD
HK Customer 16 (18%) 9 (10%) 6 (07%) 57 (65%) 88 (100%)
Producer 20 (09%) 13 (06%) 42 (20%) 140 (65%) 215 (100%)
EC=Equity cooperation, NEC=Non-equity cooperation
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
A look at the governance modes of customer relations of HK firms provides a com-
pletely different picture. 66% of the HK firms indicated having only buying and selling
agreements with their most important customer (see Table 5.1). Another 28% work on
a NEC basis with their most important customer, and only 6% have any equity rela-
tionships at all. HK foreign trade is protected by a complete set of institutions dealing
with the conclusion and enforceability of trading contracts and the exchange of financial
capital. This decreases transaction costs on markets.
Firms in the PRD produce for international consumers, but as Figure 4.2 shows, they
use HK as a gateway to the world. Indeed, 40% of the firms surveyed in the PRD
indicated having their most important customer in HK. As this study focuses on the
links between HK and the PRD, the following analysis concentrates only on the links
between PRD firms and HK customers, rather than taking all customer relationships
into account. Electronics firms in the PRD survey mainly indicated working on a market
basis with their customers in HK (65%). Only 7% of the firms work in NEC and 10%
in EC. 18% of the firms surveyed are affiliates of HK-based firms. Although over half
of all firms surveyed in HK have their own affiliates in the PRD, they only account
for a small proportion of all firms in the PRD. The PRD firms which indicated being
Chinese-owned tend not to have an affiliate in HK, whereas HK-owned firms generally
do. When firms in the PRD survey indicated how they organise their relationship to their
most important producer, 65% reported buying supplies from independent producers.
Another 20% work under NEC and only a few of them have any equity relations to their
producers. Producers are mainly located in the same district.
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Wang and Nicholas (2007:131–137) also confirmed in their article that NEC has be-
come more important for organising relationships in the Guangdong province. Moreover,
Howard and Squire (2007) provide support for the notion that product modularisa-
tion will lead to greater levels of customer-producer collaboration.
5.2 Characterising Governance Modes
Section 5.1 showed that governance modes of HK firms differ between customer and
producer relations. Section 4.4 showed that the locations of HK firms’ customers and
producers differ. This section concentrates on the analysis of characteristics of gover-
nance modes using two logit models. According to the theoretical discussion, it will
be tested whether or not the governance modes of customer and producer relations is
determined by the institutional setting, as stated by Williamson (1998). Besides that,
other determinants are tested in order to analyse how strong the effect of institutions
is. Moreover, a second logit model is used to establish whether the improvement of the
institutions and other structural variables affect the applied governance modes.
5.2.1 Governance Modes and Institutional Differences: Logit Model
In Section 2.4 the traits of governance modes and the influence of the institutional en-
vironment have been discussed. Firstly, Section 2.4.4 outlined that firms tend to choose
a hierarchical form of governance when the formal institutional setting does not provide
sufficient safeguards to protect the business. Firms choose market relationships when
business safeguards are institutionalised in laws and regulations. Wang and Nicholas
(2007) recommended not only an emphasis on the two extremes, but also a focus on
cooperation. As cooperation is manifold, they advised distinguishing between EC and
NEC. It is expected that HK firms are more likely to organise their relationships to
international partners in a market-like way than firms in China, which prefer hierar-
chical relations. Secondly, Section 2.4.3 discussed the transaction-specific environment
as a determinant for governance modes. Frequent transactions involve the lowest costs
in hierarchies, whereas rarely-made transactions are cost-efficient in market relation-
ships or NEC. Additionally, the uncertainty and the relationship-specific investments
are associated with certain governance modes.
To clarify how important the institutional environment is in determining the gover-
nance modes, links with both international and Chinese customers and producers are
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taken into account. The focus is set here on relationship-specific variables. The rela-
tionship to the most important customer and producer was analysed separately in this
model. This doubles the number of cases considered in the first logit model. It is similar
to a survey in which the number of firms is doubled, with half of the firms providing in-
formation about their producer and other about their customer relationships. To prove
the significant influence of the institutional setting for the organisation of governance
modes of HK firms, three important issues have to be discussed.
1. It can be assumed that decisions on governance modes are highly consequential for
HK firms, as they cannot be revised or changed easily. Therefore, it is expected
that predominately formal rules are taken into account for decision-making. As
the formal institutional framework depends on the location, it is expected that
the location of partners has a large influence on the choice of governance modes.
Following Wei et al. (2004), this study also takes the location of firms as an
indicator for a special institutional environment. The location of customers and
producers is expected to be a determining factor for the selected governance mode.
The impact of locations must be compared to other factors in order to exclude their
influence. This finally confirms the assumption that institutional factors are most
responsible for the selected governance mode.
2. There is no evidence that specifications in the electronics industry generate dif-
ferences in the organisation of customer and producer relations. Therefore, it can
be expected that a firm being a producer or a customer has no influence the gov-
ernance mode. Even though the majority of customers for HK firms are located
abroad and the majority of producers are located in China, the differences in gov-
ernance modes depend predominantly on location and not on whether a firm is a
customer or a producer.
3. This legitimises the method of combining customer and producer relations in a
logit analysis to analyse the influences of locations on the governance modes. For
the following logit model, governance modes towards partners are studied with-
out distinguishing between customers and producers. It is normally, of course, a
doubtful method to combine customer and producer relations, because influences
on the governance modes specific to customers and producers (for example po-
sition in value chain, power asymmetries etc.) are thereby ignored. The second
model will focus on the firm-specific influences on governance modes. But despite
some doubts as to the method, combining the two provides a good opportunity to
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show empirically whether firms really tend to adapt their governance modes to the
institutional environment. Because it is difficult to collect data from firms operat-
ing in different institutional environments, there is virtually no empirical evidence
which could legitimise an attempt to test differences in governance modes in this
way while taking care to interpret results.
To clarify the characteristics of governance modes, the logit model tests the influence
of location of partners as a dummy variable (1=China, 0=abroad). But it also includes
other potential factors to be linked with certain governance modes (see Table 5.2). Be-
sides the location of partners, the location of HK firms’ unit of collecting information
and selecting partners is included to see whether the location of decision-making also
has an influence (dummy variable: Unit is operated in HK ). Additionally, a test was
conducted as to whether the unit is linked to outside supporters (for example trading
firms, consultancies, universities) to gain better information and optimise their decisions
on a governance mode. The important role played by guanxi in China has also been
discussed. To show whether this fact influences the choice of governance mode, the
logit model includes a variable indicating whether the unit dealing with customers or
producers respectively is led by a family member. Another relevant variable included
is the need for flexibility resulting from the market pressure in the electronics indus-
try. In order to deal with low predictability of supplies and sales (Likert scale: 1=very
predictable to 5=not predictable), firms may organise their relations differently. Apart
from the firm-specific characteristics, the model also tests the influence of relationship-
specific characteristics linked to certain governance modes. It has been mentioned that
governance modes also depend on the transaction-specific environment (frequency, un-
certainty and specific investments). Transactions which are repeated frequently are
more often organised in hierarchies. The length of working experience in years is taken
as an indicator to show repeated transactions. Moreover, the share of products sold or
sourced from a partner in value terms can be taken as a sign for relationship-specific
investments. If the dependency of partners is high, it can be expected that investments
in this relationship have been higher. This is assumed to go along with hierarchies or
EC, which naturally require higher investments. To measure the quick response ability
of firms in certain governance modes, the time of negotiation in hours is included. This
is the length of time from when orders are placed until all details are figured out and
the production process can start.
Not all variables can be taken as determinants of governance modes. Determinants
are obvious before a governance modes is selected (for example location of partners,
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Table 5.2: Definition and descriptive statistics of variables used in the generalised or-
dered logit (GOL) model (1)
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
n = 206
Relation specific characteristics
Location in China dummy 0.55 0.50 0 1
Working experience years 7.72 5.56 0 25
Dependency % 52.77 30.98 2 100
Time for negotiation hours 157.02 393.73 0 4368
Firm specific characteristics
Predictability of supply/sales infos Likert scale 2.36 0.83 1 5
Supply/sales unit operated in HK dummy 0.71 0.46 0 1
Supply/sales unit family led dummy 0.32 0.47 0 1
Supply/sales unit linked to
externals
dummy 0.20 0.40 0 1
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
location of decision-making unit, unit led by family members, etc.). But some other
variables only become obvious once the mode has already been selected (for example
working experience, dependency, time of negotiation). This approach follows the trans-
action cost theory. It outlines that governance modes are related to transaction-specific
characteristics such as frequency or specific investments. Those variables are also un-
known in their specification at the time governance modes are selected. Exogenous and
endogenous variables cannot be clearly distinguished in the model. Therefore, the model
does not try to determine or predict governance modes, but rather to characterise them
and associate them with certain traits. This is a clear limitation of this model.
Table 5.3 provides a short overview of how the variables behave in the four differ-
ent governance modes. For each variable, the mean and standard deviation (S.D.) is
indicated. For all dummy variables, the mean can be interpreted as the percentage of
firms scoring a 1. Descriptive statistics show that hierarchical relationships go along
with high values of the variables location in China, working experience and dependency.
Markets relationships go along with high scores in the variables time of negotiation and
unit in HK. All other variables do not seem to correlate with any governance mode. To
analyse which variables are significantly correlated and have the strongest association
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Table 5.3: Definition and descriptive statistics of variables used in GOL (1) according
to their governance modes
H (n = 59) EC (n = 20) NEC (n = 45) M (n = 82)
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Relation specific characteristics
Location in China 0.97 0.18 0.85 0.37 0.42 0.50 0.26 0.44
Working experience 11 6.11 7 4.91 6 4.00 7 5.21
Dependency 79 27.62 66 25.83 47 26.60 34 20.41
Time for negotiation 39 99.90 125 193.99 229 656.23 210 355.54
Firm specific characteristics
Predictability 2.42 0.99 2.18 0.77 2.36 0.81 2.36 0.75
Supply/sales unit in
HK
0.44 0.50 0.95 0.22 0.76 0.43 0.82 0.39
Supply/sales unit
family led
0.31 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.22 0.42 0.37 0.48
Supply/sales unit
linked
0.10 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
with governance modes (highest β coefficient), an ordered logit model was applied, as
the dependent variable is of ordinal scale.
It continues to be fairly common practice to analyse ordered choice variables using a
linear regression model (LRM), because of the ease of interpretation. The advantages of
using a LRM are the ability to use a simple estimator (ordinary least square (OLS)), the
ease of interpretation and the small sample size required to build a model. But it also suf-
fers from disadvantages, because (1) it requires a lot of assumptions (linear correlation,
expected value of errors E[i|xik] = 0, homoscedasticity V [i] = σ2, no autocorrelation of
errors i, normal distributed errors i ∼ N(0, σ2), no exact multicollinearity of indepen-
dent variables), (2) it assumes a constant change of variables across all categories of the
independent variable, which is often unrealistic and (3) predictions pˆii are often outside
the boundary (pˆii < 0 or pˆii > 1). If this assumption is false, then LRM results may be
biased and can be severely misleading (Long and Freese 2006:183–222). In contrast,
the logit models avoid some of the problems of the LRM. Firstly, they work without
the numerous assumptions in the LRM. They do not require a linear correlation, they
have built-in homoscedasticity and errors i do not need to be normally distributed,
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but they are fixed to V [i] = pi
2/3. Only the absence of multicollinearity should be
considered. Secondly, in the logit model, no constant predictors are assumed anymore.
Thirdly, the predicted probability always ranges from 0 to 1. However, logit models also
have disadvantages compared to LRM. Instead of the easy-to-calculate OLS estimator,
logits require the user to work with the more difficult maximum likelihood (ML) esti-
mator. Additionally, the interpretation of logit models is more difficult (Steenbergen
2008:1–8).
In order to establish which variables are significantly associated with the 4-level or-
dinal scaled governance modes of HK firms, an ordered logit model (OLM) was chosen.
This was preferred to an ordered probit model because model fit statistics are easier to
calculate, which ensures quality measurement in the model design. The distributional
assumptions for an OLM form a standard logistic function, which means:
• 1F (i) = Λ(i),
• 2Thus Pr(yi = m) = Λ(τm − x′iβ)−Λ(τm−1 − x′iβ) and
• i ∼ N(0, pi23 ).
Two assumptions have to be proven. Firstly, the absence of multicollinearity should be
tested. This is proven in Appendix B in Table B.1. The Pearson correlation coefficients
are very low and insignificant. Only the variables location in China and dependency
have a significant correlation coefficient. As the first variable is a dummy variable, this
correlation must be analysed carefully, because it could be created by chance. Therefore,
it has been decided to keep both variables in the set of predictors. Secondly, the OLM
initially assumes that the effect of predictors remains constant across the categories
of the response variable. This is known as the parallel regression assumption (PRA).
When this assumption fails, the estimators become biased and inconsistent. It is easy
to see why. Imagine that a predictor has a positive effect for some categories of y and a
negative effect for other categories. When the effect is constrained to become constant
across all of the categories of y, as we have to assume under the PRA, then the net effect
might well come out as zero. The PRA is a rather stringent assumption that is frequently
violated (Long and Freese 2006:197–200). The Brant Test indicates whether the PRA
is violated and which variables are responsible for the violation. For the ordered logit
1Λ standard logistic cumulative distribution function
2Pr = Probability, yi = independent variable, m = Alternative m in the choice set of the yi, τm = cut
points for m, x′i = vector of respondent attributes, β =coefficients
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model designed above, the variables unit is linked to outside supporters and unit is led by
family members violate the PRA. As recommended by Long and Freese (2006:200),
the generalised ordered logit model (GOL) solves the problem, because the PRA has
been relaxed for the two variables, which allows them to vary across the categories of
Y . The possibility of relaxing the PRA in a GOL is its advantage over LRM.
Table 5.4 shows the GOL (1) for the different governance modes for customer and
producer relationships. The model clearly indicates that location of partners has the
largest influence (β = −1.8167∗∗∗). If the location of the most important customer or
producer is in China, firms opt significantly more frequently for a hierarchical form of
relationship. Firms in HK opt for hierarchical relationships if they work within China,
whereas they establish market relationships with international partners. This trend is
significant. The unusually strong links between firms in HK and the PRD might be
caused by the incomplete institutional framework in the PRD. In order so survive in a
transforming economic environment, firms need to find a governance mode which miti-
gates the political hazards and copes with procedural risk while remaining competitive
internationally (Krug and Hendrischke 2006b). When HK firms adapt to the dif-
ficult institutional setting in the PRD, it seems to be more appropriate and safer to
maintain control of the PRD operations and set up self-controlled affiliates, instead of
dealing with independent producers or customers and taking the risk of not knowing
whether the partner is able to master the situation. But with the improvement of the
institutional environment, cooperation and the forming of networks can be expected
(Williamson 1998; Krug and Hendrischke 2006b). In contrast, HK firms’ trade
with partners in developed countries is already protected by international trade security
regulations. It can therefore be cautiously concluded that the incomplete institutional
environment is responsible for this decision.
Comparatively much less important, but nevertheless significant, are the years of
working experience (β = −0.0829∗∗∗). The longer the working experience, the more
often transactions are embedded in hierarchies. As markets ease the switch of partners,
these relationships naturally become shorter, but in the PRD, the location-specific in-
stitutions act cumulatively on that pattern. Relationships set up before China entered
the WTO and CEPA were difficult to manage on a market basis. Firms which estab-
lished contracts after 2001 could enjoy a much more stable situation in China, which
has encouraged more firms to work within cooperation or sometimes even in market-like
relationships. Wang and Nicholas (2007) also emphasised the recent trend towards
cooperation in their PRD study. Firms seem to screen the institutional environment
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Table 5.4: GOL (1) for governance modes in customer producer relations of firms in HK
Variable Mode Coef. S. E. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
Location in China −1.8167 0.3533 −5.14 0.000∗∗∗ −2.5092 −1.1243
Working experience −0.0829 0.0293 −2.83 0.005∗∗∗ −0.1403 −0.0254
Dependency −0.0331 0.0058 −5.69 0.000∗∗∗ −0.0445 −0.0217
Time for negotiation 0.0000 0.0004 −0.01 0.993 −0.0007 0.0007
Predictability −0.2049 0.1781 −1.15 0.250 −0.5540 0.1442
Supply/sales unit in HK 0.6871 0.3481 1.97 0.048∗∗ 0.0048 1.3694
relaxed PRA for
Supply/sales
unit family led
> H −0.1144 0.4428 −0.26 0.796 −0.9822 0.7534
> EC −0.5587 0.4225 −1.32 0.186 −1.3869 0.2694
> NEC 0.2051 0.4047 0.51 0.612 −0.5881 0.9983
Supply/sales
unit linked
> H 1.1090 0.5851 1.9 0.058∗ −0.0378 2.2558
> EC −0.4158 0.4871 −0.85 0.393 −1.3706 0.5389
> NEC 0.0401 0.4622 0.09 0.931 −0.8658 0.9460
Constant > H 4.7859 0.7748 6.18 0.000 3.2673 6.3046
> EC 4.3343 0.7568 5.73 0.000 2.8510 5.8176
> NEC 2.4506 0.6991 3.51 0.000 1.0804 3.8209
Dep. Var.: Governance modes for customer and producer relations (1=Hierarchy (H),
2=Equity cooperation (EC), 3=Non-equity cooperation (NEC), 4=Market (M))
Log likelihood = −189.3 Wald χ212 = 96.4
Number of obs = 206 Prob > χ2 = 0.000
Correctly classified cases = 63% R2McFadden = 0.284
R2CraggUhler = 0.561
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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constantly in order to choose the appropriate governance mode. Moreover the degree to
which HK firms depend on their major customers or producers is significantly associated
with a certain governance mode (β = −0.0331∗∗∗). The higher the profits made with one
partner, the more likely the relationship is to be organised in a hierarchical way. This
means that if HK firms have set up their own subsidiary, then most of the production
is run by that subsidiary. Using the market place means choosing the best partner and
spreading risk, which usually results in a more diverse pool of customers and suppli-
ers. Additionally, when firms operate their sales or procurement unit in HK, they have
market-like relationships significantly more often (β = 0.6871∗∗). Other variables such
as time of negotiation, predictability of information related to producers or customers,
a family led unit and having a unit linked to outside advisers are not significantly con-
nected with specific governance modes. There is an association between the degree of
dependency on partners, the work experience and certain governance modes, but while
both variables describe specifications of governance modes, they are not decision-making
criteria for a mode. Only the location of customers and producers and the location of
decision-making is previously known and can influence the decision. The exclusion of
the influence of other variables leads to the conclusion that differences in governance of
customer and producer relations can be explained by locations connected to different
institutional settings.
In order to qualify the findings of the data, the model fit must be examined. In the
context of logit models, there are three useful approaches towards assessing model fit:
correct predictions, pseudo-R2 and the likelihood ratio test. Based on the predicted
probabilities, one can compare the actual selection of governance modes for each case
to the predicted choice of governance modes calculated by the GOL. The percentage of
correct predictions can be calculated. In the GOL (1), 63% of the cases are correctly
classified, which is a sufficient measurement. Moreover, the pseudo-R2 of McFadden
(0.284) and Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) (0.561) can be taken as adequate for model fit
(Long and Freese 2006). The likelihood ratio test contrasts the given model with an
empty model, e. g. a model where all coefficients are zero and which contains a constant
only. If the empty model fits the data no worse than the substantive model, then one
cannot reject the nill hypothesis that none of the predictors matter. When referred to
a χ212-distribution in GOL(1) p = 0.000, one can clearly reject the hypothesis that none
of the predictors matter. The model fit statistics show that GOL(1) is well defined.
Within the model, it is possible to obtain a predicted probability by simulating a set
of values on the covariates. When there are many predictors, however, it is sometimes
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helpful to keep most covariates constant and to assess the effect of only a few covari-
ates. For example, one can assess the predicted probability across the range of values
of one predictor while keeping all other predictors at their mean. In Table 5.5, pre-
dicted probabilities for different firm types are calculated. When partners are located
in China (dummy = 1, while keeping all other variables on their mean), the predicted
probability of being involved in a hierarchical relationship is 32%. The probability of
having a market relationship is only 16%. Surprisingly, the probability for being in a
NEC is 31%. This could be because of the improving institutional environment, which
allows room for NEC. In contrast, having a partner abroad reduces the probability of
having a hierarchical relationship to 7%, while increasing the probability of acting on
market to 54%. This picture clearly shows the influence of location. The high score of
NEC when having a partner in China raises the question of whether time matters for
governance mode. The years of working experience became significant in the GOL(1).
Moreover, it is of interest what modes firms prefer if they have set up their relationships
to partners recently and what modes are most successful. When firms have little work-
ing experience with their partners, they are more likely to be organised in markets or
NEC. In contrast, the likelihood of working in hierarchies increases when a long-term
relationship exists. A good predictability of partner-related information is more likely
when firms are organised in NEC or markets. A poor predictability is more likely to be
observed in hierarchical relationships. Calculating the predicted probabilities for having
little working experience and a good predictability simulates a company which has set up
their relationships recently, but has a good predictability of information regarding the
behaviour of partners. The probability of those firms acting on markets is 45% and in
NEC 34%. This shows that successful predictability of change can be perfectly supported
by young relationships on markets and in cooperation. In comparison, long relationships
involving extensive working experience but poor predictability are likely to be organised
in hierarchies (39%). Overall, this table shows that location matters and that younger
relationships are differently organised without suffering from poor predictability when
the right governance mode is selected.
It has been shown that the location matters for the characteristics of governance
modes. HK firms act significantly differently when working with partners in China as
opposed to those abroad. It could be proven that the years of working experience have
an effect on governance modes. Besides the relation-specific characteristics, firm-specific
characteristics might have an effect on governance modes as suggested by the transaction
cost theory. To prove this, it seems worth separating the customer and producer samples.
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Table 5.5: Predicted probabilities using GOL (1) for different firm types
Different Types Hierarchy EC NEC Market
Partner located in China 0.3167 0.2148 0.3111 0.1573
Partner located abroad 0.0701 0.0857 0.3097 0.5345
Little working experience 0.1223 0.1320 0.3625 0.3832
Long working experience 0.2735 0.2061 0.3335 0.1869
Good predictability 0.1348 0.1413 0.3668 0.3570
Poor predictability 0.2613 0.2028 0.3394 0.1966
Little working experience, good predictability 0.0954 0.1098 0.3441 0.4508
Long working experience, poor predictability 0.3927 0.2202 0.2691 0.1180
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
A concentration on the producer sample of HK firms implies the opportunity to discover
the influence of structural variables. Additionally, it provides the chance to see whether
changes in the institutional setting in China result in changes in governance modes,
while focusing on the working experience with producers.
5.2.2 Governance Modes, Firm-Specific Characteristics and
Institutional Change: Logit Model
For a better understanding of how HK firms organise their cross border production
activities with China, a second logit model was applied to shed light on the special
situation between HK and China. This model hopefully clarifies how changes in the
institutional environment effect governance modes. The model only concentrates on
PRD producer-related variables. The set of variables differs from the set in GOL (1).
A locational variable is generated by measuring whether the location within the PRD
matters for certain governance modes (see Table 5.6). SZ and DG were the core cities
(dummy: core PRD = 1) which were entered by foreign firms. Nowadays they are highly
developed. In comparison, having a producer in the remote areas of the PRD might be
associated with a different governance mode. Other relationship-specific characteristics,
such as working experience, time for negotiation and dependency, go along with the def-
initions of the first model. Looking to firm-specific characteristics, firms’ predictability
of producer-related information reflects how firms can deal with the need for flexibility.
Moreover, the literature specific to transaction costs discusses that firms investing more
capital (for example innovative firms) tend to organise their relationships more hierar-
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Table 5.6: Definition and descriptive statistics of variables used in the GOL (2)
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
n = 100
Relation specific characteristics
Core PRD dummya 0.79 0.41 0 1
Working experience years 8.89 5.88 0 25
Time for negotiation hours 62.47 106.26 0 504
Dependency % 70.46 29.39 10 100
Firm specific characteristics
Predictability of producers Likert scaleb 2.31 0.92 1 4
Innovativeness 4 classesc 1.68 0.84 0 3
Position in VC %d 33.33 36.27 0 100
Structural characteristics
Foundation year 5 classese 3.19 1.26 1 5
Sales growth 4 classesf 2.84 1.03 1 4
Employees 8 classesg 1.98 1.44 0 7
a1=Shenzhen/Dongguan 0=remote PRD
b1=very predictable to 5=not predictable
c0=not innovative to 3=very innovative
dShare of ODM/OBM production
e≤1978, 1979–1990, 1991–1996, 1997–2000, 2001+
f<0%, 0–2%, 2–10%, 10%+
g0, 1–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–25, 26–50, 51–100, 101–200
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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chically to protect business. The variable innovativeness consists of classes reflecting
the importance of innovation activities of firms in product, process, organisation and
marketing. A high score indicates a high degree of innovativeness, while a low score in-
dicates that firms are engaged in little or no innovation activities. Furthermore, it will be
tested whether the position in the value chain influences the governance modes. There-
fore, the GOL (2) includes the percentage of firms’ sales generated by the production
of ODM and OBM goods. Structural characteristics are included as control variables,
such as the year of foundation to see whether age matters, the number of employees
as an indicator of a firm’s size, and the growth rate of sales as an indicator of a firm’s
growth. The growth rate of sales is strongly correlated with the size of sales, the growth
rate in profits and the return on investments. Therefore, both variables are included. A
variable indicating ownership has been excluded because 78% of all firms in the sample
are HK-owned, which makes it difficult to analyse differences between the governance
modes. The correlation matrix according to Pearson is presented in Appendix B in
Table B.2. Correlation coefficients are low, which confirms that the set of variables is
suitable for a logit analysis. Only the variable year of foundation is correlated with the
working experience and the number of employees. Younger firms naturally cannot have
long relationships with their customers and producers. It also seems logical that younger
firms have fewer employees. Despite these high correlations, the year of foundation is
kept in the set of variables, as it functions as a control variable.
Table 5.7 provides a short overview of the variables classified according to their gov-
ernance mode. The descriptive statistics give a first clue as to which variables might
become significant in the logit model. The values of the variables working experience,
time of negotiation, dependency, predictability of producer-related information and inno-
vativeness seem to differ between the governance modes. Whether these variables also
become significant can be seen by calculating the logit model. The Brant Test was ap-
plied to establish whether the PRA is violated. Again, the Brant Test suggested moving
from an ordered logit to a GOL, because the variable dependency violates the PRA (see
Appendix C in Table C.1). Because the sample is reduced to producer relationships
only, the number of observations dropped down to 100. Long (1997:54) proposed the
following guidelines for the use of ML in small samples:
“It is risky to use ML with samples smaller than 100, while samples over 500
seem adequate. . . . if there are many parameters, more observations are needed
. . . A rule of at least 10 observations per parameter seems reasonable.”
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Table 5.7: Definition and descriptive statistics of variables used in GOL (2) according
to their governance mode
H (n = 56) EC (n = 16) NEC (n = 15) M (n = 13)
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Relation specific characteristics
Core PRD 0.75 0.44 0.69 0.48 1.00 0.00 0.85 0.38
Working experience 11 6.16 8 5.32 6 3.97 5 3.53
Time negotiation 28 44.02 87 145.52 101 112.57 137 169.50
Dependency 80 26.76 71 28.17 63 24.63 37 20.16
Firm specific characteristics
Predict. producers 2.41 0.99 2.31 0.70 2.07 0.70 2.15 1.07
Innovativeness 1.82 0.83 1.50 0.82 1.67 0.72 1.31 0.95
Position in VC 30 35.75 39 40.95 42 33.78 32 36.94
Structural characteristics
Foundation year 3.04 1.25 3.44 1.15 3.40 1.30 3.31 1.44
Sales growth 2.93 1.04 2.75 1.06 2.87 0.64 2.54 1.33
Employees 2 1.66 2 1.22 1 0.72 1 0.73
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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As the GOL (2) includes 10 parameters, a sample size of 100 seems to be sufficient, even
if it is on the limit. Because the number of cases is very small, variables which are,
in fact, significant may not be calculated as such, while other variables could become
significant purely by chance. Despite these risks, it still seems appropriate to work with
this logit model, as the number of cases is 100 and will not be increased in the future.
The value of the empirical data is too high to rely only on descriptive statistics.
The calculated GOL (2) is presented in Table 5.8. Four variables became significant.
The location within the PRD seems to affect the governance modes significantly (β =
1.1408∗). When producers of HK firms are located in the core PRD (SZ, DG), they
are organised significantly more often in market or NEC relationships. This might be
because firms in the core already have more experience in serving HK firms, since they
were set up early. With increasing skills and quality of products, HK firms do not need
to control producers, but can rather act on cooperation. Another reason for this could be
that the market dynamic in SZ and DG is hardly affected by policy makers, whereas in
the areas developed later, market institutions are not so well enforced and governmental
officials still have a lot of power. This might reduce the willingness of HK firms to work
in market relationships within the areas of the PRD developed later.
The variable working experience also became significant (β = −0.1277∗∗). The longer
the relationship exists, the more likely relationships are to be organised in hierarchies.
This, again, might be for the various reasons mentioned above. Besides working expe-
rience and location within the PRD, the dependency of producers became significant.
For dependency, the PRA has been relaxed as suggested by the Brant test. Different
groups of governance modes can then be compared. As the table shows, dependency
significantly distinguishes EC, NEC and markets from hierarchies (β = −0.0193∗∗).
Its effect on distinguishing hierarchies and EC from NEC and markets is even higher
(β = −0.0296∗∗∗) , while the effect increased again when comparing markets to the other
three modes. The dependency significantly decreases when moving from hierarchies to
markets. But the changes from markets to NEC are associated with the greatest change
in dependency.
The variable time of negotiation became significant as well. The time in hours for HK
firms from initiating an order until all details are cleared and the production process
can start significantly increases when moving from hierarchies to markets (β = 0.0035∗).
When working in hierarchies, firms indicated a mean of 28 hours (see Table 5.7) to clear
order details with their branch in the PRD. When HK firms work with a JV partner in
EC, they need 87 hours to clear details, because they have to start negotiation processes
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Table 5.8: GOL (2) for governance modes in producer relations of HK firms
Variable Mode Coef. S. E. z P > z [95% Conf. Interval]
Core PRD 1.1408 0.6009 1.90 0.058∗ −0.0370 2.3187
Working experience −0.1277 0.0605 −2.11 0.035∗∗ −0.2463 −0.0091
Time negotiation 0.0035 0.0020 1.77 0.077∗ −0.0004 0.0074
Innovativeness −0.1491 0.2973 −0.50 0.616 −0.7318 0.4337
Predictability producer −0.2707 0.2593 −1.04 0.297 −0.7789 0.2376
Position in VC 0.0086 0.0064 1.35 0.177 −0.0039 0.0212
Employees −0.1725 0.2117 −0.81 0.415 −0.5875 0.2425
Foundation
year
−0.0319 0.2482 −0.13 0.898 −0.5183 0.4545
Sales growth −0.3573 0.2404 −1.49 0.137 −0.8284 0.1139
relaxed PRA for
Dependency > H −0.0193 0.0093 −2.08 0.038∗∗ −0.0376 −0.0011
> EC −0.0296 0.0108 −2.73 0.006∗∗∗ −0.0508 −0.0084
> NEC −0.0594 0.0177 −3.36 0.001∗∗∗ −0.0941 −0.0248
Constant > H 3.1097 1.5962 1.95 0.051∗ −0.0188 6.2381
> EC 2.6693 1.5807 1.69 0.091∗ −0.4288 5.7674
> NEC 2.7008 1.6131 1.67 0.094∗ −0.4609 5.8625
Dep. Var.: Governance modes for customer and producer relations (1=Hierarchy (H),
2=Equity cooperation (EC), 3=Non-equity cooperation (NEC), 4=Market (M))
Log likelihood = −88.8 Wald χ212 = 39.3
Number of obs = 100 Prob > χ2 = 0.000
Correctly classified cases = 67% R2McFadden = 0.240
R2CraggUhler = 0.474
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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with their JV partner. In NEC, the time of negotiation comes to 101 hours, and in
markets to 137 hours. In order to meet market flexibility, hierarchies are able to react
fastest in dealing with orders. Production processes start approximately two days after
orders are placed. The time of negotiation is a measurement of quantitative flexibility.
There is a successive increase of time from hierarchies to markets. As expected, in-house
production organisation reduces time required to place orders to the PRD producers,
whereas negotiation with a cooperation partner or market participant takes more time.
Although the predictability of producer-related information is insignificant, the de-
scriptive statistics show that firms setting up their own plant in the PRD have more
difficulties predicting market changes. They compensate this low predictability with
greater flexibility when orders come in. In contrast, firms acting on markets or NEC can
better predict producer-related information, such as knowing where raw materials can be
sourced quickly, but they lose more time in negotiation. Hierarchical and market-related
forms of organisation are both competitive, but in different ways. Hierarchies suffer from
low predictability, but are able to find quick solutions. Relationships based on markets
and in NEC enjoy a better predictability, but need more time for negotiation.
Other variables did not affect the governance modes significantly, but it is still worth
mentioning in which direction they influence the governance modes. The theory sug-
gested that the more innovative firms are, the more likely they would be to protect their
business activities in hierarchies. This can be confirmed by the model. Firms which
indicated being highly innovative more often prefer their producer to be a subsidiary
rather than a market supplier. In contrast, firms in a higher value chain position (more
sales generated by ODM/OBM production) tend to act in market-like relationships (pos-
itive β). Innovativeness of firms does not necessarily correlate with more ODM/OBM
production. The control variables are insignificant.
The effect of the years of working experience is of special interest, because it could pro-
vide evidence of changing patterns in governance modes caused by institutional change.
Figure 5.1 presents the predicted probabilities for the years of working experience. One
can see that the predicted probability for EC, NEC and hierarchies are similar in the
first three years (about 30%). When relationships are longer-standing, the hierarchical
form takes over as the most likely governance mode. But the figure also reveals that
the probability of working in EC is above 20% when relationships are not older than
ten years. Additionally, the probability of NEC is above 20% when relationships are not
older than 7.5 years. The black vertical line at 8.9 years indicates the average length
of working experience. Although hierarchical relationships are still the most likely, it
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Figure 5.1: Predicted probabilities for an increase in working experience
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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can be seen that the likelihood of cooperations has gradually increased in recent years.
Cooperation is based on more informal agreements, because cooperation requires trust
in people, trust in reliability and trust in the commitment to cooperate. These relation-
ships seem to have increased in importance recently. Reasons for this are not easy to
define, because they lie in different parallel developments.
1. The electronics value chain has changed from a hierarchical to a modular value
chain. This development began in the 1990s. A modular value chain is based on
cooperative relationships between customers and producers. Partnerships which
were set up 10 or more years ago might still be characterised by strong hierarchical
relationships, assuming that a certain persistency goes along with the selected gov-
ernance mode. The gradual increase in cooperation for relationships characterised
by an working experience of less than ten years can be seen as a sign of the shifting
value chain pattern.
2. The shift from hierarchies to cooperation could also be a result of the improvement
of the institutional environment in China. China began to open up in 1979. After
ten years of attracting FDI and the simultaneous renewal and introduction of busi-
ness and trading law to safeguard transactions in China and lower transactional
costs, firms changed from hierarchical relationships to cooperation. They deemed
safeguards to be sufficiently developed to change to a more market-oriented gov-
ernance mode. Relying on EC or NEC was revealed as being most appropriate in
the current institutional setting. Although pure market transactions are already
taking place, they are less likely. Additionally, it must be considered that infor-
mal modes smooth cooperation. Firms do not necessarily profit from a market
transaction, but rather benefit most when working in cooperation. Again, all the
argumentation is based on the fact that governance modes are subject to a certain
persistency. It can be argued that a change of governance modes generates trans-
action costs, which firms tend to avoid by staying with their chosen governance
mode, at least for a certain time. Therefore, relationships which were set up more
than 10 years ago are more likely to be organised in hierarchies. If firms have in-
vested in hierarchical relationships, for example building their own factory in the
PRD, they will continue to produce most of their products in their own factory
even if they would ordinarily opt for a different governance mode now. Unfortu-
nately, there is a lack of empirical evidence to prove the persistency of governance
modes.
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3. The behaviour of the curves in Figure 5.1 can also be explained by general business
practices. Firms first start to act on markets with their partners. After years of
successful work with their partners, firms shift to cooperation. Firms trust in their
partners’ reliability and their commitment to cooperate. When firms cooperate
for more than 10 years, they often buy their partner out and continue to work in
hierarchies.
The effects of the three developments cannot be measured separately. It can be
expected that all of them have a certain influence on the governance mode. The change
of the electronics value chain and the improvement of the institutional setting in China
in particular act in the same direction. But keeping in mind that younger relationships
are more often organised using cooperation, and combined with the fact that in the core
PRD, where institutions are even more stable, HK firms again work more often through
cooperation and markets, one can cautiously conclude that the improving institutional
environment is responsible to a high degree for the governance modes.
The model fit can be determined by the Wald test. The Wald test shows that one can
clearly reject the hypothesis that none of the predictors matter (χ212 = 39.3, p = 0.000).
Moreover, the pseudo-R2 of McFadden (0.23964) and Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) (0.474)
can be interpreted as sufficient for model quality. The model classifies 67% of cases
correctly.
When looking at predicted probabilities for different types of firms, one can see that the
likelihood of working in a hierarchy dominates the results. But there are still differences
to discover which are worth mentioning when analysing the different characteristics of
governance modes. Table 5.9 summarises the predicted probability of certain firm types
which are associated with the four governance modes (sum = 100%). The table shows
that firms’ producer relationships in the core and non-core PRD are most likely to be
organised in hierarchies. But the likelihood of being organised in informal governance
modes (EC and NEC) is higher when a firm’s producer is located in the core PRD. The
core PRD seems to provide a better institutional environment and more highly qualified
independent producers which HK firms can rely on. When looking at the working ex-
perience, firms with a long-term producer are most likely to be organised in hierarchies
(75%). Firms with relationships to producers set up recently show a more diverse distri-
bution. The likelihood of being organised in hierarchies is 39%, the likelihood of working
in EC is 28%, and in NEC 27%. Reasons for that are the changing institutional environ-
ment and the shift in value chains or general business practices. Further explanations
are given above. When combining the two variables, the predicted probabilities reveal
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Table 5.9: Predicted probabilities using GOL (2) for different firm types
Different Types Hierarchy EC NEC Market
Core PRD 0.5183 0.2564 0.1899 0.0353
Non-Core PRD 0.7710 0.1439 0.0734 0.0116
Little working experience 0.3921 0.2813 0.2691 0.0576
Long working experience 0.7491 0.1560 0.0818 0.0130
Core PRC, little working experience 0.3367 0.2820 0.3093 0.0721
Non-Core PRD, little working experience 0.6136 0.2218 0.1404 0.0242
Core PRD, long working experience 0.7015 0.1810 0.1010 0.0165
Non-Core PRD, long working experience 0.8803 0.0789 0.0355 0.0053
Excellent predictability of producer infos 0.4895 0.2645 0.2066 0.0395
Poor predictability of producer information 0.7390 0.1615 0.0858 0.0137
Little working experience, short negotiation 0.4249 0.2776 0.2469 0.0507
Long working experience, short negotiation 0.7738 0.1424 0.0724 0.0114
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
that firms in the core PRD with little working experience with their customers are most
likely to be organised in EC or NEC. In contrast, firms outside the core with long-term
partners are most likely to have hierarchical relationships. The location, with a partic-
ular institutional environment, and the years of working experience seem to matter for
the association with certain governance modes. Although the variable predictability of
producer-related information is not significant in the GOL (2), its influence still becomes
obvious when comparing the governance modes to producers of HK firms with excellent
and poor predictability. If firms are able to predict changes related to producers very
well, their probability of working in a hierarchical relationship is 49%, but the likelihood
of working in EC (27%) and in NEC (21%) is also worth mentioning. In contrast, firms
having a poor predictability are organised in hierarchies with a likelihood of 74%. This
clearly shows that cooperative, more informal governance modes offer better conditions
for predicting changes, probably because the pool of contacts from which information
can be gained increases. In times of rapidly changing market conditions, decreased
product life cycles and political uncertainty in China, a high predictability is a means
of managing the need for flexibility. The changing behaviour can also be observed when
comparing firms with the ability to keep the negotiation time short. Firms indicating
a short negotiation time and little working experience have a much higher predicted
probability of working on a cooperation basis than firms with more working experience.
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The ability to speed up negotiation processes is a necessary tool for enhancing compet-
itiveness in times where high flexibility is required. Informal modes based on personal
understanding and interaction increase the ability to predict how producers will perform
and shorten the time required to conclude agreements.
Moreover, the logit model also provides a dynamic component for measuring effects
of changes in the independent variables on the dependent variable. Table 5.10 indicates
the average marginal effects of all dependent variables on the governance modes. The
average marginal effect indicates how the probability of being organised in a governance
mode increases/decreases in percentage points when an independent variable increases
by one unit while keeping all other variables at their mean. The average marginal effect
is calculated by increasing the independent variable xi by one unit for each sample case
and then calculating the differences in the predicted probabilities. When looking at
dummy variables, the effect can be interpreted as discrete change when moving from 0
to 1. Taking into account the significant variables, one can see that a change of a major
producer’s location from the remote PRD to the core PRD decreases the probability of
working in a hierarchy by 18.9 percentage points (pp), while it increases the probability
of working in EC, NEC and markets. An additional year of working experience increases
the predictability of working in hierarchies by 2pp. One can multiply the effect by 10 to
get change over 10 years. 10 more years of working experience decreases the likelihood
of being organised in EC by 4.4pp, in NEC by 6.9pp and in markets by 9.8pp. When
analysing the average marginal effects of the time of negotiation in hours, the table
shows that two additional days of negotiation (48 hours) decreases the probability of
working in hierarchies by 28.8pp and increases the probability of working in the other
three modes. It is noticeable that something which has a positive or negative effect
on hierarchies has the opposite effect on the other three modes, except for dependency.
When dependency increases by 10%, the likelihood of working in hierarchies (3.2pp), EC
(0.7pp) and NEC (0.7pp) also increases, whereas the likelihood for markets decreases by
4.5pp.
By way of critical comment, although the logit models provide insights into the inter-
relation of different variables and the selected governance modes, the exact coefficient,
the predicted probabilities and the marginal effects are somewhat superficial, because
they suggest a concreteness of the measurement which cannot be found in reality with
such a small sample. The logit model in general is very vulnerable to changes in the
variables. An attempt was made to affect changes in the models to see whether the
significance of variables proves a certain resistance to changes. The decision was made
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Table 5.10: Average marginal effects in the GOL (2)
Average marginal effects dy/dx
Unit Hierarchy EC NEC Market
Relation specific characteristics
Core PRD dummya −0.1885 0.0498 0.0651 0.0736
Working experience years 0.0211 −0.0044 −0.0069 −0.0098
Time for negotiation hours −0.0006 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
Dependency % 0.0032 0.0007 0.0007 −0.0045
Firm specific characteristics
Predictability of producers Likert scale 0.0447 −0.0093 −0.0146 −0.0207
Innovativeness 4 classes 0.0246 −0.0051 −0.0081 −0.0114
Position in VC % −0.0014 0.0003 0.0005 0.0007
Structural characteristics
Foundation year 5 classes 0.0053 −0.0011 −0.0017 −0.0024
Sales growth 4 classes 0.0588 −0.0123 −0.0193 −0.0273
Employees 8 classes 0.0285 −0.0059 −0.0093 −0.0132
ady/dx is for average discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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to present models with robust significant variables to ensure quality in spite of the small
sample size. It is clear that a larger number of cases would improve model quality, but
in the absence of more cases, it nevertheless seems worth presenting the results of the
logit models. However, necessary caution must be taken in interpreting results.
In the first logit model, it could be proven that HK firms organise relationships to
customers and producers differently according to location. It has been argued that
locational effects can be interpreted as institutional effects. Institutional effects are
still being heavily discussed in the academic literature, but only on a theoretical basis.
Empirical evidence is seldom provided. This work has attempted to close this gap.
The primary data effectively show that locational and therefore institutional factors
indicate the highest coefficient and are most influencing. The second model focussed
on the producer relations of HK firms. It could be proven that firms which have set
up relationships to producers recently are more likely to work in cooperation. There
are strong arguments for the fact that the improvement of institutions is responsible for
that, but other factors could not be entirely excluded. For more reliable results on this
issue, additional research is needed.
5.3 Summary and Discussion of Findings in Section 5
This chapter has shown which governance modes HK and PRD firms preferentially use
to organise their customer producer networks. Hypothesis C1—HK firms govern their
relationships to firms in China differently from relationships to firms abroad—can be
confirmed. Relationships to Western firms are more likely to be organised via markets,
whereas relationships to firms in the PRD are mainly organised in hierarchies. Within
the PRD, firms do not tend to have different relationships to customers and producers.
Additionally, it was tested whether the location of customers and producers of HK
firms significantly influences the selection of governance modes. Locations in the West-
ern world and locations in the PRD are associated with different levels of business
uncertainty due to the distinct institutional settings. A logit model could show that
location is the most important factor for determining the selection of governance modes.
As the global value chain approach does not suggest a difference in customer and pro-
ducer relations per se, it can be concluded that the institutional setting is responsible
for a large portion of differences in governance modes of HK firms. Hypothesis C2—
differences in applied governance modes of HK firms can be explained by the institutional
environment—can be confirmed.
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A second logit model tried to indicate the influences of the institutional change on
the governance mode to HK producers. It was tested whether the length of working
experience significantly affects the choice of governance modes. HK firms which have set
up their relationship to their most important producer recently opted for cooperation or
market relationships significantly more often than firms which set up their relationships
ten years ago. This shows a crucial change in governance modes. The conclusion that this
is due to an improving institutional setting is based on the assumption that governance
modes are subject to a certain persistency over time. Institutional change might also
not be the only reason. The shift of the electronics value chain from a hierarchical to a
modular chain, and the fact that this is only due to general business practices, cannot
be ignored. Therefore, Hypothesis C3—the institutional environment is responsible for
the shift from hierarchies to market-like relationships—cannot be confirmed in this way.
There are good reasons to do so, but as influences other than the institutional change
cannot be excluded, it would be wrong to confirm this hypothesis. It can only be said
that there is nothing which disproves the influence of the institutional environment, but
a confirmation is not possible. Further research is needed to exclude other influences.
I Do HK firms organise their business relations to customers and producers in the
PRD differently from their relations to customers and producers abroad? Is this a
consequence of the different development stages of the institutional environment?
Is there a trend toward hybrid forms of governance in China resulting from the
transitional change?
Research question I can now be answered. HK firms organise their relationships to
customers and producers in the PRD differently from those to customers and producers
abroad. This can be explained by the different development stages of the institutional
environment. When business safeguards are ill-protected by laws or the enforcement
of laws is poor, firms tend to use the protection afforded by hierarchies. Cooperation
turns out to be an intermediate mode used when the institutional environment has im-
proved, but business still lacks reliable protection. Markets are only used when the
institutional environment is well developed. The discussion about transaction cost the-
ory and governance modes driven by Menard (2005), Williamson (2005) and Pies
(2001) corresponds with the empirical findings. Firms adapt their governance modes to
the institutional environment (discussed in Section 2.4). It could not be conclusively
proven whether changes of governance modes over time are exclusively subject to the
improvement of institutions, but certainly institutional change is partly responsible. In
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times of institutional change, firms tend to adjust their organisation in a gradual way.
A time delay (Williamson 1998) could indeed be confirmed between the introduction
of new laws and their enforceability. Firms only adjust when enforceability of laws is
ensured.
Evaluating the empirical results gained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provides some
information to fill the gap of how the lower end of the electronics value chain is organised
in the GPRD region. It quickly becomes obvious that HK CMs receive orders from
Western LFs. LFs and CMs tend to develop a strong long-term cooperation and an equal
partnership. Modules of construction are handed over from LF to CMs. In contrast, HK
firms do not continue this strategy of having equal partners in the PRD. They tend to set
up a 100%-owned production plant in the PRD, due to uncertainty in the institutional
environment. Cross border production activities are highly protected by hierarchies and
do not follow the trend of modularisation. There is a trend towards cooperation, but this
does not dominate the chain. Firms in the PRD indicated organising producer relations
in cooperation or markets. One can conclude that although the upper end of the value
chain reflects the development of the electronics industry very accurately (Gereffi
et al. 2005; Sturgeon 2002), this does not necessarily apply to the lower end due to
locational influences. An especially poorly or well developed institutional environment
can switch the form of governance within the chain. In conclusion, proponents of the
value chain approach should consider the fact that a locational perspective is needed,
because the chain concept is not compatible with the institutional environments. Chains
can switch between modes. In the GPRD, modular chains switch to hierarchical modes
in cross border operations, but within China, they are subject to restrictions.
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6 Analysing Informality and Flexibility in
Business Relations in the GPRD
In order to study informality in business relations, one must go beyond the discussion
of governance modes. A more intense analysis of the organisation and arrangement of
certain parts of relationships provides a better insight into the use of informality and
helps to answer research question J. One major point of analysis is the different use of
informality in HK and the PRD, as well as the explanation for those differences. The
different dimensions of informality outlined in Table 2.1 will be taken into account for
the analysis. Moreover, this chapter aims to assess the effect of informal behaviour on
flexibility. For the analysis, the focus was placed on the following interaction of firms
with their customers and producers:
• contact and selection of customers and producers
• contractual arrangements
• enforcement mechanisms
The first Section 6.1 focuses on the governance modes and their impact on flexibility.
After that, the discussion moves beyond the governance modes. According to the focal
points outlined above, the contact and selection processes of customers and producers in
the PRD will be analysed (see Section 6.2). After firms gain new customers or produc-
ers, they must deal with the issue of contractual arrangements. The different types of
formal and informal arrangements will be analysed in Section 6.3. When examining the
issue in greater detail, the link between informal agreements and increasing flexibility
becomes especially apparent. Even if customers and producers are carefully selected and
contractual arrangements are concluded, conflicts can still occur. Section 6.4 analyses
the different formal and informal means of settling disputes. At the end of this chapter,
the results will be contrasted with the hypotheses set up in the theoretical part of the
work.
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6.1 Impact of Governance Modes on the Flexibility of
Firms
It could be shown in Chapter 5 that a high speed of negotiation, indicating quantitative
flexibility, is found in hierarchical realtionships more often than in markets. This section
will study the qualitative aspect of flexibility between the different governance modes.
A wide variety of actions for dealing with sudden changes allows firms to benefit in
times of high market volatility. Firms in HK and the PRD were asked to indicate how
they deal with orders which exceed their production capacity. Firms reported on a Lik-
ert scale how often they apply certain actions (1=very often, 5=never). In the following
analysis, only firms which indicated using an action “very often” or “often” are counted
in order to give an overview of the relevance of certain actions. It is assumed that the
decision of how to deal with the order in question depends on the mode of governance
towards the producer. A cross table was created measuring the frequency of certain
actions while working in a certain governance mode. Table 6.1 shows the firms in HK
and the PRD according to their governance modes towards producers and the different
ways of dealing with orders exceeding capacity (multiple answer set). As the HK ques-
tionnaire had been revised before implementation in the PRD, one category was added.
In hierarchies, EC and NEC, HK firms preferred to let their most important producer
manage the exceeding order under any governance mode. Firms tend to trust their most
important producer in terms of having the flexibility to increase production capacity.
The most important producer is not only the one which receives most of their orders,
but also the one providing a specific buffer when orders exceed a firm’s capacity. When
HK firms work in market relationships with their most important producer, 23% of the
firms replied that they subcontract to other companies when orders exceed their capac-
ity. Only 15% use their most important producer. In markets, producer relationships
do not seem to provide such a high flexibility. Firms in EC and NEC do not hesitate
to subcontract to other companies as well (either acquainted or completely new firms).
Because the dependency on their most important producer is lower than in hierarchies,
they have a range of other producers they can rely on when orders exceed their capacity.
When firms work in cooperation with their most important producer, they usually agree
on a certain maximum production capacity to be provided by the producer. Therefore,
HK firms working in cooperation more often rely on other firms as their first choice
when flexibility is required (EC: 59%, NEC: 53%). Firms working in hierarchies rely less
frequently on other producers and reject orders (18%). This shows that firms working
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Table 6.1: Actions taken when orders exceed production capacity according to gover-
nance modes to producers
Hierarchy EC NEC Market
Firms in HK (n = 107)a n = 57 n = 17 n = 17 n = 13
Place orders to the most important producer 67% 88% 77% 15%
Subcontract to other companies 18% 59% 53% 23%
Reject orders 18% 12% 24% 15%
Firms in the PRD (n = 215)a n = 20 n = 13 n = 42 n = 140
Re-negotiate 68% 75% 66% 54%
Place orders to the most important producer 53% 17% 23% 16%
Subcontract to other companies 31% 8% 29% 20%
Reject orders 31% 8% 0% 4%
a Actions taken when production capacity is suddenly exceeded, measured on a Likert scale with
(1=very often to 5=never), but the table only provides the percentage of firms which scored for 1
(very often) or 2 (often) using a certain action.
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
outside hierarchies use more opportunities to deal with orders exceeding capacity than
those using hierarchies. They are less flexible in quantitative ways (time of negotia-
tion), but more flexible in qualitative ways (opportunities to react). When looking at
PRD firms, they prefer to renegotiate when orders exceed their production capacity. It
is assumed that HK firms follow the same strategy, but it was not explicitly asked in
the questionnaire. PRD firms working in hierarchies frequently place orders exceeding
capacity with their most important producer (53%). In comparison, firms in the PRD
working in EC, NEC and markets use their most important producer and other compa-
nies more frequently. They have a more diverse pool of choices they can rely on. Firms
in hierarchical-like relationships have to reject orders more often than firms building
their producer networks on NEC and markets. The more market-like relationships are,
the more flexibly firms can react in terms of the available opportunities.
Goffin et al. (2006) found that a flexible producer is prepared to work on weekends to
fulfill a short-term order. He is able to produce and deliver the parts quickly. Inflexible
producers are unable to fulfill these wishes. One can conclude that because most of
the HK and PRD firms’ producers buffer orders exceeding capacity, they provide a
certain degree of production flexibility. Goffin et al. (2006) also found in their study
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Table 6.2: Actions taken when orders are reduced according to governance modes with
HK customers
Hierarchy EC NEC Market
Firms in the PRD (n = 88)a n = 16 n = 9 n = 6 n = 57
Re-negotiate 56% 78% 83% 79%
Sell remaining products to other companies 7% 11% 17% 18%
Put products into stock 7% 11% 0% 29%
Cancellation charge incurred 29% 11% 33% 21%
Scrap products 7% 0% 0% 6%
a Actions taken when production capacity is suddenly reduced, measured on a Likert scale with
(1=very often to 5=never), but the table only provides the percentage of firms which scored for 1
(very often) or 2 (often) using a certain action.
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
that personal relationships are of great importance for a frictionless partnership. This
element certainly smoothes the relationship and makes the producer willing to perform
quickly.
In contrast, flexibility is also required when orders are reduced or cancelled. The
different actions taken by PRD firms according to their governance mode with customers
are shown in Table 6.2. One can see the share of firms which indicated using these
actions very often or often (multiple answers possible). As products have already been
produced, the relationship to customers provides clues as to how firms deal with the
problem. Unfortunately, the data are only available for PRD firms. Most frequently,
firms renegotiate with their customers in HK. This is most frequently done by firms
working in EC, NEC and markets. When working in hierarchies, 29% of the firms have
contracts with an agreed cancellation charge. Products can be very specialised for the
parent company and unsellable to others. Therefore, they sell very few products to other
companies (7%). In comparison, market-like relationships allow a wider variety. 18% of
the firms frequently sell remaining products to other firms, as they have a large range of
customers. 29% of the firms put products into storage. Only a small proportion of firms
scrap products. Because of the small sample size of firms in cooperation, those numbers
are only of limited relevance.
It could be proven that a firm’s qualitative and quantitative flexibility according to its
governance mode is reciprocal. Firms working in hierarchies enjoy a higher quantitative
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flexibility, but a lower qualitative flexibility. When moving to cooperation and markets,
the quantitative flexibility decreases while the qualitative flexibility increases. These
results are obviously only based on the data collection in this survey, and for a gener-
alisation, the focus must be on a larger set of variables measuring the flexibility. What
could not be proven is that a cooperative, more informal governance mode is related to
greater flexibility. Reasons for that can mainly be found in the small number of cases
working in cooperation. As this study is of an explorative character and questionnaires
were limited in length, only the relationship to the most important producer was covered.
But in reality, firms work with more than one producer. The relationships to them and
their role in keeping a firm flexible could not be studied, but this area deserves further
attention nonetheless. A first clue as to how firms strategically manage their producer
network in order to maintain flexibility is provided by Krajewski et al. (2005). They
studied Taiwanese electronics firms and followed five different producer relationships.
They identified two types of producers. The Taiwanese firm had high value producers
with restricted supply contracts and relatively infrequent schedule revisions. Further-
more, limits of changes in timing and size of orders were set. Additionally, the firm
studied had producers characterised by flexible supply contracts and relatively frequent
schedule revisions, which produces a high level of uncertainty for the producer. For
a deeper understanding of how a flexible producer network is structured in the PRD,
the author recommends further research which takes an entire producer network into
account.
6.2 Contacting and Selecting Customers and Producers
in the GPRD
In this section, it will be shown what relevance informal contacting and selecting pro-
cesses have in comparison to formal ones. It will be established whether informality in
recruitment processes serves as a substitute or complement for lacking formal institu-
tions in HK and the PRD. The contacting processes will be analysed taking into account
the customer relations of HK and PRD firms (see Section 6.2.1). The role of informality
in selection processes will be assessed while focussing on HK firms’ criteria for selecting
producers for long-term cooperation (see Section 6.2.2).
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6.2.1 Contacting Processes
Referring back to the different dimensions of informality (see Table 2.1), personalisa-
tion as a crucial dimension of informality has been analysed in the contact and selection
processes of customers and producers. A bidding competition or an internet search to
recruit new customers and producers can be ranked as very impersonal, an exhibition as
moderately personal, while the recruitment within business and private networks using
their guanxi enables managers to recruit on a personal basis (see Section 2.5). When
managers can rely on their guanxi networks, they profit from the intangible, transferable
and reciprocal character of the network. Firms thus save ex ante transaction costs for a
screening process of their environment for new customers and producers, the collection
of information and the establishment of the first contact. When managers can revert
to networks, they enlarge their pool of choices for recruiting new customers and pro-
ducers. This increases the qualitative flexibility. Moreover, under volatile industry and
market conditions, time is essential for a firm’s entry to market (quantitative flexibility).
Personal networks take time to establish, but they are always ready to use once they
are there. It is a quicker way to activate new customers and producers at short notice
(Millington et al. 2006).
In Table 6.3, the importance to HK firms of seven different contact channels for gaining
new customers is evaluated. Contact channels range from very formal (bidding compe-
tition) to very informal (private contacts). Firstly, HK firms assessed their importance
on a Likert scale (1=very important to 5=not important). The table shows that recom-
mendations by business partners (5) are the most important (scale: 2.4) for HK firms
in gaining new customers. This requires a network of trustworthy business partners to
receive recommendations. Whereas business contacts seem to be of importance, private
networks (7) are not anymore (scale: 4.3). This confirms the change in the nature of
guanxi from a private to a functional network (see Section 2.5.1). This functional guanxi
network is driven by personal connections and profit orientation. Personal connections
do not necessarily involve sympathy as in the case of private contacts. Therefore, busi-
ness connections are associated with moderate informality, whereas private contacts are
associated with a high degree of informality. Sales agents (4) are the second most im-
portant (scale: 2.6). Sales agents are responsible for contacting and keeping in touch
with customers. The personal contact is important, as this creates an atmosphere of
trust. Nevertheless, personal assets are of less importance than in business networks.
However, sales agents account for moderate informality. In contrast, gaining customers
at exhibitions (3) is more impersonal and gaining them on the internet (2) or through
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bidding competitions (1), which is at a very impersonal level and therefore very for-
mal. Impersonal means, such as gaining customers at exhibitions and on the internet,
are the third most important (2.7). Formal bidding processes, the contacting of former
customers and private contacts are of minor importance. In conclusion, the most impor-
tant contacting channels are those characterised by a medium degree of informality. HK
firms still prefer contacting channels with a medium degree of informality, although the
institutional environment would allow them to rely on formal means only. Apparently,
a certain degree of informality is conducive to business success. HK firms proved that
contacting channels do not formalise completely, but that informal modes retain their
importance. This was expected by the outlined theory as well (Zenger et al. 2002).
Formal institutions do not necessarily go along with formal interactions, but provide
room for the use of informal as well as formal actions.
The table also shows how the different contact channels are correlated with each other.
Spearman-Rho has been chosen as the correlation coefficient because the importance of
contact channels is measured on an ordinal scale. The table shows that HK firms which
ranked bidding competition (formal mode) high/low also ranked private contacts, former
business relations and business partners (informal modes) significantly higher/lower.
This can be explained from two perspectives. Firstly, firms combine very formal with
very informal modes in their contacting strategy (high importance of both), because
relying either on formal or on informal modes alone does not work effectively. Private
contacts are no longer the only way to organise business, but they complement nearly all
channels to smooth relations. Secondly, when firms ranked both categories as being of
low importance (as most of the firms did), they experienced that methods of moderate
informality work best. To summarise, private contacts are still important, but they do
not sufficiently serve the HK firms on their own. Firms in HK tend to combine informal
and formal modes or rely on moderate modes of informality to recruit customers most
effectively. Although they could rely on formal contacting modes alone, the combination
with informal modes seems to be more promising to succeed in business. In terms of
contacting, informality is an opportunity rather than a necessity for HK firms.
Table 6.4 compares the results of HK firms with the recruitment channels of PRD
firms. Categories were summarised to make a comparison possible. Again, the degree of
informality increased from the category “bidding competition” to the category “private
contacts”. The table shows the share of firms in each location which ranked the different
channels as being very important or important. One can see that the share of HK firms is
lower than the PRD firms’ share over all categories. In contrast to PRD firms, HK firms
183
Table 6.4: Importance and frequency of contacting channels to customers comparing HK
and PRD firms
Customer contactinga HK firmsb PRD firmsb
n = 104 n = 220
Bidding competition 20% 29%
Active Searching (exhibitions, sales agents, internet) 52% 65%
Business Contacts (former workers, recommendation) 37% 61%
Private contacts (e. g. family ties) 10% 34%
a Importance is measured on a Likert scale with 1=very important to 5=not important, the share of
firms scored for 1=very important and 2=important is indicated
b Customers HK:PRD χ2 = 56.83, p = 0.000∗∗∗
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
used the entire spectrum of the Likert scale (1–5) to rank the importance of different
recruitment channels. PRD firms are retained to rank negative values.
In both locations, active searching (exhibitions, sales agents, internet) is most fre-
quently indicated as being important, closely followed by business contacts. Whereas
both categories were ranked of similar frequency in the PRD (65% and 61%), active
searching is more frequently deemed important in HK than business contacts (52% and
37%). In contrast, PRD firms placed private contacts on the third position, whereas
HK firms preferred bidding competition. Although HK firms use informal elements to
contact customers, PRD firms still rely more on them than HK firms do. Private con-
tacts are used by one third of the firms in the PRD, whereas they are only used by
10% of the HK firms. This might be due to the location of customers. HK firms serve a
global customer base, but 40% of the PRD firms’ customers are located in HK, the other
60% divided in about equal shares between Chinese and international customers. PRD
firms may use more informal modes for contacting customers in China and sometimes in
HK, whereas they certainly apply more formal modes when they contact international
customers. Testing the distribution of customers within the two categories for differ-
ences with the χ2-test shows differences to be significant (χ2 = 56.83, p = 0.000∗∗∗).
To summarise, for contacting customers, PRD firms more frequently deemed informal
modes to be important than HK firms, because customers of PRD firms are more of-
ten located in China or HK, where personal, more informal modes succeed in gaining
business. HK firms more frequently rated formal or mixed modes as being of greater
importance, whereas private contacts do not have such a high importance for recruiting
customers as they used to.
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6.2.2 Selection Processes
It is expected that contacting of customers and producers is done on a continual basis.
A selection occurs if potential customers and producers fit the firm’s profile. Selection
processes are of special interest when firms look for new cooperation partners. Section 5.2
outlined that cooperation with PRD producers has become more important for HK firms
in recent years. Therefore, the selection criteria for producers in cooperation have been
analysed. Selection criteria can range from very formal, without any involvement of
personal assets, to very informal, which qualifies producers only because of personal
relations (informality dimension: personalisation). Expertise (1) can be seen as an
objective measurement of skills and is therefore very impersonal. A good reputation (2)
is based on a pool of subjective measurements and is therefore deemed to be impersonal,
but not as impersonal as expertise. Positive experiences in previous business dealings (3)
is based on a firm’s own subjective measurement of the producer’s quality. It is linked
to moderate personalisation. In contrast, selection criteria are more personal when
they qualify producers to get along well with local workers, suppliers (4) and public
officials (5). When a producer is qualified because of a private connection (6), this
counts as very personal and therefore informal. In this study, it will be analysed how
HK firms have selected producers for long-term relationships in EC and NEC. The
differentiation between EC and NEC provides interesting results about firms’ preferences
within those relationships. When looking at EC, Table 6.5 shows that positive experience
in previous business dealings is of the greatest importance (scale: 1.94), followed by a
good reputation of producers (scale: 2.12) and the existence of personal relationships
(scale: 2.18). HK firms’ selection criteria for producers in EC are based on subjective
quality measurements and personal relationships. Informal and moderately informal
criteria are mainly applied. However, when turning to NEC, expertise as an objective
means of measuring the quality of producers is of the greatest importance, along with a
good reputation (scale: 2.00). The third most important factor is positive experience in
previous business dealings (scale: 2.12). Whereas HK firms apparently need to smooth
relationships to potential JV partners by informal modes, HK firms working in NEC set
their priority on measurements of quality.
A look at the correlation matrix provides even more insights. When HK firms work in
EC, the categories of good reputation and positive experiences correlate strongly with
the fact that partners are important for getting along with workers, suppliers and public
officials. EC still seems to be important for HK firms to “get things done in the PRD”.
Expertise of partners is only important at the second stage. Apparently, HK firms are
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responsible for the entire production process, whereas Chinese partners deal with sur-
rounding parties (workers, suppliers, public officials). However, this stands in contrast
to NEC. Expertise of partners is of the greatest importance. Looking at the correla-
tion matrix, one can see that expertise is, in fact, negatively correlated with partners
getting along well with workers, suppliers and public officials. It is noticeable that the
quality measurements (more formal) correlate significantly with personal relationships
(most informal measurements). Although modes of quality are very important, they
are combined with the most informal modes in NEC. NEC seems to be a partnership
relying on high quality productions, but it does not neglect a certain level of personal
assets. Apparently, a successful partnership in NEC is characterised by expertise and a
good reputation of producers in combination with mutual understanding. In contrast,
EC follows another strategy. It is mainly applied to running the business on a functional
level. This was the way in which HK firms were forced to work at the beginning of the
Chinese opening policy. The way EC is seen by HK firms does not seem to have changed
over recent years.
In this section, it could be proven firstly that HK firms still use informal modes to
recruit and select partners, even though the institutional environment would allow a
reliance on formal modes alone. This confirms again that a certain degree of infor-
malisation smooths business relations. Secondly, it could be shown that firms tend to
combine formal and informal modes in order to succeed. Formal and informal modes
are not mutually exclusive, but rather complement each other. Thirdly, it has been es-
tablished that PRD firms still rely more frequently on informal modes, or at least assess
their importance as being greater. This is certainly due to the fact that the PRD is
still in transition and formal interaction modes do not find their basic analogy in law
and enforcement. Millington et al. (2006) also worked on the identification process of
Chinese partners. Their findings also show that personal connections, and in particular
guanxi, have helped UK- and US-invested manufacturers in China to select producers.
They also observed, however, that guanxi nowadays consists of business rather than
family and community connections.
Once firms have contacted and selected their potential customers and producers, they
have to settle transaction-specific details. The next section provides evidence of how
contractual arrangements are concluded.
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6.3 Contractual Arrangements of Hong Kong firms
This section relates back to the theoretical discussion in Section 2.5.2, in which it was
outlined how contractual arrangements can be characterised in a dynamic (framework
agreement and renegotiation) and a static model (direct contracting). The distribution of
firms within the different contractual models will be shown, thereby examining informal
and formal modes of contracting. Two dimensions of informality are analysed: the form
of agreements (written → verbal) and precision (precise → open-ended). The more
open-ended an agreement is and the more details are agreed on verbally, the greater
the informal character of a contractual arrangement is (see Table 2.1). The dynamic
model will be compared to the static model. A distinction here has been made between
the different governance modes. To gauge the precision of contracts, the points covered
will be analysed. Furthermore, it will be examined how details are fixed (written or
verbally). Finally, it will be established whether the dynamic model reduces the time of
negotiation in general, and whether informal agreements have a particular effect.
This section concentrates exclusively on the analysis of the HK survey, as the complete
analysis requires data which were not collected in the PRD survey. Even then, the
number of cases considered in this section is limited. Some information was not provided
by all firms and some cases seemed to be illogical. Therefore, the sample size was reduced.
The four governance modes considered in Section 3.2.2 can be characterised and dis-
tinguished further according to the contractual arrangements. Table 3.1 provides an
overview of how hierarchies, EC and markets can use FAs to switch from a static to a
dynamic model. FAs are concluded in advance. They fully or partly cover contractual
details such as product specification, quantity and price, delivery time of products, ex-
clusive production and conflict resolution. As production is especially time-sensitive in
highly competitive markets, it is expected that FAs speed up the negotiation process
when an actual order is placed, because certain details are already fixed in advance. The
time from the placement of orders until the actual production starts should be kept as
short as possible.
Section 3.2.2 outlined in detail how the contractual models are linked to the governance
modes. When market participants conclude a FA, they no longer act with an anonymous
partner on pure markets. If they agree to cooperate, market relationships change to
NEC. Moreover, firms working in hierarchies or EC can have additional FA. It is assumed
that firms sometimes have more than one affiliate or JV for production. Affiliates or JV
might work quite independently from the parent company. Parent companies might take
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Table 6.6: Negotiation time of HK firms according to governance modes
Customers Producer
Days of negotiation Days of negotiation
FA n % Mean 95% C. I.a n % Mean 95% C. I.a
Tight
Hierarchy
− 2 3 − − 22 30 2 [1,3]
Loose
Hierarchy
+ 0 0 − − 12 16 2 [1,3]
Tight Equity
Cooperation
− 1 1 − − 4 5 4 [3,10]
Loose Equity
Cooperation
+ 0 0 − − 10 14 7 [0,14]
Non-Equity
Cooperation
+ 27 36 7 [3,10] 16 22 4 [2,7]
Pure Market − 46 61 13 [7,18] 10 14 7 [2,13]
In total 76 100 74 100
aConfidence Interval
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
advantage from FA, allocating which jobs the different plants have to fulfil. Although
this organisational structure is still characterised by hierarchies/EC, it is not as tightly
organised and controlled, but is characterised by a loose form.
Table 6.6 shows the different governance modes divided into loose and tight forms, and
indicates whether they work with (+) or without (–) FA. Additionally, it is shown how
many of the HK firms surveyed apply the different modes to organise their relationship
to their most important customer and producer. Looking at the responses of HK firms
regarding their customer relationships, most of them opted for a NEC and a market
relationship (36% and 61% respectively). The figures of producer relationships are more
diverse. 30% of the HK firms work in tight hierarchies and another 16% work in loose
hierarchies. Turning to EC, only 5% of the HK firms opted for a tight EC, whereas 14%
work in loose EC concluding FAs in advance. This already shows how important it is to
distinguish between firms working with and without FAs. 14% of the HK firms work in
pure market relationships with their producers and another 22% have switched to NEC
using FAs.
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Furthermore, it has been assessed whether a FA with customers affects the time of
negotiation when the actual order is placed. It is assumed that the dynamic contracting
model provides advantages in negotation time compared to the static model. Negotiation
time was measured in days. The mean value as well as the 95% confidence interval is
given. When looking at customer relations, HK firms gain advantages from transforming
a pure market relationship to a NEC. Instead of negotiating for 13 days before a final
order is placed with the HK firms and the production process can start, it takes only 7
days in NEC. The exchange of expectations and the conclusion of a FA nearly halve the
time of negotiation and speed up the production process in general. Unfortunately, the
effect of FA in customer relations cannot be assessed in EC and hierarchies due to the
low number of cases. NEC reduces a firm’s negotiation time and therefore increases its
quantitative flexibility in contract conclusion.
The effect of FAs on producer relations has also been analysed. In general, negotiation
time increases when moving from hierarchies to markets. Comparing the effect of FAs
within the different governance modes provides interesting insights. Passing on orders
within hierarchies only takes 2 days. FAs have no effect on the time of negotiation. In
EC, the result is the opposite of what was expected. In tight EC, the negotiation time is
reduced to 4 days, while it takes 7 days when FAs are concluded. This might be due to
the fact that in tight EC, one partner can govern and control the other partner’s work
without any agreement. Similiarities to hierarchical organisations are obvious. This
unequal relationship reduces the time of negotiation in tight EC. Chinese-HK JVs that
developed after the Chinese opening are characteristic for this group. Loose EC can be
seen in relationships of HK firms with a set of equally stated Chinese JV partners. In
that case, negotiation is more time-consuming. In contrast, when comparing NEC and
markets, FAs in NEC almost halve the time of negotiation, from 7 to 4 days.
For both customer and producer relations, FAs positively affect market relationships,
because a transformation to NEC halves the time required by HK firms in negotiation
processes. What could not be proven is a positive effect of FAs on the negotiation time
in hierarchies and EC. If any equity relationship exits, a tight control reduces the time of
negotiation or maintains it at the same level. What must also be noted is the ratio of the
negotiation time among the different governance modes. NEC enhances negotation time
by 2 days in comparison to hierarchies. When considering the high costs of hierarchies,
NEC seems to be a good alternative for future business.
The last paragraph revealed the relevance of the dynamic contracting model for firms
in HK. Half of the relations to customers and producers are organised within FAs. This
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paragraph analyses the formality and informality of FAs. For customer and producer
relations, it has been outlined which points are agreed in FAs (Precision of FA) and in
which form (written, verbal or both) it has been done. Points which require attention
when contracts are concluded are: product specification, quantity, price, delivery time,
agreement on exclusivity, penalties for breach of contract. This derives from interviews
with lawyers in the GPRD. If everything is precisely fixed, a formal contract has been
concluded. If the points mentioned above are missing, then contracts are open-ended
and therefore informal. The share of HK firms which have fixed all points in the FA are
given in Table 6.7. If points are fixed in FAs, this could be in written, verbal or both
forms. The share of HK firms using the specific forms is given. Using verbal FA refers
to an informal agreement, while using a written form refers to a formal agreement.
When looking at customer and producer relations, the majority of HK firms fix im-
portant points in written form. In customer relations, an average of 51% of HK firms
fixed all points in writing, while in producer relations, 46% of firms did so. Comparing
customer and producer relations, it becomes clear that the number of written details in
FAs is slightly higher with customers than with producers. A verbal agreement is only
concluded by a very small number of firms (customers: 7%, producers: 5%). In producer
relations, the combination of written and verbal agreements is preferred by about one
quarter of the firms, while in customer relations the number drops to 21%. A sum-
mary of the share of firms which fix necessary details in one of the three forms (written,
verbal, both) provides information about the precision of FAs. 79% of HK firms agree
on the important points in customer relations before an order is placed. In producer
relations, 76% of firms do so. Returning to the form of agreements as a dimension of
informality, the share of firms having informal agreements is relatively low. Contracts
tend to be written. However, the share of informal agreements with PRD producers
is slightly higher than with international customers. When looking at the precision as
the second dimension of informality studied in this section, the findings show that more
than three quarters of the necessary details are fixed in one of the three forms. Only
a small proportion of firms have imprecise and therefore informal contracts. HK firms
mainly keep to formal modes in terms of form and precision of FAs, although there is
a slight trend towards more informal agreements with PRD producers. HK firms apply
informal modes when contacting and selecting customers and producers, but when it
comes to contractual arrangements, HK firms mainly do not rely on trust and a hand
shake, but prefer written agreements. When disputes occur, a written document is of
more value than a person’s word. What could not be proven in the quantitative data,
but has been derived from the interviews, is that contracts are mainly written, although
quality is not comparable with Western standards.
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“There are differences in the quality of contracts between China and the interna-
tional environment. In the PRD, personal relationships are of great importance.
Family ties and long-term business relationships are reasons for non-dedicated
contracts. We have often experienced that Chinese firms have only rudimentary
contracts, even for large projects.”
“It is not the mentality of Chinese people or society to have contracts. It really
is a new thing. They are not really used to foreseeing problems. We always want
to make sure that all the grey zones are removed. . . . But the Chinese face these
problems when they arise. They are changing, but it still takes time.”
Often, a one page contract is concluded covering the main points, but it is not proofed
by lawyers. Those contracts are very difficult to enforce by law in the case of disputes.
For a better understanding, one has to keep in mind that points are fixed in a written
form, but those written contracts are not comparable to what Westerners intuitively
associate with written contracts.
“Chinese firms only have a one page contract with each other, even if it is a big
deal.”
“There can be a beautiful contract, but if it cannot be enforced, that work is
worth nothing.”
An important contribution of this work is to study the correlation of informality and
flexibility. Firstly, it is of great interest to know whether firms can reduce the number
of points they need to negotiate when orders are placed due to the conclusion of FAs in
advance. Secondly, it must be investigated whether informal FAs are perhaps even of
greater advantage than formal FAs with respect to the time of negotiation.
Taking the first point into account, firms with FAs were asked to provide information
as to which points they renegotiate. It is expected that firms using the static contracting
model without FAs must agree to all important points when orders are placed. In con-
trast, HK firms which have FA with customers indicated negotiating fewer points. 52%
of the HK firms do not renegotiate product specifications. For quantity (41%) and price
(48%) of products, almost half of the firms have no need for renegotiation. Delivery
time is sensitive. Only 22% of firms can forecast delivery time and do not need any
renegotiation. 19% of all firms indicated that they can start production immediately
when orders are placed without any renegotiation process. The χ2-test proved that FAs
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significantly reduce the number of points for renegotiation. Turning to producer rela-
tions, the share of HK firms which have to renegotiate details is higher than in customer
relations. Only one third of firms do not consider renegotiating (product specification:
34%, quantity: 24%, price: 34%, delivery time: 18%). The share of HK firms without
any renegotiation drops to 13%. Again the χ2-test showed that FAs reduce the number
of points for renegotiation significantly. Producer relations require more attention in
renegotiation processes, because (1) FAs are less precise than in customer relations (see
Table 6.7) and (2) although points are fixed, the standard quality of contracts is lower
than in the Western business world. In contrast, contracts with international customers
are mainly characterised by higher quality, meaning that points do not require further
negotiation. It is expected that an increasing number of negotiation points is correlated
with an extended negotiation process, which delays the production process. But overall,
it could be proven that FAs reduce the points which need to be negotiated when orders
are placed in customer and producer relations. This increases the flexibility of firms,
because the negotiation process is expected to speed up accordingly.
It has been shown that FAs can reduce the number of negotiation points when orders
are placed. This enables firms to respond to customers more quickly. In order to prove
the correlation of informality and flexibility, evidence must be found of informal FAs
leaving more leeway for firms to arrange the actual order, saving them extra time and
reducing transaction costs. Informality in FAs was measured according to the number of
details in contracts (product description, price, product volume, delivery time, exclusive
production, conflict resolution) which are agreed on verbally rather than being fixed in
written form. All details are taken to be equally important. A FA is defined as informal
if most details are fixed verbally. It is assumed to be formal when most details are fixed
in writing. Flexibility in contractual arrangements was measured according to the time
in days required by firms to negotiate details before the production process can start.
Table 6.8 shows what effect informal FAs have on the time of negotiation in contrast
to formal FAs, distinguishing between customers and producers. HK firms which have
informal FAs with their producers indicated a shorter negotiation time on average than
firms with formal FAs (3 days instead of 5 days). In this case, informal FAs seem to
allow more leeway for final negotiation, which reduces negotiation time before produc-
tion can start. In a rapidly changing business environment, the costs of drawing up
a comprehensive contract are extremely high. It could be proven in Chapter 4 that
PRD firms in particular, as component suppliers of HK firms, suffer from permanently
changing market conditions and poor forecasting systems, which increases their need for
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Table 6.8: Effects of formal and informal framework agreements on the negotiation time
Customers Producers
n Time of negotiation n Time of negotiation
Formal framework agreement 18 7 days 23 5 days
Informal framework agreement 9 6 days 15 3 days
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
flexibility. As the enforcing of contracts is difficult in the PRD due to the poor legal
safeguards, HK firms tend to have either verbal contracts or poorly written contracts.
Neither are up to legal standards. Two thirds of the firms revisited the FAs when orders
were placed. However, this does not seem to negatively affect the negotiation time. In-
formal FAs even enable firms to agree more quickly on final contractual details. When
producers are located within the PRD, informality in contractual arrangements works
well in combination with spatial proximity and guanxi, as information can be verbally
agreed on and revised. This speeds up the process of negotiation. The results were
not significant, which is due to the small sample size. The correlation between informal
agreements and quantitative flexibility in producer relations could be proven. When
the need for flexibility is great because predictability of demand changes is low, infor-
mal agreements provide more leeway for negotiation and speed up the process. Lyons
(1994) investigated firms in France and found that contracts between firms usually tend
to be informalised when they work in rapidly changing business environments, because
the costs of drawing up a comprehensive contract are too high.
Informal agreements with customers reduce the time required for negotiation when
an actual order is placed from 7 days to 6 days. Within customer and producer rela-
tions, informal FAs reduce the negotiation time. But it seems to be more difficult to
agree upon actual orders when the FA is informally organised in long-distance customer
relationships, because the absolute negotiation time is longer. The effect of FAs is less
strong than in producer relations. As forecasting systems of HK firms are better and the
need for flexibility is lower, informal agreements are of advantage, but formal agreements
can hold their own in terms of speed. As HK firms and international customers work in
a complete institutional environment, transaction costs for concluding written contracts
are lower. Additionally, this seems to be of advantage for the enforcement of contracts,
as the legal system provides firms with sufficient enforcement mechanisms. Keeping
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in mind those results, the next section analyses the informal and formal enforcement
mechanisms of contracts in customer and producer relations.
In this section the contractual arrangements between HK firms and their customers
and producers are examined. It could be shown that FAs provide an opportunity to
cover important points of negotiation in advance in order to save time when the order
is placed, allowing the production process to start without delay. FAs can be applied
in combination with each governance mode. Comparing the negotiation time of firms
with and without FAs, it could be shown that firms in market relationships in particular
benefit from FAs. If pure market relationships turn into NEC while concluding a FA,
the negotiation time nearly halves. The effect of FAs in EC and hierarchies could
not be proven as positive. Moreover, it has been shown that most of the FAs reach
a formal stage, because they are concluded in written form and cover all necessary
details. In customer relations, FAs are even more formal than in producer relations.
Nevertheless, it could be proven for customers and producers of HK firms that informal
FAs leave more leeway for negotiation and reduce the negotiation time compared to
formal FAs. Informality in contractual arrangements enhances a firm’s quantitative
flexibility in terms of negotiation time. Although firms in the GPRD select partners
carefully and try to optimise contractual arrangements, disputes can still occur and
require the enforcement of contracts.
6.4 Enforcement Mechanisms of Contracts in the GPRD
Although firms apply ex-ante safeguards to ensure the reliability of partners, disputes
can still occur. Ex-post enforcement mechanisms are needed. Section 2.5.3 outlines
the different ex-post enforcement mechanisms. Two dimensions of informality (see Ta-
ble 2.1) are thereby touched upon: enforcement (tight → loose) and power (legal →
social). Dispute resolution and contract enforcement can be very formally organised
when firms opt for litigation. This implies legal power and a tight enforcement (close to
the contract). However, firms can also decide on alternative dispute settlement. They
might negotiate, mediate or arbitrate. Negotiation is the most informal mode of re-
solving disputes. It is driven by social power and may only loosely keep to the actual
contract, but considers the situation as a whole. When negotiation does not lead to any
satisfying result, firms can opt for mediation. Mediation is more formal than negotia-
tion, but still provides more informal elements than arbitration. Arbitration can follow
mediation or negotiation when no solution is reached. Arbitration is a direct alternative
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to litigation, but it is more confidential and ensures privacy. Its character tends to be
less formal than litigation. In this section, it will firstly be outlined which means of
dispute resolution are applied by HK and PRD firms, and secondly an attempt will be
made to find determinants for the choice of different means.
It has been assumed that every dispute resolution process starts with negotiation, but
of most interest is whether firms continue to apply formal enforcement mechanisms if
negotiation fails. Therefore, data were collected about the variety of techniques applied
by HK and PRD firms (see Table 6.9). Firms in HK and the PRD were asked which
actions they had taken to settle a dispute within the last five years. 45% of the firms sur-
veyed in HK indicated that they have only used negotiation to settle disputes. 11% have
used negotiations followed by mediation and 44% reported also considering arbitration
and litigation for dispute resolution. Nearly half of the firms in HK rely exclusively on
informal dispute resolution processes. In contrast, firms surveyed in the PRD negotiate
more often with their producers alone (62%). Another 27% move on to mediation when
disputes occur. This share is higher than in HK, because in China, mediation is a com-
mon strategy used by courts. Mediation can be mandatory before a litigation process
is able to start at all. Additionally, China has a long and rich philosophical history of
mediation. The culture backed by confucianism holds that the best way to maintain
harmony is to resolve a dispute through moral persuasion and agreement. A peaceful
and respectful compromise should be reached. This also explains why only a few firms
opt for arbitration and litigation (11%).
Returning to the contractual arrangements, it was established that contracts exist in a
written form, but interviews with experts showed that this written form does not satisfy
the legal requirements. Arbitration and litigation can only succeed when contracts are
adapted to a legal form and enforcement of contracts is ensured by law. When contracts
do not fulfil the legal requirements, they have no chance of being enforced by law. But
if law and enforcement standards do not guarantee a fair judgment, firms do not invest
transaction costs in adapting contracts to a legal form (chicken and egg problem).
Taking litigation processes into account, China is lacking laws adapted to the interna-
tional standard and qualified education for judges to enforce them. For example in the
past, military officers took positions as judges. Although the central government has
improved legal standards and the education of judges, some firms fear not receiving a
fair judgment in China. Transparency is lacking.
If contracts are properly formalised, firms in China also consider arbitration as an
alternative. But arbitration in China also involves difficulties in application. In China
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Table 6.9: Enforcement mechanisms of contracts in HK and the PRD
PRD surveya HK survey
n = 218 n = 100
Negotiation only 62% 45%
Negotiation and mediation 27% 11%
Negotiation, mediation, arbitration and litigation 11% 44%
Total 100% 100%
aχ2 = 113.0, p = 0.000∗∗∗
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
there is a distinction between international and domestic arbitration. International ar-
bitration is only allowed to be handled by the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) or by the China Maritime Arbitration Commis-
sion (CMAC). Foreign arbitrators are not allowed. As more international firms enter
China, the arbitration commissions’ workload has increased enormously. This is the
first reason why arbitration is less attractive for firms (Chang and Hilmer 2006). Ad-
ditionally, Chinese arbitration law is lacking in quality. Chang and Hilmer (2006)
cited that “. . . there have been many uncertainties about the Arbitration Law and this
is why China’s People’s Supreme Court addressed a number of judicial interpretations
over the last years in an attempt . . . to fill the gaps of the legislation”. For the inter-
national harmonisation and unification of the law of international trade, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (n. d.) has
been established. The UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules deal with procedural guidelines
for parties in a commercial relationship which agree to accept arbitration. The Chinese
Arbitration Law 1994 and the UNCITRAL Model Law have a number of differences,
which is the second reason why arbitration in China is not very popular, as it does not
meet international standards. Chang and Hilmer (2006) call for an urgently needed
improvement and reform of the Arbitration Law 1994, as China’s economy is growing
and is becoming more international, leading to many international disputes that need
to be settled through a rapid and efficient arbitration procedure. They suggest allowing
foreign lawyers to practice law in China and revising the pricing policy. The Chinese gov-
ernment regulates arbitrators’ fees, which do not comply with international standards.
This gives rise to concern about the quality of arbitrators.
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Although improvements have been seen in recent years, firms have not switched im-
mediately to formal modes of dispute resolution. As Williamson (2000:597) outlined,
there is only a slow and gradual change from the use of informal to formal means (see
Figure 2.5). A change in a firm’s behaviour takes time. Firms prefer to resolve con-
flicts informally among themselves. Even if the institutional environment continues to
improve, it will take some time before Chinese firms can take advantage of the new tech-
niques. Moreover, according to the Worldbank (n. d.)’s indicators “Doing Business”,
the enforcement of contracts through legal action takes 406 days (2008) without any
change in the last 4 years, whereas it takes only 211 days in HK. It is expected that
firms can greatly reduce this time using more informal means of dispute resolution.
A frequently used alternative to arbitration in China is mediation. Because arbitration
and litigation need to be more institutionalised in China, firms in the PRD indicated
mainly using negotiation and mediation techniques to settle disputes.
In contrast, HK firms firstly work under a complete set of laws protecting their trading
and manufacturing activities accompanied by a functional court system and qualified
judges, and secondly they enjoy a world class arbitration law and system, which gives
them leeway to decide on the most appropriate alternative for settling disputes. HK
has an excellent Arbitration Commission Centre, which not only has highly educated
arbitrators, but also promotes arbitration among the firms. The applied arbitration rules
of the centre are attractive for firms. Moreover, the HK government has established an
Arbitration Law adapted to the UNCITRAL Model Law. Additionally, mediation is a
hot topic of discussion in HK right now (Hilmer 2007). The HK government wants firms
to have the opportunity to mediate effectively, rather than going directly to arbitration.
For this reason, HK has established a mediation centre. The use of mediation is a more
cost-effective means of resolving disputes. HK hopes to establish itself as a hub for legal
services. Two HK universities offer a masters degree programme in Arbitration and
Dispute Resolution. As HK is a hub for international trade, dispute resolution must
be fair, quick and cost-effective. Today, companies and enterprises doing business in
mainland China and other Asian jurisdictions increasingly use HK as an arbitration and
mediation hub (Sandborg 2007). Providing firms with a set of alternative means for
dispute resolution accompanied by the appropriate infrastructure increases their variety
of choice and therefore their flexibility. The HK data show that a good legal system
encourages more firms to find the appropriate dispute resolution process. Although HK
firms can use courts, most firms still prefer negotiation as an informal mode of solving
disputes, because in many cases, this is more appropriate. Negotiation is time- and cost-
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saving in comparison to litigation. Negotiation relies on the will to reach an agreement
confidentially. This increases the probability of abiding by the terms of the agreement
later on, even if it is not legally binding. But if negotiation fails, at least half of the firms
surveyed in HK move on and use the entire spectrum of dispute resolution mechanisms
to solve disputes. They tend to use formal and informal modes of dispute resolution
at the same time. This makes them flexible while providing the chance to choose the
appropriate mode of resolving disputes.
The distribution of firms in HK over the three categories is significantly different
from the distribution of firms in the PRD (χ2 = 113.0, p = 0.000∗∗∗). PRD firms
rely significantly more often on informal enforcement mechanisms alone. Unfortunately,
there are no separate data available for a distinction of dispute resolution means between
customers and producers. But it is expected that the means of dispute resolution used
with international partners are more formally organised than those used with Chinese
partners. However, this cannot be empirically proven.
The argumentation above has shown that institutions provided by the government
play a crucial role in explaining the significantly different results in HK and the PRD.
In Table 6.10, it is additionally tested what structural firm characteristics correlate with
the use of enforcement techniques used by HK and PRD firms. As some variables could
only be measured on a nominal scale (for example HK connection), the contingence
coefficient Cramer’s V was chosen to measure the strength of association. Values range
from 0 (no association) to 1 (the theoretical maximum possible association). The three
different enforcement categories with increasing degrees of formalisation are set as de-
pendent variables (negotiation only; negotiation and mediation; negotiation, mediation,
arbitration and litigation). The variables tested are given in the far left column (firm
size: employees, sales, foundation year, ownership, innovativeness, position in the value
chain and HK connection). They can be interpreted as the variables used in the logit
models in Section 5.2. Cramer’s V value and a short interpretation is also provided.
It is immediately obvious that the correlation between enforcement mechanisms and
structural characteristics of firms is low in the PRD. Only firm size in terms of sales
is significant. The more sales a firm generates (the larger the firm), the more often
firms use the variety of dispute resolution processes available. This confirms that the
lack of institutionalised means of dispute resolution seems to have a stronger influence
on the choice of alternatives than structural firm characteristics. If the appropriate
infrastructure is missing, innovativeness, firm size, ownership or age do not influence the
decision on enforcement techniques.
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Table 6.10: Enforcement mechanisms and its correlation with structural firm charac-
teristics
PRD survey n = 218 HK survey n = 100
Enforcement
mechanisms X
Cramer’s V . . . the more
formal
Cramer’s V . . . the more
formal
Firm size:
employees
0.12 no correlation 0.24 the larger . . .
Firm size: sales 0.21∗∗ the larger. . . 0.27 the larger . . .
Foundation year 0.17 no correlation 0.21 the younger . . .
Ownership 0.07 no correlation 0.27∗∗ the higher
foreign shares . . .
Innovativeness 0.07 no correlation 0.21 the more
innovative . . .
Position in VC 0.11 no correlation . . . 0.23 the higher the
position in the
VC . . .
HK connection 0.04 no correlation — —
Note: Dependent Variable: Enforcement Mechanisms (1 = Negotiation only, 2 = Nego-
tiation and Mediation, 3 = Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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In contrast, in HK structural characteristics seem to be important for the decision on
enforcement mechanisms. The ownership structure has a significant influence (Cramer’s
V = 0.27). The higher the share held by foreigners, the more frequently firms use the
entire spectrum of enforcement mechanisms. Although the other influences are not sig-
nificant, their contingence coefficient is higher absolutely (> 0.20) than for PRD firms.
A tendency can be identified. The higher the number of employees and the higher the
number of sales, the more often firms prefer formal dispute resolution techniques. More-
over, younger, more innovative firms with a higher position in the value chain tend to use
more formal means of settling disputes. As HK’s institutional and infrastructural envi-
ronment encourages the appropriate dispute resolution techniques, HK firms can freely
choose between alternatives. Therefore, firm characteristics have a greater influence on
the decision than in mainland China, where the institutional environment turns out to
be a restrictive force.
To conclude, HK firms tend to tap the full potential of dispute resolution techniques.
This is supported by the HK government, which is aiming for HK to become a hub for
legal services. They provide the appropriate infrastructure. HK firms combine informal
and formal means of dispute resolution to reach the maximum possible output. They
first apply informal methods such as negotiation, and if this fails, mediation comes into
play. They do not hesitate to go for arbitration and litigation as well. However, the
data also showed that almost half of the firms indicated that negotiation was a sufficient
means of settling disputes. Informal enforcement mechanisms seem to be a popular
choice for settling disputes. In China, however, informal means of dispute resolution
are also frequently used, but more out of necessity than choice, since formal means such
as arbitration and litigation are difficult to realise. In China, the lack of international
standards in arbitration and litigation processes seem to be the restrictive reason for
the decision about enforcement mechanisms. Firm characteristics do not function very
well as determinants. Johnson et al. (1999) studied contract enforcement in transitional
economies: Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. They also found that infor-
mal contractual methods, such as relational contracting, serve as substitutes for formal
mechanisms at the beginning of the transformation process. But they could also show
that an increasing functionality of courts encourages more firms to consider litigation.
On the other hand, they argue that informal enforcement will retain its importance
for certain issues. They argue that more advanced technology, specific investments and
more goods with subtle quality characteristics make it difficult or impossible for courts
to verify that the contract has been breached. This fits with the findings of HK firms’
behaviour.
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6.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings in Section 6
In this chapter, informality and flexibility in customer producer relations of electronics
firms in the GPRD was studied from three perspectives. Firstly, the governance modes
and their flexibility were analysed. Secondly, contact channels and selection criteria for
customers and producers were analysed. Thirdly, contractual arrangements needing to
be settled following the selection process were examined. Additionally, it was mentioned
that even if customers and producers are carefully selected and contracts are concluded,
disputes can still occur. Informal and formal means of enforcing contracts were analysed.
Informality has been studied within its five dimensions outlined in the theoretical part
of this work. While analysing formal and informal means, its effect on flexibility was
measured. Moreover, a comparison was made between firms localised in HK and those
in the PRD to see whether they informalise business practices on different levels.
Flexibility in governance modes was measured in a quantitative and qualitative way.
The time of negotiation was an indicator of the quantitative flexibility. The negotiation
time increased when moving from hierarchies to markets. Qualitative flexibility was
measured by the different options firms consider when order volume suddenly changes.
The survey revealed that firms in cooperation and market relationships are provided with
more qualitative flexibility to react, whereas firms in hierarchies enjoy more quantitative
flexibility. This explains where the competitive edge for each governance mode lies.
What could not be proven is that cooperative, more informal modes provide the greatest
flexibility. One can still argue over which form of flexibility is or will become more
important, but this is not the subject of this work. Cooperation as a medium mode
certainly provides for both directions of development.
The analysis of contacting channels (corresponding to the conceptual discussion in
Section 2.5.1) of HK firms proved that HK firms use informal modes to recruit cus-
tomers, even though the institutional environment gives leeway to rely on formal modes
alone. Furthermore, the data show that HK firms succeed while combining formal and
informal modes. The two extremes are not mutually exclusive, but rather complement
each other. Informal modes seem to smooth business relations even in a complete insti-
tutional environment. This is in line with the theoretically derived discussion of Zenger
et al. (2002) in Section 2.3.5. Comparing HK and PRD firms, the data show that PRD
firms still rely more frequently on informal modes during contact and selection pro-
cesses. China is still in transition, therefore formal interactions sometimes do not find
their basic analogy in the law. Even though the Chinese government has improved the
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quality of formal channels, firms need time to adapt. They react with a time delay to
the introduction of formal means, which has been suggested by Williamson (2000).
Looking at these results, Hypothesis D1—firms in HK apply informal modes to recruit
and select producers and customers, but to a lesser extent than firms in the PRD—
cannot be rejected. Moreover, Hypothesis D2—the combination of informal and formal
practices for recruitment enables firms to be flexible—also cannot be rejected. A variety
of choices ensures finding the most appropriate channel to recruit and select partners.
The connection between flexibility and business success could not be proven because of
a lack of valid data, but should be the topic of further research.
As soon as customers and producers are selected, contracts come into play (corre-
sponding to the conceptual discussion in Section 2.5.2). It was analysed (1) what share
of firms rely on the dynamic and static contracting model, (2) whether the dynamic
contracting model reduces time of negotiation and (3) whether informal agreements in
particular accelerate the process. The survey showed that half of the firms in HK and
the PRD use the dynamic contracting model. The theoretical discussion of Masten
(2000) and Hart and Moore (1999) about the profitability of incomplete contracts
and their renegotiability could be proven as true for the GPRD. The data show that
the effect of FAs on the negotiation time in dynamic models depends on the gover-
nance modes. When market relationships turn into NEC, the negotiation time nearly
halves. In EC and hierarchies, no positive effect could be proven. Therefore, Hypoth-
esis D4—firms using the dynamic contracting model are more flexible than firms using
the static model—can be confirmed for market relations, but must be rejected for EC
and hierarchies.
The informality of FAs in terms of precision and form was also studied. HK firms
tend to completely cover the necessary details in FAs, mainly in written form. However,
Hypothesis D3—firms in the GPRD rely on informal contracting modes, but HK firms’
contracts with PRD firms are likely to be more informal than contracts with firms in
the Western world—must be partly rejected. Contracts are mainly concluded formally.
Although written contracts are adapted to the Western standard, it has been found that
firms in China do not rely on a person’s word or a handshake anymore. A comparison
between customers and producers showed that FAs with producers in the PRD are
slightly more informally organised than FAs with international customers. Moreover,
it could be proven that firms with informal FAs have a reduced negotiation time in
comparison to firms with formal FAs. Hypothesis D5—informal contracts enhance the
flexibility of firms—can be confirmed: informal contracts lead to a greater quantitative
flexibility.
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When enforcement of contracts is needed (corresponding to the conceptual discus-
sion in Section 2.5.3), HK firms use the entire spectrum of techniques from informal
to formal. Any dispute is likely to be settled by negotiation first. In case of failure,
mediation, arbitration and litigation follow. Although about half of HK firms only need
to negotiate to settle disputes, they do not hesitate to use legal action as well. The insti-
tutional environment supports HK firms’ choice to go for the most appropriate dispute
resolution technique. In contrast, PRD firms cannot flexibly choose their means of dis-
pute resolution, because national institutions for arbitration and litigation are lacking
in quality. Instead, they rely mainly on negotiation. Therefore, Hypothesis D6—HK
firms use the entire spectrum of formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, whereas
PRD firms mainly rely on informal techniques—cannot be rejected. Differences in en-
forcement mechanisms between HK and PRD firms are significant. Determinants of the
use of enforcement mechanisms in the PRD can mainly be reduced to the institutional
environment. However, in HK it could be found that larger, younger firms with more
foreign shares and better technological skills are more likely to use formal enforcement
mechanisms. Hypothesis D7—firm characteristics determine the choice of enforcement
mechanisms—must be partly rejected. Firm characteristics are only important for HK,
and not for PRD firms.
In more general terms, it could be proven that although China is a transitional econ-
omy which is continually improving its institutional environment, it firstly has not yet
reached the level of HK institutions, and secondly, even if it has reached an interna-
tional level in some areas, firms have not immediately changed their traditional business
practices. According to Williamson (2000), firms adapt gradually to the new system.
Hypothesis B2—PRD firms use informal practices more intensively than HK firms—can
be confirmed in terms of recruitment and enforcement mechanisms. Contracts in the
PRD could not be analysed according to their informality, but it could be shown that
HK firms have slightly more informal contracts with producers in the PRD than with
international customers.
Hypothesis B3—although HK firms work within a complete institutional environment,
they still rely on informal practices—can be confirmed. In terms of recruitment of
customers and enforcement mechanisms, this hypothesis could be proven. Regarding
contracts, HK firms mainly prefer formal contracts fixing the important points. But it
was derived from the interviews that formal standards in HK are not in line with those in
the Western world. A formal contract to China-based producers leaves more leeway for
renegotiation. Hypothesis B4—informal practices in customer producer relations lead
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to greater firm flexibility—can be definitively confirmed for contracts, because informal
contracts reduce negotiation time (quantitative flexibility). In recruitment processes and
enforcement mechanisms, it could be proven that the use of informal means enhances
firms’ qualitative flexibility. HK firms in particular benefit from the ability to choose
between informal and formal means in order to find the most appropriate solution.
Although these findings suggest a direct connection between informality and flexibility,
the topic deserves more research in order to provide a holistic picture.
J How high is the degree of informality in customer producer relations of HK-based
and Chinese-based firms? Are there any differences in the behaviour of firms be-
tween the two locations? Does informal behaviour result in greater flexibility? In
answering these questions, the focus will be on:
• contact and selection procedures for customer and producers
• contractual arrangements
• enforcement mechanisms
HK firms still rely on informal practices to organise their business. However, informal
modes are of greater importance in producer relations with the PRD than in customer
relations of global scale. PRD firms indicated working even more informally. In contact
and selection processes, HK firms combine informal with formal modes. In HK, it could
be shown that guanxi has changed from a network of private relations to a network of
functional business relations. In the PRD, this development could also be observed, but
to a lesser extent. Private relationships are still of greater importance than in HK. In
contractual arrangements, the degree of informality is low. HK firms’ contracts mainly
cover the necessary details in written form, but contracts to PRD producers are slightly
more informal. In terms of enforcement mechanisms, negotiation as an informal mode
is still frequently used by HK and PRD firms. Negotiation in the PRD mainly functions
as a necessity due to an incomplete infrastructure supporting formal modes, whereas in
HK, negotiation is an option which can be the most appropriate for settling disputes.
In general, using the range from formal to informal practices increases firms’ options
to react and organise business, thereby increasing qualitative flexibility. Quantitative
flexibility resulting from informal interactions could only be proven for contracts in
terms of negotiation time. For recruitment and enforcement mechanisms, data about
quantitative flexibility were not collected. What could not be proven directly, due to
invalid data, is the relationship between flexibility and success. It could be proven that
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HK firms’ ability to predict market changes is low and that PRD firms’ ability is even
lower. Flexible reactions seem to be a way of enabling firms to deal with market pressure,
but it might not be directly related to or measurable in typical business success figures
such as sales or growth. But flexible reactions can already be interpreted as a variable
of business success itself under certain constraints.
For stronger empirical evidence of the relationship between informality and flexibility,
further research is needed which covers other business areas as well. In this work, the
focal point was to analyse the informalisation of business practices in customer and
producer relations and their effect on flexibility in HK and the PRD.
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7 Conclusion
The research objective of this work was to analyse how electronics firms in the GPRD
are integrated into global value chains in order to respond to the high degree of flexi-
bility required by leading global firms. Emphasis was placed on the firms’ selection of
governance modes to organise their customer and producer relations, and beyond that,
on how informal modes of interactions enhance the flexibility of firms in terms of the
contact and selection processes for customers and producers, as well as for the conclusion
and enforcement of contracts. Against this background, hypotheses were derived from
the conceptual Chapter 2 which were fundamental to answering the empirically guided
research questions. This last chapter will consist of an overall summary and discussion of
empirical findings (see Section 7.1). This provides the basis for policy recommendations
and an outline for further research possibilities (see Section 7.2) as demanded by the
policy-related research question K.
K What implications do the research results have for policy makers and firm managers
in the GPRD and what further research is needed in order to consolidate the new
business concept?
7.1 Summarising Empirical Findings
In the first empirical chapter, it could be proven that electronics firms in the GPRD
are integrated into modular global value chains. The position in the value chain can
differ between firms in HK and the PRD, although this is not always the case. Large
HK electronics firms usually take the position of a global contract manufacturer (CM),
which serves leading Western firms on an OEM or ODM basis. They organise the entire
production process for several leading firms, which allows them to profit from economies
of scale. For most SMEs in HK, one can say that they follow the chain and provide
CMs both in HK and abroad with components. HK, as a location with a complete
institutional setting and a history of trade, provides firms with perfect conditions for
doing international business. Two separate surveys of electronic firms were conducted in
208
HK and the PRD in order to follow the organisation of the value chain in the GPRD. The
survey of HK SMEs revealed that most manufacturing activities of HK firms take place
in the PRD. In order to follow the value chain, a survey of PRD firms was conducted.
Almost half of the PRD firms operated as producers for HK firms, while the other half
built up relations to international customers. The functionality of HK firms as a gateway
to the world market for PRD firms is declining. In any case, the PRD survey revealed
that producers of PRD firms are mainly located in the same city or other cities in the
PRD. The production process along the value chain in the GPRD is very much locally
concentrated. The segment of the electronics value chain in the GPRD starts with large
CMs in HK and continues with a network of firms located in the PRD. The spatial
distance between leading firms and CMs is large, but the producer network is locally
concentrated in the PRD. This spatial dimension has not yet been considered in the
value chain approach of Gereffi et al. (2005), but should be integrated. How these
relationships are organised is considered in the second empirical chapter.
The empirical analysis of the applied governance modes to customers and producers
within the value chain in the GPRD provided evidence of how those firms are connected.
Hierarchies, equity cooperation, non-equity cooperation and markets were distinguished.
Equity and non-equity cooperation is related to more informal modes of interaction be-
cause it involves trust, personal considerations and reliability. The majority of HK firms
preferred a hierarchical relationship to their producers in the PRD, but some firms also
opted for equity cooperation or non-equity cooperation. Taking a time dimension into
account, data provide evidence that an improving formal institutional environment in
the PRD has encouraged more HK firms to opt for cooperative relationships or even
market relationships with their PRD producers. The quality of PRD producers has also
improved. The “front shop, back factory” model has changed its face. This is because
front shop and back factory are no longer controlled by one firm, resulting in an increase
in cooperative relationships. A comparison of HK firms’ relations to customers and pro-
ducers revealed that the selection of governance modes (hierarchy → market) depends
heavily on the location of partners, which is strongly linked to a particular institutional
environment. Relationships to international customers in a complete institutional en-
vironment were mainly market-oriented, whereas relationships to producers were still
mostly organised in hierarchies, despite recent trends to the contrary. The theoretically
derived assumption that the institutional environment determines governance modes
could be proven empirically, although there may be arguments that other determinants,
such as general business practice, are also partly responsible for this decision. Besides
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the variable location, which can be decisive, as it is known before the governance mode
is selected, it could be shown that relationship-specific characteristics are significantly
associated with certain governance modes. The survey showed that firms with a higher
dependency on customers or producers and greater working experience were more likely
to be organised in hierarchies. For producer relations of HK firms, it could be empirically
proven that cooperative and more informal governance modes reduce the time required
for negotiation with partners. This increases the flexibility of firms, because the pro-
duction process is not delayed by extensive contractual negotiations. The organisation
within the electronics value chain differs according to the institutional environment. The
value chain concept does not take this point into account. Criticism of the value chain
concept has touched on this point before, but this study provides empirical evidence to
strengthen the call for the expansion of the value chain concept.
In the third empirical chapter, the discussion went beyond the governance modes and
the factors associated with them. The level of informality and flexibility in interaction
processes with customers and producers was analysed. Special emphasis was placed on
contact and selection processes for customers and producers, as well as on the conclusion
and enforcement of contracts. The five dimensions of informality served as an analyt-
ical framework. The surveys revealed that PRD firms rely more often than HK firms
on informal processes while contacting and selecting customers and producers, which
is a result of the inadequate support of formal processes by law. The difference in the
level of informality can be explained by PRD firms’ dependency on informal processes.
However, the strategy of HK firms is to use a variety of informal and formal methods
to recruit and select customers and producers. A complete institutional environment
does not necessarily lead to formal behaviour. Formal and informal processes are not
mutually exclusive for HK firms, but they are rather combined to enlarge the pool of
opportunities from which firms can choose. Turning to the contractual arrangements,
firms in HK and in the PRD mainly fix contracts very precisely in writing. Informal
contracts can hardly be found, although PRD firms tend to use more informal elements
than HK firms. Contract enforcement in the PRD is more difficult due to a lack of
legal safeguards. Therefore, PRD firms rely more frequently on informal mechanisms of
conflict resolution, such as negotiation and mediation, while HK firms do not hesitate
to use litigation as well. However, informal interactions, such as proximity, face-to-face
contacts, mutual help within networks and trust, are more important for PRD man-
agers when doing business. Although the formal institutional environment in China
has recently provided more efficient safeguards for contract conclusion and enforcement,
210
Chinese managers need time to adapt their managerial behaviour. Whereas formal insti-
tutions can change overnight, informal institutions only change gradually (Williamson
2000). This explains why firms in the PRD still rely on more informal institutions, even
if, in some cases, formal institutions have already been adapted to the international
standard. It can be expected that PRD firms will formalise their behaviour to a certain
extent, but not completely. Informal and formal interactions seem to work in combina-
tion rather than being mutually exclusive, which confirms the expectation of Zenger
et al. (2002). A certain degree of informality will probably be sustained, as could be
proven in the case of HK firms. Informal modes of interaction seem to enhance the
flexibility of firms, both in terms of speed and variety. Firms benefit from (1) using
business contacts to find a new producer or customer quickly, (2) concluding informal
contracts to increase speed to market and (3) negotiating rather than litigating, as it is
confidential and saves time. It can be concluded that a certain degree of informalisation
of behaviour serves the flexibility of firms well. As this is only a rough and preliminary
explorative study to test this hypothesis, further research is certainly needed to provide
more details of this interplay.
7.2 Need for Further Research and Implications for
Politicians and Managers
The aim of this work is not only to establish what effects informal modes of interaction in
customer and producer relations have on flexibility in the GPRD, but also to encourage
and invite further research on the topic of informality. This work investigates only a very
limited area of business activities in the GPRD, but the empirical evidence shows that
the idea of a new business model driven by informal interactions should be considered.
The following recommendations are answers to research question K, which asked what
further research is needed to consolidate the new business concept:
Further Research Required
Extension of network analysis: To provide a wider scope of the organisation of cus-
tomer and producer relations, research should be extended to the entire network
of customers and producers, not only to the most important partners. This would
help to differentiate customer and producer relations with different levels of infor-
mality and flexibility.
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Transferability to other business operations: The focus of this work was to analyse
the degree of informality in external firm organisation with customers and pro-
ducers. Other external relationships to government officials, innovation partners,
universities and business service providers have not been taken into account. Fur-
thermore, the implications of informality for internal firm organisation, for example
internal production organisation, administration, financing and innovation activi-
ties, has not been considered. For a holistic picture of a business model driven by
informality, other business activities must be studied and compared. As this idea
is part of a larger research project, two further studies are expected in the future.
The first will analyse the informal modes of interactions in innovation activities
(Wan-Hsin Liu, The Kiel Institute of the World Economy), while the second study
will consider the role of informality in general firm activities from a comparative
perspective (Daniel Schiller, Leibniz University of Hannover, Institute of Economic
and Cultural Geography).
Considering positive and negative effects of informality: A more intensive analysis
of informality in customer producer relations, but also in other business operations,
would be valuable in order to better assess the borderline between the positive
effects of informality on flexibility and the negative effects, which could lead to a
lock-in of firms.
Assessment of the importance of the variable informality for firm flexibility: This
work has focussed on the interplay between informality and flexibility. In the
introduction, it was mentioned that other influencing factors might exist which
also contribute to the flexibility of firms. To assess the importance of informality
for firm flexibility, other potentially influencing factors must be considered and
their influence compared to that of informality.
Flexibility, informality and firm success: It has been argued that global markets de-
mand flexibility. Operating with a certain degree of flexibility is assumed to in-
crease the success of firms. What has not been analysed in this work is whether
a higher degree of flexibility has an effect on the success figures of firms, such as
sales or sales growth. If it can be empirically proven that flexibility increases firms’
success, then informal behaviour can also be assumed to be related to measurable
success figures. It is, therefore, worth studying whether informality has a direct
effect on firm performance.
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Persistence of informality and upgrading of firms: Informality seems to be a suitable
concept when firms are required to serve market demand in manufacturing pro-
cesses quickly. To keep their competitive edge, firms in the GPRD are forced to up-
grade their manufacturing activities and invest in innovation activities. Innovation-
related knowledge, partners and contracts are more sensitive. More intensive stud-
ies are required to establish whether informality will remain important for firms
in upgrading processes. It is expected that trust is more necessary for informal
knowledge transfer, but that contracts or patents will become more formalised.
Transferability to other regions: In the GPRD region, there are indications that infor-
mal modes of interaction enhance flexibility. It has been argued that this region
seems to be suitable for proving this model due to the two different institutional
settings. But nevertheless, there is not yet empirical evidence which illustrates
to what extent this phenomenon is limited to the GPRD region, or whether the
concept is transferable to other regions as well. To conceptualise or theorise the
findings of this study, a similar study in other regions is recommended. It is recom-
mended that any such study should (1) concentrate on regions with two different
institutional settings (for example Singapore/Malaysia, USA/Mexico), (2) consider
other Asian agglomerations in order to establish whether this is a uniquely Asian
phenomenon (for example the Shanghai or Beijing regions, the Bangkok region,
the Seoul region) and (3) apply the same criteria to Western agglomerations (for
example Austria/Hungary, Finland/Estonia).
Transferability to other sectors: This study concentrated on the electronics industry,
but the transferability of the phenomenon to other sectors should be investigated.
Differences might occur when observing low-technology sectors, such as the textile
industry, in comparison to high-technology sectors, such as biotechnology.
Learning effects for German enterprises: In case the concept of informality and flexi-
bility is evident not only for the GPRD region, but also in other regions, one should
consider what German enterprises can learn from this business model. The West-
ern business culture seems to be more formalised than the business environment
in the GPRD. It would be valuable to analyse what capacity German firms have
to adapt to this business model and how this could contribute to their business
success.
Although the research focus in this work is limited and additional research is needed,
an attempt has been made to derive implications for politicians in HK and the PRD
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to increase the competitiveness of the region. This also refers to research question K.
The empirical findings revealed trends in the economic development which should be
considered or further emphasised by politicians in the future.
Policy Implications
Definition and concentration on strengths in HK: HK is, in many ways, still the gate-
way to the PRD, but the capabilities of PRD firms are increasing and they can
now compete in certain areas formerly thought of as the sphere of HK firms, for
example simple service, innovation activities. HK must clearly define its future
role in the GPRD and concentrate on its strengths in order to benefit from the
unique setting in the GPRD.
Developing a global service hub in HK: HK should continue to consciously develop
itself towards being a global hub of sophisticated services. Legal services, for ex-
ample, provide potential for upgrading the service activities. In doing so, informal
modes of firm behaviour should be considered and taken advantage of. As the
value chain becomes more fragmented, a variety of special legal services is needed
to conclude (international) contracts. Furthermore, service centres for different
dispute resolution techniques should be further developed, for example arbitration
and mediation centres. Supporting firms in finding the appropriate method of
dispute resolution enhances their competitiveness. HK should establish itself as a
service hub not only for firms in the GPRD, but also for firms in the Shanghai or
Beijing regions.
Strengthening the interaction between HK and the PRD: HK politicians should
continue to work intensively with regional stakeholders in the PRD. Only cooper-
ation and a development of common strategies can provide the basis for regional
competitiveness. Inconsistent or competing aims waste valuable resources. An or-
ganisation should be developed which provides a framework for interaction between
regional stakeholders in HK and the PRD.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence gives rise to recommendations for electronics
firms in the GPRD to optimise and evaluate their business activities. Recommendations
for firm managers in HK and the PRD are based on ideas derived mainly from interviews
with firms and regional stakeholders.
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Recommendations for Firms
Innovative capitalisation on cross-border business activities: Firms in HK and the
PRD still gain a significant advantage from cross-border business relationships,
for example due to better market access, a more intimate knowledge of global
demand, greater predictability of markets or a sophisticated set of financial and
other business-related services. HK and PRD firms should continue to capitalise
on the opportunities to combine their resources in order to successfully operate on
markets. Competition should be avoided.
Use informal strategies as an opportunity: Many HK firms view informality as an in-
ferior business strategy when compared with the highly formalised ways of doing
business in Western economies. However, the findings suggest that informality
is an opportunity to increase flexibility and responsiveness, even if business en-
vironments are improving and formal ways of doing business are becoming more
feasible. PRD firms should follow the HK example of using a balance of informal
and formal modes of behaviour in order to reach the greatest flexibility.
Improve predictability of changing market conditions: The need to adjust produc-
tion processes quickly often arises from difficulties in predicting changes on mar-
kets. HK firms have an edge over PRD firms in this respect. HK firms should
interact closely with global customers and transfer forecast information to their
PRD producers. Only a sharing of information furthers the regional competitive
advantage.
Transform the organisation of customer producer relations: A wholly-owned produc-
tion plant in the PRD is still efficient, but close cooperation with Chinese producers
turned out to be a flexible alternative. In the future, firms in HK should concen-
trate on their competitive advantage (product quality, marketing, innovativeness)
and rely on qualified Chinese producers rather than operating their own production
plant in the PRD.
Combine formal and informal recruitment processes of partners: Firms in HK shall
continue to combine formal and informal modes for contacting and selecting cus-
tomers and producers. Informal modes, such as personal contacts, are a reliable
and quick way to select producers. Formal modes take into account objective
measurements such as expertise and quality. HK firms are thus recommended to
consciously establish an efficient selecting and contacting system for producers to
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ensure high quality and flexibility in their production processes. PRD firms should
learn from HK firms in this respect, as quality measurements are underemphasised
in their priority catalogue.
Considering dynamic rather than static contracting models: More firms in HK and
the PRD should consider concluding framework agreements in advance in order to
reduce the negotiation time when actual orders are placed. This enhances their
speed to market since the production process starts without delay. It is more time-
consuming to consider all necessary details in a direct contracting process when
an order is placed.
Favour appropriate and reliable modes of dispute resolution: HK firms use informal
and quick conflict solution mechanisms, such as negotiation, but do not hesitate
to use legal action as well when informal mechanisms fail. PRD firms rely mainly
on negotiations. They are recommended to consider other forms of contract en-
forcement if appropriate and feasible.
This work showed that the call of Yeung (2007) and Yeung and Lin (2003) for a
research agenda for Asian firms corresponds with the empirical findings in the GPRD.
Informal modes in interactions enhance the flexibility of firms. Firms in the GPRD
use this strategy to compete successfully in the low-cost production of electronic items.
Although this work only took into account the organisation of customer producer rela-
tions, it can be concluded that the idea of a special business model for firms in Asia must
be strengthened. The findings of this work encourage and invite others to follow and
further conceptualise the idea. The theoretical approaches and empirical findings for a
new concept provided in this work are from the point of view of economic geography.
This view should be combined with perspectives from other disciplines in order to reach
a comprehensive model of business organisation in Asia which explains the success of
firms.
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Appendix A Definition of Electronics Industry
according to Statistical Standards
231
Table A.1: Definition of product classification in the electronics industry according to
statistical standards
Level Name Digits
Inter-
na-
tional
and
Hong
Kong
(HK)-
SITC
Rev. 3a
• 75 Office machines and automatic data-processing machines
• 76 Telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing
apparatus and equipment
• 77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances
• 87 Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and
apparatus
• 88 Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and
optical goods
China HS
2002b • 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical
appliances
• 85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof;
sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound
recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such
articles
• 90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring,
checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and
apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
aHong Kong Standard International Trade Classification
bHarmonised System
Source: United Nations Statistics Devision, World Customs Organization
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Table A.2: Definition of activity classification in the electronics industry according to
statistical standards
Level Name Digits
Inter-
national
ISIC
Rev. 3a • 30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery
• 31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
• 32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication
equipment and apparatus
• 33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments,
watches and clocks
Hong
Kong
HSIC
Ver.
1.1b
• 383 Radio, television and communication equipment and
apparatus
• 384 Electronic parts and components
• 385 Electrical appliances and houseware and electronic toys
• 386-387 Machinery, equipment, apparatus, parts and
components
• 389 Professional scientific, measuring controlling equipment
China GB/-
T4754--
2002
• 39 Manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment
• 40 Manufacture of communication equipment, computers and
other electronic equipment
• 41 Manufacture of instruments, meters and machinery for
cultural and office use
aInternational Standard Industrial Classification
bHong Kong Standard Industrial Classification
Source: United Nations Statistics Devision, Census and Statistics Depart-
ment Hong Kong, National Bureau of Statistics of China
233
Appendix B Test of Multicollinearity for
Generalised Ordered Logit Models
234
Table B.1: Pearson correlation coefficient of variables used in GOL (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Location China 1
(2) Working exper. 0.153 1
(3) Dependency 0.482 0.237 1
(4) Time negotiation −0.246 −0.093 −0.127 1
(5) Predictability −0.038 −0.002 −0.039 0.101 1
(6) Unit in HK −0.359 0.050 −0.204 0.132 −0.061 1
(7) Unit family led −0.020 −0.063 −0.079 0.033 0.014 0.067 1
(8) Unit linked −0.041 −0.177 −0.030 −0.045 0.019 −0.031 −0.208 1
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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Appendix C Test of the Parallel Regression
Assumption
237
Table C.1: Brant-Test for ordered logit models
χ2 p > χ2 df
All 74.36 0 20
Core PRD 3.96 0.138 2
Working experience 0.99 0.610 2
Time for negotiation 1.75 0.417 2
Innovativeness 1.53 0.465 2
Dependency 4.75 0.093a 2
Predictability of producer information 0.45 0.797 2
Position in VC 0.93 0.628 2
Employees 4.13 0.127 2
Foundation year 3.73 0.155 2
Sales growth 0.37 0.832 2
aA significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated
Source: Calculation based on own survey conducted in DFG SPP 1233 [2007]
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